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IDEALS AND PRACTICE (II)

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PART II

8. Two types of conception of a Way of Life are important for a consideration of the question of the forming and testing of ideals of conduct, and consequently for a consideration of our questions regarding the relation of ideals to practice. The one type is more, the other type less general. The one has reference to man as man, the other to particular classes of man, with relation to their specific function in society. The former issues in the idea of a universal ethic, the latter in the idea of a professional code. Thus the former has a wider generality, the latter has a greater concreteness. Ethical progress seems to me to require that both types should be kept in view, and used to guide man's efforts.

Let us look first at the notion of a way of life, from various standpoints, beginning as concretely as possible.

We may start with a particular individual. His life will include a number of detailed activities: those e.g. of his trade or profession, those arising out of his interests in literature and the arts, in the sciences, in politics, in religion, etc., those connected with his home and social life, physical activities of various sorts. It is clear that individuals differ not only in regard to the particular items in this list, but also in the degrees of importance attached to particular items. Granting that the activities are engaged in because each is preferred to any other, in its proper time and place, still one may be regarded as central and of greater importance than the rest, so that they will be set aside if they interfere with it. Thus in giving an account of a way of life as a combination of activities, the question of the balance of these activities is important.

Besides this, the spirit in which the activities are engaged in is important. There may be a single general aim pervading the whole life, e.g. the spirit of social service, so that the various activities will be felt to need justification not merely because of a personal preference for them, but also because they are thought of in relation to some form of social service, some directly, some as a condition of physical and mental fitness. Or some particular motive—e.g. ambition—may pervade the spirit of the main activity. Or the various activities may be coloured each in its own way by ambition, so that the aim is simply to shine in whatever one does. Or again, social prestige may be the aim, activities being engaged in so far as they are judged (or felt) to be suitable means towards this. There is no need to elaborate; it is clear that there are great differences both in spirit and in the way in which a particular spirit is shown in the various activities. It is also clear that there are great differences in respect of the consistency with which a particular spirit is maintained over various activities: one spirit may animate one set of activities, another spirit another set, or there may be a change of spirit in regard to the same activity at different times, as in the classical example of Plato's description of the Democratic man in the *Republic*.

If we are to speak of a Way of Life as something which can serve as a Type, we must do so by supposing a life characterized by a particular spirit with something like single-mindedness, as Plato does in his typification of the Ideal man, the Timocratic man, etc. And we must recognize that the activities of ordinary men are rarely penetrated by a single spirit so persistently as to conform to any single type.

This raises an interesting problem. In Plato's types, the spirit of the life is described as more appropriately manifested in certain kinds of activity than in others; as if the reason-loving life required for its consummation the study of dialectic and the exercise of rule in an ideal city, while the life animated by the love of honour required military duties, all else being subordinated to these, and so on. This is obviously too narrow a conception of a type, from the modern point of view. The range of activities that can be connected with any particular spirit is much wider than Plato suggests, so that there is for us a far greater variety of possible lives coming under any typical way of life expressing a particular spirit. A life devoted to the service of God, for instance, no longer requires for its most appropriate activities those of the priesthood. I think that modern feeling would permit a much wider alternative. The educator and the doctor (or perhaps the nurse) come into mind at once; but their activities have had close associations with the priesthood for ages. But almost any occupation which makes a positive contribution

to the arts of peace can be penetrated with the spirit of the service of God. That the arts of war are appropriate means to this service would be denied by some people but affirmed by others. A life inspired by social service, or by the pursuit of honour, or of gain, or of knowledge, or of comfort, is equally free from limitation to some single set of activities. Thus nowadays we seem to be at a point diametrically opposite to that suggested by Plato's treatment. Instead of the spirit of a life dictating what kinds of activity are to be engaged in, we seem to hold that a wide variety of types of activity can manifest a single spirit; and again, that a single type of activity can be pursued in a very different spirit by different persons.

There is in this difference from Plato a loss as well as a gain, but I shall deal with this point later.

We may take as an example the Christian spirit. It is, of course, not possible to give a single definitive account of what it involves at the present day, or of what it has involved at different periods in the past. Strictly speaking perhaps it ought not to be referred to in the singular. In any of its forms, it needs for its explication a number of principles, all of which are felt to be its partial expression. It has changed greatly in the course of its history, blending with and making its own doctrines which at an earlier period it opposed. What can be said is that the Christian Way of Life is defined in terms of a doctrine of God and of man, an attitude of mind, and a set of principles, and not in terms of a set of specific activities. I do not wish to attempt to say what is or is not essential to it. But with some hesitation I would say that at the present time the chief concern of some of its exponents seems to be to stress the points of difference between itself and a doctrine of a Way of Life with which it has many points in common. Consider a doctrine whose central ideas are those of the fatherhood of God and the brotherhood of man, with love as the dominant attitude conditioning all behaviour; of the overwhelming worth of the human soul, by comparison with anything material. Purity and integrity of soul, honesty not only of purpose but of means. A programme of social betterment, seeking full equality of personal rights for all human beings. This doctrine would lead to principles of conduct making for unselfishness and helpfulness, discouraging trickery and deceit. It would encourage the pursuit of a humanitarian programme, backed by all the resources of modern science and technical invention and organization, which sought to improve the material conditions of life with the purpose of making possible the full realization of man's personality; to conquer disease, banish uncertainty about the means of livelihood, and endeavour to spread a love of the beautiful in nature and in art, and an interest in human culture, so as to enable the ordinary man to live this life worthily. There is nothing uniquely christian

in all this, and much of it is due to the influence of thinkers who were deeply hostile to the official christianity of their day, however much some of it may have been influenced by christian writings. Indeed, I think it would be branded by many exponents of christian doctrine to-day as profoundly anti-christian, when taken by itself, though as part of christian doctrine, and with proper safeguards, they would approve of it. What it lacks, they would say, is any stress on the sinfulness of man. It explains man's shortcomings by reference to the idea of a development from animal beginnings, and does not see them as the result of a deliberate turning of man away from God, as the result of his estrangement from God. It makes the love of God for man too easy a thing, makes God too complacent. It fails to see that not even infinite love can forgive sin without a penalty being paid, and that repentance and an endeavour to reform are not enough. God's love is shown in the fact that He Himself paid the penalty necessary for the forgiveness of man's sins. Thus Christ's death on the cross is man's gateway to life, and there is no walking in the Way for anyone who does not perennially bear this fact in his heart. A theistic humanism which leaves all this aside, these exponents of christian doctrine would say, which forgets man's sinfulness and the price of forgiveness, very easily forgets also man's dependence on God, cultivates pride in human personality, thinks of man as God's helper in the cosmic process, thinks next of God as depending on man, and easily ends by denying God altogether. Thus theistic humanitarianism with its doctrine of progress readily slips into a humanitarianism without a God. This, however, is not the worst, the exposition goes on to say. When man proclaims as his goal man's mastery over the world, his pride ministers to his passions and he ends not in a desire for human equality, but in a desire for dominance over men as well as over the material world. This dismal prognostication causes many exponents of christian doctrine to concentrate their attacks not on the theistic but on the secularistic form of humanitarianism, and the particular points of emphasis in their exposition depend on this fact.

Now if we consider the two sharply antithetic views, the christian view as just described (which for the sake of brevity I shall call simply the "christian" view in the rest of this section, without suggesting that it is "the" christian view) on the one hand, and that of secularistic humanism on the other, we see that while verbally the same ethical principles can be enunciated by both, the background and the spirit is very different in the two cases. Humility and obedience to God in the one case, self-respect and a self-imposed goal to be attained in the other. The former is more likely than the latter to regard its principles as commands which ought to be obeyed by everybody, here and now, regardless of conditions and of

consequences. The latter is more likely to regard them as an expression of ideals of behaviour, to work towards, by producing social and material conditions favourable for them. For the former, breaches of the principles are sin, and sin entails suffering. For the latter, breaches of the principles are a natural result of imperfect conditions, whether of upbringing or of environment, and punishment is often a brutal and unintelligent way of dealing with them. For the former, suffering somehow forms an essential element in the life of the universe, and the readiness to suffer on behalf of those we love is sanctified by the Divine example. For the latter, suffering, like disease, is largely due to man's ignorance, and a great deal of it is unnecessary evil. For the former, the goal is union with God, for the latter, a realization of man's potentialities on earth. If the difference between these two points of view, so far as everyday conduct is concerned, is not always very obvious, it is because many who regard themselves as christians behave more in accordance with humanitarian ideas and do not give so much prominence to the tragic side of christian doctrine.

The chief difference, and the one on which I want to lay stress at this point, is in the attitude toward the problems arising out of social and political and business activities. The secularistic humanitarian has to work toward a state of affairs which does not exist. He has no guarantee that it ever will exist. Whether it will, must depend on the efforts of himself and of those willing to co-operate with him. He cannot rely on the active support of an infinite benign power, so as to be confident that if he makes his actual conduct here and now conform to the principles he regards as ideal, he can leave the outcome to God. He is compelled to be circumspect. How much of the ideal he can realize, will depend on the quality of his insight into actual conditions, and of his statesmanship. The christian on the other hand has been given a firm assurance, not indeed that God will make the world a place in which it is easy to do His will—not indeed that God will make the world any different a place than it is now—but that it is His will that man should obey His commands, live the Way of Life revealed by Him, regardless of the consequences either socially or politically or in the way of business. And even though he cannot always bring himself to accept this assurance, the christian can always feel that God is on the side of the right and the good, that the struggle with evil is not left to man alone, and that in consequence full obedience to the highest principles of conduct here and now would always be the best practical politics, both for the individual in his private affairs, and for groups and societies, in their activities affecting the community.

I have made the contrast between the two extremes as sharp as possible for the sake of clearness of exposition, and to bring out

what is involved in one of the most clear-cut conceptions of the christian Way of Life, and of the principles of behaviour resulting therefrom. I think that at the present time the vast majority of those who call themselves christians hold views which fall somewhere between the two extremes I have described; that a great many of them could be described as theistic humanitarians, and that a great many do in practice adopt the policy of secularistic humanitarianism. This remark is meant to be purely descriptive and is not intended to convey a criticism. I do not think it is a valid objection against a man's attitude of life to say that his views do not tally at all points with those of an easily classifiable type. Life is very complex. Types are valuable for descriptive purposes; they do not by themselves provide a criterion of soundness of doctrine.

9. It will be clear from what I have said, I think, that the christian Way of Life, as I have described it, gives expression to a spirit which is intended to animate every man's whole activity, whatever his calling, in his private and public affairs alike. In this it is very different from what I spoke of as the Platonic type, which requires for its expression reference to a particular kind of activity.

The problems raised by the view that it is the christian's duty to follow the christian Way of Life here and now can best be brought out by a quotation from Professor Tawney's *Religion and the Rise of Capitalism*. "The most crucial and the most difficult of all political questions," he says, "is that which turns on the difference between public and private morality. The problem which it presents in the relations between States is a commonplace. But, since its essence is the difficulty of applying the same moral standard to decisions which affect large masses of men as to those in which only individuals are involved, it emerges in a hardly less acute form in the sphere of economic life, as soon as its connections ramify widely, and the unit is no longer the solitary producer, but a group. To argue, in the manner of Machiavelli, that there is one rule for business and another for private life, is to open a door to an orgy of unscrupulousness before which the mind recoils. To argue that there is no difference at all, is to lay down a principle which few men who have faced the difficulty in practice will be prepared to endorse as of invariable application, and incidentally to expose the idea of morality itself to discredit by subjecting it to an almost intolerable strain. The practical result of sentimentality is too often a violent reaction towards the baser kinds of *Realpolitik*."[1]

"The difficulty of applying the same moral standard to decisions which affect large masses of men as to those in which only individuals are involved"; there is the crux for Professor Tawney. With that I

[1] Standard Edition, p. 183. Pelican Reprint, p. 170.

fully agree. And I think that some light can be thrown on the problem by a consideration of the second type of conception of a Way of Life of which I spoke in §8, viz., that which has reference to particular classes of men, with reference to their specific function in society: which, I suggested, gives rise to the idea of a professional code. This type I shall now proceed to consider.

10. When a number of individuals gain their livelihood by following a specialized set of activities, they develop common interests and gradually form themselves into a craft or a profession. And the craft or professional spirit becomes something of which they are clearly conscious as marking them off from the rest of their fellows; as a source of pride, on the ground that they possess a skill and a knowledge other men do not possess. From this springs a variety of tendencies and feelings which may conflict, though they do not necessarily do so. On the one hand is a desire to make the most of this skill for their own advantage; and on the other hand is a desire to display this skill in fine craftsmanship, and a tendency to criticize bad work, and to object to the intrusion of outsiders who have not been through the recognized course of apprenticeship.

Law and medicine are outstanding examples. In medicine the determining factor is the peculiar relation between practitioner and patient. It is not merely that in general the patient is ignorant and without resources in medical and surgical matters; it is also that he is in distress and in no state to look after his own interests. *Caveat emptor* would be a mockery in his case. He needs someone whom he can trust, not merely to be well meaning, but to be well informed and skilful. He would be easy prey for the unscrupulous quack. An uncontrolled situation of this sort is objectionable from many points of view. Both the skilled practitioner and the patient need protection against the quack, and thus the interest of those most concerned is in favour of a professional standard. Further, a situation in which a sick patient is taken advantage of by an unscrupulous practitioner revolts the feelings. Again, the course of training of the practitioner is such as to encourage in the best minds habits of patient watchfulness and service of nature, a desire for truth, a readiness to undergo discipline at the hands of fact. And these qualities are on the whole more friendly than otherwise to honesty of purpose and straight dealing, although the connection is not inevitable. On the whole the expert tends to despise the quack, as well as hating him as a menace. Thus a combination of forces arising out of the entire situation in which the medical art is developed, tends to stress the need for an organization which will be some guarantee that the practitioner shall have a certain degree of reliability of skill and knowledge, and that he shall be able to be trusted to treat his patients for their benefit and not take advantage

of them (as Plato puts it in Book I of the *Republic*) for his own greater gain.

Here, then, is a Way of Life which in its own concrete set of activities tends to bring into prominence certain controlling principles of conduct, whose justification can be seen to be connected with the activities themselves. The activities are a response to obvious human needs, and the principles are required for the satisfaction of these needs. The valuations which arise in connection with the activities are subject to what might be called a day to day test. We consider the situation not merely in its generality, but in its normal setting. If doctors were a hated and oppressed class in the community enjoying a brief respite from their misery only while they were being utilized in providing cures, it would not be so easy to condemn a doctor for taking what advantage he could of a patient. If we looked on illness as a divine punishment for wrongdoing, so that the use of a doctor was an attempt to escape merited punishment, we should regard even a trustworthy doctor as objectionable. As it is, we approve of health, and of the use of doctors for gaining it; we approve (on the whole) of the methods used in the medical and scientific world for gaining the knowledge of diseases necessary for medical practice. This being so, we can see how greatly mankind has gained by the activities of medical men. Thus the patient-doctor situation is connected with a variety of other situations in a concrete setting, and our valuations in regard to it are connected with our valuations in regard to them. We can see that the situation requires a certain kind of behaviour in the doctor. We can see also (under present-day conditions) that the principle that doctors should behave in this way is no mere ideal, liable to make over-great demands on the profession, but is actually practicable in the existing situation; that so far from endangering the function the medical profession has to perform in society, it rather enhances it. But this is only because of the long series of steps taken by medical men themselves in the past to ensure adequate training and discipline for all the members of the profession. If on the contrary the situation in medicine were such that few men could succeed in it without at least on some occasions taking advantage of some of their patients, so that a rigorous adhesion to good principles would result in the profession becoming top-heavy with the unscrupulous, then I do not think that our judgment would be quite as simple. We should judge the entire situation imperfect, and hold it good that changes should be made, but I do not think that most people would expect the best men to act rigorously regardless of consequences. We should judge it imperative to seek for ways by which the hands of the best men might be strengthened so as to make it possible to change the conditions in which they had to work—in

short, given sufficient wisdom, we might judge desirable just some such course of events as that by which the medical profession has in fact developed its code of professional behaviour. That the code is still far from perfect, is clear, but it has not ceased to develop.

The case of law is more complex and would involve more discussion than I have space for. But that the lawyer advising a client should consider the best interest of the client, and that he should not disclose or use for his own advantage anything communicated to him by his client; that the judge administering the law should be impartial and should be guided by the law as interpreted in the light of the whole legal tradition of his country: such principles as these seem to arise out of reflexion on the legal activities themselves, and to find their justification in the entire situation within which these activities take place. And the development of conditions which encourage conduct of this sort, the building up of a profession with a socially recognized status and with power to maintain a code of professional behaviour among its members, has been the work of the men engaging in the activities. They have built up a conception of a Way of Life based on a tradition and animated by a spirit which has much in common with that of the medical profession, but which contains much special to itself.

Without going into details in any other cases, we may think of the principles which have come to express the spirit of the military profession: discipline, obedience to orders of a superior, comradeship, readiness to sacrifice oneself in the course of duty, and so on; or those of the scientific investigator: to draw only tentative conclusions, to submit one's tentative conclusions to carefully designed test by scrupulous examination of fact, to publish discoveries as quickly and as widely as possible, and co-operate with other workers in the same field; or those of the historian, especially in regard to the critical use of documents, and the preservation of material for future historians. In regard to scholarship and scientific research, logicians have noted that, while there are certain principles common to all, different fields of investigation have different principles of method specially appropriate to them; but principles of method are not merely a subject for the logician, but for the moralist as well. The "logic" of historical method is a moral code as well; so is the "logic" of scientific method. Each worker in a special field tends to "develop a conscience" in regard to that field.

These examples, sketchy and inadequate as they are, will suffice to illustrate the general point that there are principles which have special relevance to particular types of activity, which are as it were nourished by the activity however little they may be heeded elsewhere. The maintenance of these principles has been seen to be

an important objective by those engaging in the activities. Thus there emerges, I think, a second type of conception, more akin to Plato's, of a Way of Life closely related to a specific set of activities, with its own particular spirit, expressed by principles specially appropriate to it. Where the christian Way of Life gives rise to a universal ethic, claiming applicability to all men under all conditions, claiming man's allegiance regardless of consequences, this second type of Way of Life gives rise to the notion of a professional code, binding on a particular class of men, and enforceable because conditions have been produced within the profession which show the maintenance of the code to be in the interests of the general public, the practitioner's clients, his fellow practitioners, and the practitioner himself. I use the word "interests" here not in a narrowly utilitarian sense. Whatever I value is included in "my interests." The principles of a universal ethic sketch the good life without reference to circumstances, point the general direction for man; those of a professional code refer to the particular incidents of a particular kind of journey, chart the dangers and show how they are to be avoided. Perhaps, following the picturesque example of Bacon, we might call the one type of principle, principles of the compass, the other type, principles of the rocks. The compass gives the direction for the whole voyage; but rocks are to be avoided, and it is only a chart of the rocks that can tell you how to steer when you are among them. You may be so intent on avoiding rocks that you forget that you are making a journey, or so intent on your compass that you steer on to the rocks. What we have to do is to remember both things.

II. The examples taken from professional activities suggest two things. First, that different activities have their own specific contribution to make to our conception of what is valuable: a value hitherto unregarded by men in general coming to be stressed by a particular set of professional workers, and gradually making its way to recognition elsewhere. Second, that different activities have their own special dangers to guard against. Organization into a profession has proceeded further in some fields than in others. Thus different standards of behaviour are to be expected in different fields. While, for instance, new remedies for diseases are made available for common use without the discoverer exploiting them for his own advantage, new processes in industry are often kept secret for the financial advantage of the exploiter, or if made public, are at least patented and a royalty exacted for their use. The whole of the conditions in industry have to be taken into account before an adequate judgment can be passed on this kind of behaviour; the fact of competition, the expense of scrapping old machinery and setting up new, the desirability or otherwise of encouraging

small producers, the dependence of employees for a livelihood on their employers continuing to make profits. It is no use to take a single feature in isolation, judge that it is bad, and insist that it be cut out forthwith. We have to take the entire situation into account, and often our condemnation must be transferred to it. It was fashionable at the end of the 17th Century to argue that many things appeared evil in the universe when taken by themselves which were seen to increase the beauty of the whole when taken in their setting. I am not prepared to accept such an argument as final. What is to be said is that when we find some feature which we regard as objectionable, we cannot take it for granted that the best way of remedying the situation is to cut out the offending feature directly. It may be necessary to take a more roundabout way and deal with the situation as a whole, modifying it so that the objectionable feature no longer arises. What can be done in one set of circumstances may not be able to be done in another set. And thus, as I have said, we must expect to find different standards of behaviour in different fields of activity. The example of professional organizations shows one way in which the problem of raising standards of behaviour can be dealt with, by a process whose possibilities are by no means fully exhausted.

A further important point emerges. A code of professional behaviour is addressed not to the solitary individual in his private capacity, but to every member of the profession in his professional activity. It thus meets one of the requirements laid down by Professor Tawney in the passage already quoted. It neither "subjects morality to an almost intolerable strain" nor "opens a door to an orgy of unscrupulousness."

The general conception of principles of behaviour to which I am pointing, while making intelligible and (I think) valuable the suggestion that we should expect different modes of behaviour (on different ethical levels) in different fields of activity, also indicates the need for constant effort to raise the ethical level in every field. The compass—the highest ideal we can conceive of the life of man as we feel and think it ought to be—must never be left out of sight. And this brings me to an important part of my view. I think it is important for men when acting in a private capacity to endeavour to come closer to their ideal than they may think possible in their professional activities. There is no need to suppose that an individual is guilty of inconsistency or of compromise who shows e.g. more charity in his private life than he does in his business. No one would accuse of inconsistency a magistrate who imposes a fine on an offender and then pays the fine himself, for he is acting in two capacities. In the same way, there is no ground for accusing of inconsistency a business man who in the course of business tries to

get ahead of his competitors by using information he is careful not to disclose to them, while in his private life he behaves unselfishly. What is objectionable is not the following of different codes, but the acceptance of the lower code as final and inevitable in its own sphere. An extension of the development of professional associations, so as to keep the individual in his business capacity keyed up to at least a minimum standard, and so as to assure him that successful efforts have been made in the past, and that efforts can still be made with success, to raise the standards, is the best antidote. The best guarantee that low standards in business will be recognized as low, is for men to practise higher standards outside business. But if this recognition is to lead to efforts at improvement in any particular field, there must be an active and powerful organization of the men engaged in this field which has this improvement as one of its direct aims. The professional organizations in medicine and law and elsewhere have shown what can be done; how much more can be done in future, and how much remains to be done, can be seen from a study of the books of C. F. Taeusch (for America) and of Carr-Saunders and Wilson (for England).[1] Where there are such activities, they can be greatly helped by the individual in his private life endeavouring to maintain a higher standard still; for it is likely to result in steady pressure within the profession toward the raising of the standard there.

12. I can now proceed to a general discussion of the question of how our ideals should guide our practice, with special reference to the ideals of the first kind, whose principles I called principles of the compass. I took the christian conception as an illustration, and contrasted it with humanitarianism, theistic and secular, which give different ideals. But these are not the only ones. There is indeed a multiplicity of such ideals, all striving to gain our acceptance. Rational considerations may predominate in the building up of an ideal. The idea of a natural law for man, discoverable by reason, has been familiar from the times of the Stoics. It had an influence on the development of Roman law, was incorporated into the thought of many medieval christian philosophers, and had a decisive effect on the political thinking of such men as Grotius and Locke. Its influence persists. The subversive eye of reason looks coldly and uncomprehendingly on vested interests and class privileges, and builds up a conception of life based on human rights which is very different from life as it is actually lived. And since man thinks not with a fragment of himself located in his head, but with his whole being, his conception of a rationally ideal life becomes filled out into a picture of a joyous life freed from the

[1] C. F. Taeusch, *Professional and Business Ethics*. A. M. Carr-Saunders and P. Wilson, *The Professions*.

miseries and fears imposed by man on man, in which the individual is helped to bear inevitable ills by the loving care of his fellows.

There are many other ways by which a picture of an ideal life is built up. Feeling or imagination may play the predominant part instead of reason. There is then in any community a great diversity of ideals of this first kind, so that we should speak not of one compass, but of many, each put forward as giving the true direction.

What should be our attitude toward our ideal? We have to take it seriously, and to act upon it so far as we can. It is our goal, and we must aim at it. There are various attitudes men have adopted. They may seek to win adherents to their ideal and start a revolution, on a small or a large scale, to bring some part of their ideal into existence by direct action. Or they may proceed to act on some part of it, themselves, hoping that other persons will follow. On the other hand are those who feel that a multitude of small steps is necessary if the gap between the actual and the ideal is to be safely passed, and who are content to move slowly. The professional organizations were built up partly in this way, though some of the steps forward even here were the result of the courage of men who, acting on their ideal, dared to defy their professional code, where it seemed to fall short.

I do not think that any decision can be made about the wisdom of any of these ways, when the situation is left thus general. Something, however, can be said.

In the first place, I do not think that there is any way of proving that an ideal is a good one, so long as it remains merely an ideal. The only way to test it is by relation to actual practice. This point is in favour of the revolutionaries, who have an experimentalist's attitude to life. On the other hand, however fully an ideal may be sketched, important details must be lacking. You can be sure that there would be many surprises for you, if you were transplanted into a situation which did embody your ideal. There is much to be learned from the story of King Midas, or from Mr. Wells's *Invisible Man*, or his *Country of the Blind*. To seek to realize an ideal is an adventure and involves risk. For an ideal, however ultimate it may seem, is provisional and subject to revision.

In those engaged in this adventure there is sometimes a tendency to suppose that if the objectionable features of the existing situation were cut out, all the valuable features would remain. This supposition is not always justified. As a minor but familiar example, consider the small lies, the petty evasions, the flattery and "tact" which almost inevitably accompany friendly social relationships. An attempt straightway to cut out all tact of the kind felt to be objectionable, is likely to produce not a better but a worsened situation. Good and bad elements are so delicately interwoven in

the fabric of society that much circumspectness is needed on the part of the reformer, if he wishes to succeed in his aims.

This, however, is not an excuse for refusing to see the bad elements, or for taking no steps. Our policy, I think, should be to continue to judge the situation in the light of the ideal, keep the ideal steadily before us as a goal. *What the ideal demands* is here fundamental. It is our compass. But in seeking to work towards this goal, we must keep our eyes fixed on the existing situation, and try to discover what changes can be made in it which will lead towards the goal. Only on the basis of *what the situation permits*, have we any right to act. We must have our chart of the rocks and currents. What the ideal demands must here take secondary place. By these two guides, what the ideal demands and what the situation permits, our action must be determined. This does not mean that we should never break violently with existing states of affairs, never be revolutionaries, always follow a path of slow evolution. There is no such general principle. This is entirely a matter which depends on the nature of the actual situation before us. In some cases a violent break is the best policy. In some cases it will fail. And only the highest type of statesmanship can determine, in such matters as those concerning social changes affecting a large number of people, whether a sharp break or a slow evolution is the wise policy in any actual case.

The zealous reformer is apt to be impatient with such counsels of caution. He feels that people do not need to be told to be circumspect, but rather to be spurred on to act. Natural inertia makes men only too ready to conclude that the situation permits nothing at all. What we need is an ideal that can be put before men as making an absolute claim on them, something that should not be (as the saying is) compromised with, something they should be ready to follow resolutely, whatever immediate consequences may result. What can reforming zeal do with an ideal that may turn out not to be in all respects sound, and with the injunction not to practise it straightway, but to put it into operation only so far as the situation permits? How could you overcome the inertia of the ordinary man with so faint-hearted a clarion call as this? It is not as if even small changes can be made without opposition; there are forces of evil working in the opposite direction, using as allies the ordinary man's natural conservatism and his natural unwillingness to make a fuss; and only the sternest struggle will enable us to make progress. It is a bitter war in which the reformer is engaged, and morale is all important. For him there are no times of peace. The only way to make ultimate victory even remotely possible is to key men up to the highest pitch of enthusiasm. Circumspectness is here a hindrance.

It is feelings such as these, I think, that make men unwilling to advocate anything but the actual putting of the ideal into practice,

immediately; and make them feel that to do anything which falls short of the ideal is itself to fall short of the ideal, to compromise with the ideal.

But if the view I have been suggesting is correct, then it is a mistake to suppose that we are compromising with our ideals if we do anything but follow them implicitly. This mistake can result from an over simple view of the nature and function of an ideal, i.e. from forgetting that action must be conditioned not merely by what the ideal demands, but also by what the situation permits. To be guided by the situation is not to compromise with the ideal. It is to use the ideal as the ideal should be used. Or again, the mistake can arise from an over hasty generalization about the value of revolutionary changes. It is true that some of the most important changes wrought in the world have been connected with revolutionary breaks with the past. But this cannot be generalized. Many of the most radical changes have crept into the world in far less spectacular fashion. I think myself that both cataclysms and gradual changes are to be found in the history of any particular line of progress. A violent outbreak, followed by fallings back, with slow progress; or again, slow progress followed by a violent outbreak, with further slow progress: we have both sequences. The two forms of progress intermingle. It is true that the revolutionaries, those who, as the saying is, "refuse to compromise," hold the imagination and can fire enthusiasm; but there are occasions in plenty when this spirit hinders rather than makes for progress, and where less spectacular policies are more sure. It is for the situation to decide; and if there are occasions where a sharp break succeeds better than a gradual change, this is not because a gradual change involves compromising with the ideal, and because compromising with the ideal is objectionable, but *because the situation itself is best met on these occasions by a sharp break*. What I am objecting to is the idea that anything less than an implicit following of the ideal in actual behaviour involves compromising with the ideal. At bottom this is based on the assumption that *the only way to use an ideal rightly is to follow it implicitly*. This assumption in my view is wrong. Sometimes this is the best way to use an ideal; but it is the actual situation which determines whether it is so; and when the situation requires it, the best way to use the ideal is to move cautiously toward it, making such changes in the direction of the ideal as the situation permits.

What I have said would be important, I think, even if we were sure that there was absolutely nothing to modify in our ideal; it is even more important if there are any possible shortcomings about the ideal itself. For then, our attempts to move toward the ideal enable us to criticize and modify the ideal, and thus provide a means of testing the ideal.

(*Concluded*)

SKETCH-MAP OF HUMAN NATURE

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THE troubles of our time have many causes, economic, political, cultural. All are intimately connected. Of the cultural causes, one of the most important has been disillusionment about human nature. The old view which exalted man to something a little lower than the angels has given way in many quarters to the conviction that in essentials he is no higher than the beasts, and that anyhow the very notion that anything can be ethically higher than anything else is illusory. I believe that in each of these attitudes to human nature there is a distorted half-truth, in both a blindness to the half-truth of the other. In this essay I shall try to map out the main contours of human nature, so as to emphasize that, although man is at bottom identical with the beasts, he is also in a limited but all-important manner unique. I shall also argue that one consequence of his uniqueness is moral experience, and that in human nature properly understood, a moral goal is very clearly revealed.

The scope of this essay is thus both psychological and ethical. Its aim is not minute analysis in either field but the figuring out of a pattern which involves both. I offer a sketch-map which omits everything but the essential features, and represents these in a simplified and therefore inaccurate form. I have not the audacity to claim that my map is a wholly true symbol of this great and largely unexplored continent. But it does seem to me to knit into an intelligible and a satisfying shape the findings of many explorers who have attacked the continent from opposite sides. I am well aware that in the effort to reconcile conflicting views I may misrepresent both.

According to Christian teaching there is a fundamental difference of kind between man and animal. Men have immortal souls to be saved, animals have not. Under the influence of scientific materialism it has become fashionable not merely to deny that men have souls but to assert that the whole difference between human and subhuman mammals is superficial. Man, it is insisted, is simply an animal. Though he is more complex and developed than any other animal, there is nothing in him which has not its source and counterpart in subhuman nature. This is true; but some of man's powers, rudimentary in the beasts, are in him developed to such an extent that they transform his whole experience and behaviour into something essentially different from that of any subhuman animal. They

enable him to apprehend in his world (which includes himself and his fellows) features upon which the beasts have no effective grasp at all. This is indeed a case in which quantity rises to such a degree that something qualitatively new occurs. The increase of "quantity" is perhaps simply an increase in innate capacity for intelligence; but the new quality, I shall argue, is something which is evoked in human minds afresh in each generation through their intelligent viewing of their environment. By means not only of native intelligence but also of social tradition each generation discovers features of the objective world which are beyond the ken of the beasts. This experience, and not simply man's superior innate capacity, renders man's behaviour unique. For instance, human intelligence can, and subhuman intelligence cannot, clearly single out the objective fact of number, and the impact of number on the human mind qualitatively transforms man's reaction to his world. Similarly man can, and animals cannot, attain a kind of self-awareness which has far-reaching effects on human social life. From the epistemological point of view even the self, and of course other selves also, must be regarded as part of the objective world. Thus even in the case of self-knowledge man's uniqueness is due not immediately to novel powers in his own nature but to the impact of novel objects on his slightly more sensitive, analytical, and synthetic mind. This impact, it may be said, causes the *emergence* of novel powers in man. In some sense, yes; but the powers emerge not simply in man's more complicated nervous system but in the intercourse of this with an ever more fully cognized environment.

In what respects is man identical with beast? Both are physical organisms. Empirically both appear to arise through the interaction of a particular combination of physical genes and an appropriate physical environment. Both mature as highly integrated and self-regulative physical systems, constantly modified by the environment and constantly responding to stimuli received from the environment. In both, behaviour is conveniently regarded as an expression of a particular physical system in a particular physical environment. The betting is at present heavily in favour of the view that ultimately *all* behaviour will be shown to be determined by, or (more precisely) to vary with, physical events in nerves, glands, muscles, and so on. Any account of human nature which depends on the denial of this precise correlation of behaviour with physiological events is of little use.

But this need not dismay us. A little temperate speculation renders this correlation of behaviour with the physical less devastating than it at first appears. Let us admit for the sake of argument that in both man and beast behaviour is wholly determined by physical events in the body. These are in theory reducible to electro-

magnetic events. This suggests complete materialism; but two considerations must be borne in mind. They are related to the two different ways in which materialism is devastating. First, it explains the behaviour of the whole in terms of the minutest parts, thereby reducing the individual to a mere collection of ultra-microscopic units. Second, if materialism is true, consciousness would seem to be ineffective, since physical causation is enough to explain behaviour.

The first alleviating consideration is this. Physics itself is increasingly dominated by the idea of the unitary *field* or system of influence within which all discrete parts are at once causes of and functions of the whole. Thus the electrons and protons and so on within an atom are not to be properly regarded as bricks comprising the atom, but rather as particular determinations of the atom itself. Only when they leave the atom do they become more like self-complete "things." The molecule composed of a number of atoms, though less close-knit than the atom, is also essentially a unitary field. It may turn out that a living organism has the kind of unity of a gigantic molecule, as has already been suggested by Dr. Max Loewenthal.[1] If so, it is neither more nor less significant to describe the behaviour of the whole organism in terms of its electro-magnetic components than *vice versa*. It is of course immensely useful to analyse human behaviour down through organ-behaviour, cell-behaviour, gene-behaviour, atom-behaviour, to the behaviour of electrons and protons and so on; but we must not forget that these ultimate parts are themselves abstract determinations within the great unitary whole. Though they are just as real as the whole, they are also no more real than the whole. And the descriptive laws of their behaviour within the whole are essentially laws of a field which reciprocally determines the behaviour of all factors within it. Even if this principle is true, the problem of the relation between whole and part remains at bottom unsolved; but it should at least remind us that, though wholes can be analysed into atomic parts, those parts themselves may in an important sense depend for their character on the nature of the whole.

The second alleviating consideration is this. We may suppose the unitary experience of the organism to be the inner life of the unitary organic field in its relation with the environment. If so, then the individual's experience seems to be not only the resultant of the behaviour of the electro-magnetic factors within the whole but *also* the subjective aspect of the whole unitary field's inner life, which in turn determines the parts. If some such view as this should turn out to be correct, then a kind of pan-psychism might follow from it. Free electrons, free cells, free agglomerations of cells living an organic life of their own might have their own experience. But

[1] Max Loewenthal, *Life and the Soul.*

when, instead of being free, they are merely factors within some greater organism, then perhaps they do not have experience of their own, but merely contribute through their psychical potentiality to the unitary experience of the organism.

I have indulged in these perhaps ill-conceived and by no means original speculations merely in order to suggest that belief in physical determinism need not be as devastating as is sometimes supposed. I now return to the comparison of man and beast. So far as the preceding speculations are concerned they are in the same case. The only physical difference is that man is the more complex and the more unified field. In both, behaviour is certainly the expression of the interaction of an internal structure and external circumstances. In man, however, apparently owing to his greater physical complexity and integration, there is also greater mental complexity and integration; and this, through intercourse with the more fully cognized environment, generates the distinctively human powers. To this we must add that in man there is greater freedom than in the beast, in the sense that in him the internal determinants of behaviour play a much more important part than in the beast. Man's actions, compared with the beast's, are caused more by his own established nature, less by the pressure of immediate circumstances. At the same time what is internal to man is itself more largely the expression of the individual's own past responses to past environments than is the case with the beast. Memories, sentiments, attitudes (and their physical counterparts) acquired in response to past environments, are far more developed in man than beast. Thus man is at once more closely determined by his environment and yet more free, in the only sense in which freedom matters, namely self-determination. A man is at once more penetratingly and comprehensively sensitive to his environment and also more coherently, diversely and spontaneously active in response to his environment. Psychologically he assimilates more, and therefore acts more effectively.

But the difference of innate structure between man and beast is merely one of degree. (The difference of *kind* involves the environment.) In the behaviour of both there is a subtle mixture of three factors, the purely innate, the blindly conditioned, the lucidly intelligent and creative; though in the beast lucid intelligence plays only a very minor part. In both, then, the ground-plan of behaviour and of behaving structure is the same. Hunger, fear, anger, aggression, self-display, sex, social suggestibility, and so on occur in both.

Yet man is unique. There is more difference, or more significant difference, between human behaviour and ape behaviour, than between ape-behaviour and the far simpler behaviour of a worm. The relation between these three types can be approximately

symbolized by an architectural metaphor. In all three the ground-plan is almost identical. In man and ape, however, the bottom storey is built in a far more complex style than that of the worm. Indeed in the worm there is little more than bare walls and a few small windows, while in the ape and in man there is more window than wall, and the interior is equipped with all the instruments through which mammalian life has intercourse with the external world. Yet man is indeed unique, for whereas in both worm and ape the bottom storey is practically all there is, in man it supports a sky-scraper. Fancifully we may say that the upper storeys teem with workshops, laboratories, libraries, meeting-halls, boudoirs, studios, studies, theatres, chapels. Even in man, however, the building is patently incomplete. In many individuals much of their accommodation, particularly in the upper storeys, is vacant or inadequately equipped. Moreover, in all human beings the uppermost storey of all suggests by its structure that it might support a loftier structure. Indeed the roof is obviously a floor. Human nature obviously suggests the possibility of a still more developed nature, in which the distinctively human but still rudimentary capacities might be more fully formed and effectively expressed.

What is it precisely that causes this immense difference between man and beast? There are in the first place certain differences of sensory and neural development. The human retina contains more sensitive points than any non-human retina. Discrimination of form and colour is more precise in man than in ape. (On the other hand, the dog seems to surpass man in respect not only of scent but of hearing.) Probably the tactual sense, and certainly manual dexterity and versatility, are far better developed in man than in ape, the only other creature that can compete with man in this respect. But neither visual nor tactual and manual development, nor all these together, constitutes the essential distinction between the human and the subhuman. More fundamental are man's greater powers of discriminative attention and of recall of past experience relevant to present problems. Far more than an ape, a man can attend to the identities and differences within his experienced world, can abstract universal characters from their particular contexts, can analyse, can synthesize. In a rudimentary style the beasts do this whenever they exercise genuine intelligence. To some extent at least they can solve novel problems by attending to significant characters of the novel situation. They can call up from their past life relevant patterns of experience and of response. These familiar experiences and responses they can to some extent reorganize into new patterns to suit the new situation. Thus Köhler's apes,[1] gazing at the out-of-reach banana, remembered their games with climable packing-cases,

[1] W. Köhler, *The Intelligence of Apes.*

fetched one, and climbed for the booty. For subhuman intelligence this was a great triumph. Man alone goes so far as to attend to the universality of universal characters and name them, thereby pigeonholing them, so to speak, for further use.

Language, for which man alone had sufficient mental discrimination and agility, transformed him from the brightest of dumb animals into articulate man. This almost miraculous change occurs afresh in the infancy of every human individual. Without language it would be impossible. For not only does language play the main part in transmitting the knowledge accumulated by past generations, but also it increases almost beyond recognition the range and precision of that little extra lucidity which had made language itself possible. Incidentally it also besets man with snares from which the beast is free. As well as knowledge it transmits error; in particular, the error of attributing to words all kinds of magical powers. Nevertheless it is true that language, which is impossible to the subhuman intelligence, has opened up for man vast new spheres of possible experience and action which even to-day we are only beginning to explore.

Man's slightly superior native capacity, greatly aided by language, raises him to a far higher level of development throughout his conscious life. In respect of cognition, affection, and conation he far outstrips the beast. He can know his world, including himself and his fellows, far more precisely and comprehensively than any beast. His feelings in response to the very diverse factors in his world can be far more subtle and differentiated. His striving can be far better integrated, and more nicely adapted to his needs. And he can know better, but not fully, what his needs really are. In fact, he is far less the sport of impulse, though also far more the sport of acquired obsession. His striving may be also in a significant sense more creative.

All action, of course, is creative in an unimportant sense, since it produces a new situation; but it is significantly creative only in so far as it creates a new *kind* of situation, adapted to need in a novel manner. And it is still more significantly creative when it favours a new and more thorough expression of capacity for sensitive and integrated behaviour; or in so far as the act itself constitutes such an expression. All intelligent behaviour, human and subhuman, is up to a point creative in the significant sense, since by means of insight into the implications of a situation it creates the solution of some problem posed by a frustrated need. In this kind of creative action man far outstrips the beasts.

There is another kind of creative action, in which, though intelligence may play an important part, the essence of the activity may be said to transcend intelligence. In this there is no conscious analysis and synthesis but a gratuitous and novel response, in the form of

vision or action, or both. An example of this is the intuitive judgment of personal character, and the tactful management of persons. Another example, of a very different kind, is artistic creation. Even in scientific research and theorizing, it is said, the formal scientific method is in practice often used merely to confirm conclusions reached in the first instance by brilliant intuitive guess-work, in fact by creative imagination.

This intuitive kind of creative action may be partly the result of very subtle conditioning, of the formation of successful habits under the influence of the environment. But, since the action is by hypothesis creative, since it is a *novel* pattern of behaviour, with novel and significant results, it cannot be *merely* a case of habit. It is a novel pattern of old habits. Possibly the formative influence at work in it is what I shall later describe as "the upper unconscious." Whatever the true explanation, this intuitive creative action does occur, and is responsible for all great forward movements of the human spirit. Its danger is that in itself it is uncritical. Creative imagination may do wonders in every sphere, but also it may degenerate into crazy fantasy. Thus at every step it should be scrutinized by the critical intelligence. Not only so, but intelligence by its patient and pedestrian work is often needed to "set the board," to prepare the ground from which creative imagination can leap into its soaring flight.

In the life of the beasts, and indeed in human life also, something occurs which is superficially much like creative imagination, but at bottom it is very different. Perhaps the most striking example is the bird's nest-building. On the first occasion that a bird gropes its way toward the building of a nest, its actions are throughout intuitive. It apparently "feels like" picking up sticks or moss or what not, and presently "feels like" depositing its booty in a tree. Later still it "feels like" weaving the strands into a rough wad. Then more or less suddenly, as though with a flash of creative imagination, it concentrates on one particular site and sets about the building of a real nest with immense energy and purposiveness and with new-found skill. The similarity between this sort of thing and human creative imagination has suggested the explanation of creative imagination in terms of instinct. But though from the point of view of the individual bird the first nest-building is very much like creative imagination, and must, one imagines, feel precisely as creative imagination feels, yet objectively there is a great difference between the two. For the bird, after all, is repeating behaviour carried out by earlier generations. So to speak, its action is indeed the creative outcome of the thrust of its own developing unconscious innate character, and is instrumental to further development, namely to effective parenthood; but from the point of view

of the species its action is merely repetitive behaviour. In true creative imagination, on the other hand, as in true critical intelligence, the action is novel and creative from both the individual and the racial points of view.

It matters little whether the word "creative" is, or is not, applied both to instinctive action and to human creative imagination; but it is important to recognize the essential difference between the two kinds of behaviour. Both are in part expressions of the individual's unconscious nature; but, while in the one case what expresses itself is a racially well-established and repetitive unconscious nature, in the other case the source of the action lies partly in a newly formed unconscious capacity groping so to speak toward higher development. Or rather, the pressure of the environment, by producing mental conflicts and frustrations, forces some factors in the unconscious nature into such a pass that nothing but a novel and creative kind of behaviour can bring satisfaction. Apparently the conflict produces an intensification of vitality, and an intuitive leap into new insight into the problem. If this is "emergence," it is a kind which involves not only organism but environment.

In such a situation the function of language in facilitating the creative act is very important. Even without language man would, no doubt, be more capable of creative action than the brightest of the beasts, but language immensely increases the scope of his creativity. For developed thinking of every kind is linguistic. By means of linguistic symbols which signify all sorts of universal characters man can imaginatively "play about with" these characters, conceiving them in new juxtapositions and creating with them new patterns relevant to his needs. Not only in literary art but in all the arts, creation avails itself of linguistic thinking. Similarly in all the spheres of man's intellect and practical intelligence language is an instrument without which creative action would be as ineffective as the fluttering of a moth compared with a bird's flight. Language is indeed necessary for all man's arts and sciences. It has made possible his practical mastery of his environment by means of tools and machinery. It has also made possible the distinctive human kind of self-awareness and other-awareness, which is quite beyond the reach of any beast; and in consequence it has prepared the way for a kind of social relationship equally beyond the subhuman range.

In this connection I note a problem which I cannot solve. In the case of awareness of the external world man certainly outstrips the brightest beasts by means of two distinct advantages. He has not only greater powers of discriminative attention and integrative association but also, as was mentioned above, greater detail of visual experience, based on the finer mesh of his retinae. Is there,

then, in his awareness of himself as a centre of conscious activity any special degree of sensitivity, or is the *sole* cause of his great development of self-awareness simply his greater discriminative attention and integrative association? Has he actually greater sensibility to his own conscious life, or does he merely bring greater intelligence to bear upon introspective data which are available (though unnoticed) also on the subhuman level?

The problem is not to be solved by simply denying the existence of any awareness whatever of psychical activity. Even if what we regard as "self-awareness" is really only awareness of internal bodily processes, still the question remains as to whether man's greater *so-called* "self-awareness" is due solely to greater powers of analysing his internal bodily sensations or partly to greater detail and precision in bodily sensations themselves.

For my part I have little doubt that there is, as a matter of fact, awareness of psychical activity, at least in man and the higher mammals, and possibly wherever psychical activity of any kind occurs. But the power of *attending to* psychical activity seems to be limited almost entirely to man. It is difficult to decide whether this power is due simply to man's greater power of intelligent observation or whether it involves also greater intensity and precision in his actual sensibility to psychical activity.

Whatever the answer to this question, the important fact is that a man is in some sense aware of himself and of his fellow men also, as a centre of conscious activity, and that he is aware with a precision which is seemingly far beyond the range of the brightest beasts. Doubtless his self-awareness is nevertheless very superficial and erroneous. His ignorance of his real motives and his deeper nature is vast, but compared with the beasts he has at least the beginnings of self-knowledge.

This is a convenient point at which to consider in more detail the problem of the unconscious sources of man's conscious behaviour. It was recently the fashion to interpret human behaviour mainly in terms of certain specific instincts or innate dispositions, such as pugnacity, fear, hunger, sex, gregariousness. That such dispositions do in some sense play a part in human behaviour is obvious. They are sometimes thought of as factors in an innate mental structure, but sometimes as mental consequences of, or reactions to, an innate bodily structure. Whatever their nature, however, they seem to be far less valuable for the understanding of human behaviour than was recently supposed. For there is no certainty as to what precisely man's innate dispositions are. In man the stereotyped innate impulses which are shared with the beasts are often modified beyond recognition by acquired habit. What part in any particular action is played by "instinct" is generally quite uncertain. Ingenious

interpretations can plausibly attribute any act to any "instinct." All that is certain is that conscious behaviour is very largely an expression of the individual's unconscious nature, and that his unconscious nature at any moment is the product of the interaction of his past internal structure and his past environments throughout his life.

The upshot of this interaction is that each individual at any moment has a distinctive "character," or system of behaviour tendencies. This is best thought of as a subtle tissue of "sentiments" (in Shand's sense),[1] of established dispositions to behave in certain manners in response to particular objects. These objects may be either physical things or persons or groups or abstractions, such as justice or truth, empire or love. One of the most far-reaching and complicated sentiments is the self-regarding sentiment, which appears in behaviour as a strange mixture of self-exaltation and self-abasement. In all cases the general structure of sentiments is the same. A sentiment is a disposition, partly innate and party acquired, to behave in appropriate manners in relation to the varying situation of the sentiment's object; appropriate, to the central needs which form the sentiment. John in love with Jane reacts now with love-making, now with jealousy, now with fear for her safety, now with a shopping expedition to find her a present. This behaviour must be regarded as a resultant of his sentiment for Jane and his self-regarding sentiment, and doubtless many other sentiments also.

Some sentiments are much more conscious than others. That is, in some the individual is clearly aware that he has such a sentiment, in others but vaguely aware or completely unaware. He observably behaves as though he had such a sentiment, but he himself cannot recognize that this is so. In fact he has a "complex." John's love for Jane, for instance, may be influenced by complexes about his mother, about himself, about personal security or dominance, and so on.

Complexes are said to be due to repression, and this to conflict. Circumstance may lead the individual to crave earnestly ends which circumstance itself renders incompatible. He may both love and hate the same person. He may seek both dominance and submission, or both perfection and self-indulgence, both socially-approved virtue and socially-condemned sin. In such circumstances one of his cravings, namely that which violates his conscious ideal of himself, may be repressed, may cease to be introspectable; yet it may profoundly influence his behaviour, introducing into it an "irrational" element. No doubt even the most normal person is often led astray by complexes, which appear in behaviour as prejudices, phobias, obsessions.

[1] A. F. Shand, *The Foundations of Character.*

All the individual's motives and actions are in some sense an expression of his "unconscious nature." But this phrase covers many different factors in his nature at any moment. And conscious activity itself is not to be thought of as ineffective, as a *mere* resultant of unconscious influences. It is convenient to think of a man's nature as consisting of a "lower" and an "upper" unconscious, and (between the two) his consciousness, or all that is easily available to his consciousness. The three departments are not sharply divided from each other, and indeed the classification must be regarded as merely provisional. The lower unconscious nature consists of all in the individual that is relatively primitive in temper and incompatible with the system of his conscious mind. Roughly this lower and more primitive unconscious comprises his subhuman animal nature, his infant nature, much of his childhood and adolescent nature, and everything in him which has subsequently been repressed, in the ordinary sense of the word. In fact, in the lower unconscious lies all that for one reason or another, owing to its relatively archaic and primitive character, is not normally introspectable. Above this lies his conscious or at least introspectable nature, his memories, skills, culture, tastes, theories, moral values. Above this again we must, I think, postulate an upper unconscious. By this I mean all in him which is thrusting toward a greater clarity of vision, a greater delicacy of feeling, a greater integrity of action, than is as yet possible to his conscious nature. The upper unconscious, though it seems to involve the emergence of something qualitatively new, is to be thought of not as a divine spirit or guardian angel but simply as the outcome of the impact of circumstances on a creature that is not fully developed, that is therefore imperfectly lucid, and integrated. Circumstances so impinge on him that he must either tackle them with greater lucidity and integrity or flounder into trouble. And circumstances apparently spur him to new lucidity. The upper unconscious, then, contains all in him which is tending toward greater lucidity and integrity but has not yet achieved this result.

Conflict occurs not only between consciousness and the lower unconscious but between consciousness and the upper unconscious. Incipient desires of a more lucid or more integrated kind than the individual's conscious desires may be unintrospectable, not only because of their difficulty but also because of their incompatibility with established desires.

At this point I had better discuss two ideas that have already been employed and seem necessary to the proper understanding of human nature, namely "development" and "perversion." Both of them imply a norm or goal to which man's nature approximates and from which it may be side-tracked. Is there in fact any such

norm implied in our experience of ourselves and others, or is the common assumption that there is such a norm merely a prejudice due to social conditioning? If there is such a norm, precisely how should it be defined? And has it any ethical significance?

Objectively regarded, the difference of development between a man and an amoeba is merely one of complexity and integration; and there is no reason for declaring that greater complexity and integration are in any sense intrinsically better than relative simplicity and disunity. But from the point of view of subjectivity the situation is different. When we look into our own experience of ourselves, and when we examine our judgments of other persons, and when we consider the teachings of the leaders of culture in all ages and lands, a certain norm or ideal for human nature and behaviour does appear, though obscurely and with many contradictions. Critical examination of the many goals that men have accepted suggests that they are all approximations to the ideal of the full expression and further development of the individual's capacity for personality, or, more accurately, for personality-in-community.

For personality involves a social environment, and the healthy development of personality involves community; by which I mean not merely a social environment but mutual mental enrichment, mutual valuing, and mutual responsibility. Without community a person is but a frost-bitten seedling. It is perhaps advisable to add that, for the full development of personality-in-community, the persons related together in community must be diverse in character. The more diverse they are, the better, provided only that they are sufficiently developed to use their diversity as a means of mutual enrichment rather than of intolerant conflict. Nor is it necessary that their diversity should be only the diversity of peers of equal mental rank. They may be of many ranks, provided only that even the lowliest are sufficiently developed to appreciate the life of the community; and that the most exalted, in spite of their superior powers, gladly recognize their fundamental brotherhood with the rest, and joyfully accept their responsibility even to the lowliest.

With increasing clarity the goal appears as the ever fuller expression and development of man's powers of conscious activity in relation to the actual universe, in fact his ever more accurate and comprehensive awareness of his world (including himself and others) and his ever more discriminate feeling and more appropriate and more creative action in relation to his world. This definition raises many problems which I cannot here face. But whatever the problems, it is surely clear that we all do, in practice and according to our respective lights, try to apply this standard in judging one another and ourselves, and in estimating the worth of cultures.

And the fact that we cannot help doing this must be given great weight in ethical theory. If "personality-in-community" is not the right goal of personal and social action, then there can be no right goal whatever, for no other goal that has ever been suggested can compare with this.

Formidable arguments can be brought forward in favour of complete ethical scepticism. I shall not here deal with them in any detail. They may hold good against ethical theories of the more uncompromising type, but I shall adopt an ethical point of view which, I believe, escapes sceptical criticism by making only a temperate claim. One important point must be added. Even if sceptical criticism were to prove logically that morality was entirely an illusion based on social conditioning, it would be unwise to accept this conclusion. The choice is between certain intellectual constructions and a conviction common to all the most lucid minds in all lands and ages, a conviction which is vital for the conduct of ordinary life. I cannot but believe, therefore, that in the sceptic's arguments there is a catch somewhere. I accept without hesitation the intuition that the development of the capacity for personality-in-community is in some significant sense, admittedly difficult to state accurately, the *right* goal of human action.

But, without entering into ethical controversy, one must at least offer some intelligible meaning for the word "right." So far as I can see, to say that the development of personality-in-community is "right" must mean *at least* this. Any mind, anywhere in the universe and in any age, that is itself sufficiently developed to appreciate what personality-in-community is, and is not perverted by some irrelevant obsession, *cannot but* will this end. It "cannot but" will it in the sense that, mind being what it is, this will is involved in its nature, explicitly when it is sufficiently developed and unperverted, implicitly when it is not.

Does this "implicitly" involve a return to the Idealists' theory of moral obligation? No. So long as the goal is only *implied* in a mind's nature, and not explicitly recognized, there is no obligation toward it. On the other hand, the fact remains that the way of personality-in-community is the way of fulfilment, whether recognized or not; and that the sufficiently developed and unperverted mind cannot but will it.

How do I know that this is so? I know it because I myself, with all my short-comings, am a mind sufficiently developed and unperverted to *feel* it so in my own case, and to recognize that it *must* therefore be so for all developed and unperverted minds.

But is it not possible that minds of a far higher range of development than mine might, after all, not will personality-in-community? Is it not sheer arrogance on my part to affirm that even minds of

superhuman lucidity cannot but will this goal? No. If these minds really are superhuman, really are not only superhumanly developed but also unperverted in the sense defined above, then I cannot seriously doubt that they must will this goal.

One qualification, however, should be made. It is theoretically possible of course that their superhuman vision may reveal a goal still more desirable than the development of personality-in-community, a goal inconceivable to man. But even so, I submit that they cannot but regard personality-in-community as good "so far as it goes." In their superior vision it may be subordinated to something even better, but not rejected as something which, after all, is not good. Further, if they do see a still higher good, it must be something which is implied in, or a further development of, personality-in-community. It cannot be something of a wholly different kind. Just as personality-in-community is itself a further development of the goals of the beasts, so the superhuman goal, inconceivable to us, may be some transcendent development of personality-in-community. Perhaps the religious will for absolute self-denial springs from an obscure impulse in this direction. On this plane, which is at the uppermost reach of human personality, humanism, even of the most developed kind, must be subordinated to "superhumanism." But even so, the way to true "superhumanism," if such there be, must lie through the development and purification of the humanistic ideal itself.

This theoretical qualification about superhuman minds need not in any way detract from the indubitable intuition that *all* sufficiently developed and unperverted minds cannot but recognize personality-in-community as good, so far as it goes. Provided that humanism is not permitted to suppress the genuine though groping impulse toward superhuman values, we may conclude that humanism affords a sufficient ethical goal for human beings. Personality-in-community, even if it is not the final cosmical or divine goal, remains absolutely the right *direction* for all human action.

This conviction can, I know, be plausibly explained away in terms of social conditioning, and so on. But, to repeat, for my part I find this fundamental moral intuition infinitely more trustworthy than the sceptical arguments. We all know "in our hearts" that personality-in-community really does matter. Scepticism is really no more than a smoke-screen to distract us from this fundamental truth about human life. Valuable as its arguments are as an intellectual exercise, and for clarifying our moral experience, they become pernicious and a perversion of intellect when they succeed in weakening the moral conviction. For intellect's task is to take all things into account, giving to everything its due weight. To discount this supreme moral intuition in favour of a theory, is not really rational;

it is on the contrary a violation of reason. However logical it is within a limited universe of discourse, in the wider sphere of man's whole experience it appears as flagrantly unreasonable.

The idea of development in respect of personality-in-community, it may be objected, is very vague. It is, but in principle it is sound. The difference in this respect between man and beast is a real objective difference, and quite unmistakable. Even within the human sphere it is easy to recognize the difference between the extremely undeveloped and the very highly developed human persons. Between these limits, no doubt, our judgment may often be mistaken, circumscribed by our own ignorance of the other's real nature, and also distorted by our own unconscious perversions. The fact remains that we do constantly and effectively apply this standard.

It is necessary to distinguish between mere absence of development and positive perversion. A relatively undeveloped individual may be relatively unperverted on his lowly level, may in fact be sane, though simple. A relatively developed individual may be gravely perverted from the true line of development. Milton's Satan is a classical example. To be perverted is to be obsessed by some minor or wholly irrelevant motive, so that thought and feeling and action become ill-adapted to the objective situation, in the sense that they lead sooner or later to death, or to stagnation or actual regression, in fact to violation of the right aim of personality-in-community.

It is time to give clearer meaning to this word "community" and show its relation to personality. Community, in the sense in which I use the word, involves the human degree of self-awareness and other-awareness. Self-awareness, or at any rate articulated self-knowledge, is of course largely a social product. Man does not first know himself and then by inference know other people. Out of the vague syncretic self-awareness and social awareness of the beast arose gradually a more precise experience of self and others. The social behaviour typical of beasts seems to be a compound of impulsive gregariousness and impulsive self-assertion, with a few threads of impulsive and *blind* affection for particular individuals, such as sexual partners and offspring. In typical gregarious behaviour the individual reacts to the herd as a whole, and is presumably aware of the herd merely as a syncretic whole. He gives little evidence of clear discrimination of the individuals as particular centres of activity, having distinctive character and continuous identity. He seeks merely to conform to the behaviour of the herd, and to enforce conformity on any individuals who are noticeably eccentric. Similarly the self-assertion of the beast is impulsive and fragmentary. There is little evidence that it springs from clear and continuous self-awareness, from an enduring sentiment of self-regard. Finally in the

affection of a beast for another individual there seems to be little realization of the other as a centre of activity and experience different in character from the affectionate one himself, and having different needs. In this sense the beast's affection is "blind," is not genuine love.

It may be that some beasts, particularly in domestication by man, are capable of more developed kinds of social behaviour and experience. Some, for instance, may be able to rise to some measure of genuine love. To admit this, however, means only that some beasts are a little more than typical beasts, just as some men are a little less than typical men. Similarly some beasts show some slight degree of the typically human intelligence, and some men show far less human intelligence than others.

In man, though of course all behaviour is through and through human in some degree, very much of social behaviour and experience is mainly an expression of primitive animal motive. But man is also capable of something very different, in fact of social behaviour and experience which deserves to be called distinctively human. Man's capacity for this distinctively human social behaviour is very feeble, but it does exist. It may be gravely inhibited or greatly strengthened by the tradition and institutions of the social group in which the individual lives.

In the distinctively human social experience a man is aware of himself and some others as individual centres of conscious activity, having each of them peculiar character and needs. The full development of human social behaviour is that in which there is this clear self-awareness and other-awareness. Consciousness of personality leads to mutual responsibility, and also to mutual mental enrichment through the impact of all on each. This relationship I call true "community," in contrast with the beast's blind gregariousness and the human egotist's sham community of mere self-seeking within the law.

Of course any kind of social behaviour which involves the human degree of intelligence may be said to be distinctively human, no matter how purely gregarious or individualistic its dominant motive; but only that in which the *dominant motive is "community"* is distinctive of man in its strictly social aspect. "Community" is a distinctively human attribute of human society.

The word "society" I use in two senses. In the abstract it covers every kind of organized living together, good or bad; and in concrete every particular instance of organized living together, good or bad. Thus a herd of cattle and a pack of wolves are rudimentary societies. A beehive and an ants' nest are highly developed societies, though in them there is probably even less of true community than in herd or pack. The bird with its mate forms a minute society which

is enlarged when the nestlings appear. Mammalian families, subhuman and human, are societies; and so, of course, are all human tribes, cities, states, and so on.

Correspondingly I use the word "community" in two senses. It means either the abstract principle which I have described as the distinctively human kind of social relationship, or a concrete society in which that relationship is an important influence. Essentially community in the abstract is a relationship between persons, self-conscious and other-conscious, who respect each other's personality and accept full mutual responsibility.

There are many kinds and degrees of true community. The intensest and most thorough of all is love, in which there is personal contact and strong mutual valuing. Each party prizes the other (or the others) as an end and not merely as a means to self-increase. Each serves the other, welcomes service by the other, joyfully recognizes the other as at once akin and yet different in character, in fact as complementary to himself. In all genuine love each individual values not only the other as an individual but also the love-relationship of the two of them. Or rather he values the concrete whole made up of the two of them in community, which is felt to be so much more than they could be in isolation from one another. Feeling thus, he gladly subordinates his individual self to the well-being of the little community, yet discovers great self-increase in the common life.

It is perhaps well to note in passing that in every actual case of community, even in every actual case of love, no matter how strong and well-developed, there is another side to the picture. Each party, though accepting the other, though even loving the other, remains also an individualist, resents the frustration imposed on his individualism by the other, conceives rivalry with and jealousy of or about the other, and has impulses (generally unrecognized) of sheer spite and vindictiveness.

Love is community at its fullest and intensest. Friendship and comradeship in work and play are less intense forms of community through personal contact. In large groups, where there is no personal contact uniting all the members, genuine community is possible only to those who have had some experience of community through contact, and rests upon the principle, incorporated in the tradition or tone of the group, that individuals whether personally known or not must always be treated *as persons*, with respect for their peculiar needs and capacities, never *merely* as instruments for private aggrandisement or social manipulation. In the life of human societies there is little enough of genuine community; but that little makes the difference between the incipiently human social order and one that is inhuman, such as an ants' nest. In extant human society lip

service at least is paid to the principle of genuine community, save under Nazism. In small groups there is often a good deal of actual community; but the existing social structure, since it is based on fierce economic self-seeking, and results in fomenting the impulse of self-display, renders average individuals far less capable of real community than they might be in a more favourable social environment.

Human society is at once an effect and a cause of man's distinctively human nature. It is an effect in that only a creature with man's native capacity could generate human society, with its immense volume of tradition, its relative adaptability, its complex and fluid organization, its shreds of true community. No such society could arise among beasts or insects. On the other hand, human society was necessary to evoke man's full human capacity, and to develop it. The human individual without a social environment would be something less than human. The jungle child, if it survives at all, is doomed to grow up an imbecile. For without a social environment the individual lacks, not only human intercourse and the possibility of community, but the whole human cultural tradition, including, of course, language, without which there can be no possibility of developed thought. No account of human nature can be adequate if it ignores all that is evoked in man by his social environment.

It would, however, be a great mistake to suppose that the influence of society on the individual is wholly good. Almost as great a mistake would it be as to suppose society wholly pernicious. Without society no doubt, originally perhaps in the form of the family or clan, man could never have become man at all; but under the influence of a kind of society which has probably in all ages been a perverted society, and certainly is so to-day, all human individuals are largely perverted. The will for true community has had but a feeble influence in the generating of human society. It has had a greater influence on the forming of the tradition of personal conduct, but far less than is generally supposed on the growth of public institutions. Incomparably more powerful have been the motives of self-seeking and mere gregariousness or mob-feeling. In the growth of society certain types of individuals have inevitably played a dominating part, and they were far from the most developed types. No doubt, individuals of outstanding mental and spiritual capacity have had a great influence in the development of culture. The prophets, saints, sages, philosophers, poets, scientists have not been wholly ineffective; but in the moulding of social institutions and customs, which in turn have moulded ordinary individual minds, a far larger part has probably been played by the addicts of personal power and self-display, and by the mob-sensitive leaders of the mob.

It was inevitable that from prehistoric times up to the present

day and beyond it the life of human society should be determined mainly by man's more primitive motives and by *perverted* motives of higher evolutionary rank. Primitive impulses of aggression, self-display, fear, hunger, sex, and gregariousness are far more insistent and far more communicable than the frail impulses of developed personal and communal behaviour. The life of all human societies has hitherto been mainly haphazard and unplanned as a whole. Such short-sighted and superficial planning as there has been could never seriously affect the basic texture of social behaviour save in the direction of corruption. For social organization has never, until very recently and locally, been inspired by any serious effort to make the best of human beings as developed personalities. Its effective aim has always been to strengthen the State, or increase the power of the section of society which controlled the State. Consequently the life of societies has never yet been much more than an automatic resultant of the clash of sectional interests. Always there has been some one dominating class within society, and this class, whatever its professed aims, has been in fact mainly concerned to preserve its power and privileges. Further, however high soundingly its cultural leaders have preached, in practice its political leaders have always found that the effective way to control men was to trade upon their more primitive and on their perverted impulses. This they have done in two ways, directly by appeal to fear, aggressiveness and self-display, and indirectly by glorifying the State and the social hierarchy, with themselves at the top. Thus they were able to provide symbolical fulfilment for the frustrated self-display of the masses through the paraphernalia of monarchy, militarism, ecclesiasticism, and ostentatious wealth, and by fomenting in every individual so far as possible jealous adulation of his social superiors, along with contempt, disgust and fear against his inferiors, and mean rivalry with his equals. It need not be supposed that this very effective policy was consciously planned. In the main it was probably established by a process of natural selection.

The impact of society on individuals has thus been very gravely harmful. Primitive impulses and perverted impulses are strong; rightly developed impulses are frail; and the influence of society has invariably been to foment the primitive impulses, and indeed to pervert them from the relatively innocent expressions which they seek in beast and child and savage, distorting them into sophisticated forms that are far more deadly.

Some theoretical anarchists have imagined that, in view of the spiritual damage done by society to individuals, all comprehensive social organization should be abolished. Left to themselves, it is claimed, individuals would develop without perversion, and would behave as innocent and generous children of God.

This view is surely mistaken. Bad as society is and always has been, it has nevertheless been necessary for man's advancement. Without society, his life would have remained "poor, nasty, brutish, and short." For only by means of social organization could he develop agriculture and production in general to such a pitch as to obtain a surplus of goods over primary needs; and without this surplus early civilization and culture could never have begun. Similarly without still more far-reaching organization in our own age, industrial power could never have been developed, modern science could never have occurred, the species would never have opened up the possibility of securing for all its members full human development up to the limit of each individual's capacity.

The damaging influence which society has hitherto had need not continue. It has been due to faulty organization, class-dominance, and to the absence of any serious planning to strengthen men's capacity for community. When these mistakes are corrected the influence of society should begin to be almost wholly good.

Social organization, then, in ever larger units and with ever increasing impact on the individual is necessary if the human species is to make the best of itself. But intelligent social organization, or rather the consciously creative planning of world-society for the fulfilment of the capacity of all kinds of individuals, has not yet begun. Our present world-wide turmoils are perhaps its birth-throes. For behind those turmoils, behind the struggle between imperial Britain and imperial Germany, behind the conflict between democratic and totalitarian ideologies, and cutting right across this cleavage, lies the struggle between the old unplanned and perverted form of society and the dawning will for a new kind of society, world-wide, coherent, controlled by the will to make the most of the human species; and consciously, creatively, planned for that end.

We may perhaps give more concrete meaning to this end of "making the most of" man, and at the same time we may sum up the main issue of this whole discussion, by saying that to make the most of man, socially and individually, implies developing all that is most developed in him, all that is most distinctive, all that is unique; and that three human powers are, indeed, unique, namely, free intelligence, community, creative imagination. The fostering of these, then, should be the explicit goal of social planning.

I have argued that human nature strongly suggests a goal or norm toward which it approximates but which it can never attain. Does this fact in turn strongly suggest anything about the universe? Of course it implies that some beings in the universe can approximate to the goal; but this statement tells us nothing new. Does man's experience of his own nature imply any metaphysical truth about the universe as a whole, or its fundamental character? Does it

imply that personality-in-community is the goal of the universe as a whole, or that a divine person or "super-person" is the ground of all things? I cannot see that it does. It implies only that wherever developed persons occur they cannot but will this goal.

But do we really need any metaphysical knowledge about the universe as a whole, save the knowledge that, wherever there are persons, this must be their goal? I cannot feel that we need anything more.

If we do need more, we may at least encourage ourselves with this thought. Our flesh is of the same stuff as the remotest galaxies. Here on earth that stuff becomes flesh and is a vehicle of spirit. Probably the universe contains a great diversity of other flesh and other vehicles of spirit; in other planetary systems, may be, but also perhaps in very different physical circumstances. Personality-in-community may not be the goal of the universe as a whole, or the ground of all things, but certainly it must play a very great part within the universe. Is not this enough?

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MANY people who have never read the works of Nietzsche possess some vague notion of what he taught. For them the philosophy of Nietzsche is represented by a few floating ideas—"Superman," "Will to Power," and even perhaps "blond beast." Others again have learnt a little more about Nietzsche and perhaps read something of what he actually said; yet the net result is an impression of a passionate and destructive thinker, who launched his attacks on this side and on that, without any regard for consistency. For them there can be no philosophy of Nietzsche: they know that he often wrote in the form of aphorism and they picture his thought in general as a series of detached utterances, many of which are mutually exclusive. It may then be of use to some, if we attempt to set forth the guiding inspiration and leading ideas of Nietzsche, for when these have been grasped, it will be seen that it is by no means absurd to speak of a philosophy of Nietzsche. It may well be impossible to reconcile all his utterances, at least so far as the words are concerned—though Nietzsche is of course not the only philosopher who betrays inconsistency in his thought—but it should be remembered that Nietzsche was not given to standing still: his thought developed. Moreover, he often spoke in an exaggerated form, so that some of the apparent inconsistencies may be ascribed to overemphasis. In any case, even granting the presence of irreconcilable inconsistencies in his thought, Nietzsche's various theories not only may, but must, be seen as a whole, if they are seen in the light of his guiding ideas and inspiration.

Yet to say that the thought of Nietzsche is a philosophy, a whole, is not the same as to say that it is a cut-and-dried, fully articulated system. For Nietzsche's philosophy is not meant to be a complete and final statement of what *is*, of Reality, so much as an instrument of creation: it looks to the future, to what is not yet but *is to be*. A good deal therefore remains vague and shadowy, and must necessarily remain so. It is absurd for example to complain that Nietzsche has given no clear-cut and well-defined delineation of Superman, since the latter is essentially man-surpassed: he is not yet but is to be. It is not to be expected, then, that Nietzsche should portray the "Übermensch" in clear relief; his thought is largely prophetic and an appeal to creation. The real disciples of Nietzsche are not those who abide by the *ipse dixit* of the Master, but those who have grasped the dynamic character of his ideal and who have drunk of

his spirit. (The present writer, it may be remarked, is not a Nietzschean but only one who has attempted, so far as he can, to understand the thought of Nietzsche. No one can lay claim to infallibility of interpretation—and the present writer would be very glad of correction where he has gone wrong—but it is to be regretted that some who write about Nietzsche have apparently made little effort to understand the spirit of the philosopher.)

Nietzsche is above all things a philosopher of culture. Those who see in Nietzsche merely the Nihilist, the spirit of attack and destruction, are unjust to him: Nietzsche's great desire was not the destruction of culture but the attainment of a higher type of culture. This is made quite clear even in his early works. For instance, in his lectures on "The Future of our Educational Institutions" and in "Thoughts out of Season" it is made abundantly obvious that Nietzsche did not criticize the contemporary German "Kultur" in an anti-cultural spirit but because he passionately desired a higher state of culture. To him German "Kultur" was not really a culture at all; it had no "unity of artistic style" but was "Alexandrine" in character, to be compared with an old curiosity shop. It was purely historical, a knowledge *about* culture—past culture—rather than a living culture in its own right. This was the culture that the German culture—Philistines fondly imagined to have proved victorious over French culture in the Franco-Prussian war. Nietzsche ridiculed this notion, pointing out that it was German military prowess that had won the war and not German "Kultur," and that in any case German "Kultur" was by no means superior to the French variety. The German victory was, in Nietzsche's eyes, a national disaster, since it confirmed the Germans in their belief that their culture was a superior article and that thay had a mission to spread their culture in Europe, a culture which was in reality no culture at all—in the deeper sense of the word at least. The attack delivered by Nietzsche on German "Kultur," as we see it, for example, in the essays on David Strauss and on "The Use and Abuse of History," was thus by no means a mere piece of wanton destruction: it was indeed destructive, but at the same time it was an incitement to and an appeal for a higher type of culture.

Nietzsche often praised Greek Culture, and particularly that of the sixth century B.C., but it should not be imagined that he was advocating a mere return to Greek culture. He believed that the Greeks possessed a living culture of their own, a true unity of artistic style: they did not merely prey on the past—as happens in a predominantly "historical" or Alexandrine culture—but, however much they may have owed to the past, they had integrated all inherited elements in a higher synthesis, in a culture which was not a mere knowledge about culture but a lived culture. Nietzsche never denied

the fact that the Greeks owed a debt to, e.g., Egyptians and Babylonians; but he insisted that the question of the origins of Greek culture was a small point compared with the fact that the Greek was not a scholar, who amassed information concerning past civilizations, but a living embodiment of culture. He praised the Greeks then for this fact, without however preaching a literal return to the Greeks: he wanted us to go forward—in the spirit of the Greeks of the best period—to a still higher type of culture. Any attempt at a literal reproduction of Greek society would be to fall into the very fault that Nietzsche decried: we have not to reproduce a former historical period, which is an impossible task in any case, but to *create*. The dynamism of Nietzsche, his place in the anti-rationalist reaction, is here apparent: we are summoned, not simply to know the present or even the past, but to create the future.

Nietzsche therefore is a philosopher of culture; but culture is obviously a state of man in society. The whole world might be filled with art-galleries and museums, with splendid monuments of architecture and copious relics of the past; yet if men and women were themselves inferior, uncultured creatures, moving among their splendid surroundings like ants crawling over the ruins of the Parthenon, we should not be justified in speaking of a state of culture. Culture without man is meaningless: man is the bearer and creator of culture. If therefore we are to attain a higher state of culture, man himself must be elevated. Hence it is that the philosophy of Nietzsche may be said to centre round the elevation of man. Nietzsche's philosophy is often said to be a philosophy of Life—and this is true: he has his place in the current of the "Lebensphilosophie"—but it is human life of which he is thinking first and foremost: he is concerned with ascending life, the ascending life of man, a future which cannot be left simply to a mechanical process of evolution but has to be created. It was one of Nietzsche's complaints against Plato, that the latter substituted the Idea, the subsistent concept, for man, whereas it is man who should stand in the centre of the picture.

Once this has been grasped, it becomes clear how Nietzsche's dissatisfaction with contemporary culture and his dissatisfaction with contemporary man go hand in hand. Diogenes Laërtius relates of the Cynic philosopher Diogenes, that the latter lit a candle in the daytime and explained his strange action by the words, "I am looking for a man." Nietzsche might have re-echoed the words of Diogenes: he was looking for a man, or rather for a higher type of man, and he did not find him. In the *Wanderer and his Shadow*, Nietzsche expressly refers to the saying of Diogenes, and he frequently expressed his disgust with man as he found him, petty and miserable. Does he not put even into the mouth of the saint in the

prologue to *Zarathustra* the words: "Now I love God: men, I do not love. Man is a thing too imperfect for me. Love to man would be fatal to me"? Nietzsche, however, does not love God (in Whom he does not believe) but he protests that he does love man. Zarathustra, in opposition to the "saint," will abide in the world and help man, out of love to man: he has conquered his disgust, that disgust which is the great danger. Recognizing this disgust for man as the great danger, this feeling of contempt for man—"blacker than the blackest melancholy"—Nietzsche will not abandon man, but will attempt to raise him above himself, speaking to those who have ears to hear. Though he recognizes contempt for man as his greatest danger, Nietzsche recognizes it also as the spring of his love for man. It is the great despisers of man—those who recognize man for what he is and are *not satisfied*—that become man's greatest benefactors. A man who has never felt disgust and contempt for mankind, has never really loved them: he has no consuming thirst for the elevation of man, for the coming of the real, the integral man. It is because Nietzsche loves man, that he despises man—or rather it is because he knows what man is in potency, what he can be, and loves him as such, that he recoils before man in his stunted and imperfect state. It is a great mistake then to isolate the passages in which Nietzsche speaks of his contempt for man and to depict him as a misanthrope, for he loves man as he might be, man with all his great possibilities. His final position is even that he loves man *as he is*—because man as he is embodies tremendous possibilities. Nietzsche therefore contrasts "die Nächstenliebe" with "die Fernstenliebe": he appeals, he looks to the future, he is a prophet—of man.

The philosophy of Nietzsche centres then round this guiding inspiration, the attainment of a truly higher culture through the elevation of the type, man. A higher culture can only be attained through the realization of the higher man, and Nietzsche preaches love towards the higher man. We must accordingly say that Nietzsche is an "idealist": not, that is to say, in the philosophical senses of the word, but in the ordinary sense, of a man who possesses an ideal. Perhaps everybody might seem to be an idealist in this sense, for all have some ideal, even if it be only the ideal of comfort or the negative ideal of the avoidance of pain as much as possible, but such "ideals" are ideals for man as he is, without reference to the elevation of man as a type: moreover, they tend to belittle or neglect man's highest faculties and potentialities and so are but pseudo-ideals. Nietzsche was never content with such complacency and acquicence, looking, as he did, to man's possibilities of higher developesment. His ideal of man hovered before his eyes—somewhat vaguely, it may be—and on this ideal his gaze was set; he loved man as a potentiality for the realization of this ideal. Nietzsche said some

very sharp things about idealists; but he was unquestionably an "idealist" in the practical sense, that he never acquiesced in things simply and solely as they were. He called on us to be true to the earth, *this* earth, but the whole of his intense soul went out towards the future in passionate longing. The second period of his personal development, the period in which he praised Socrates and professed a "Wissenschaftsideal" was of short duration, and was really but an interlude or breathing-space on his onward march. No static ideal of ice-cold knowledge could satisfy Nietzsche: he was a creative and prophetic philosopher, who did not attempt to philosophize with reason alone.

Who then is the higher man, what sort of a type is he and how are we to conceive of him? He is the more *complete* man, the noble and aristocratic man. We are to conceive of the "higher man" as physically healthy and strong, as powerful and devoid of weakness, but Nietzsche does not stop there, for his ideal is not that of the barbarian, the blond beast. Compared with certain other types of men Nietzsche may have preferred the "blond beast," but when he calls for the attainment of a higher state of culture through the higher man, he is not thinking of the fair-haired and physically strong barbarian, and it is unjust to interpret him in this sense. The "higher man" is endowed, not merely with physical vigour and strength, but also with intellectual power, independence of soul, artistic perception and appreciation, psychological insight. Nietzsche lays great stress on nobility, independence, truthfulness, and unwavering courage: moreover, he makes it quite clear that the higher man has command over himself, is slave to no passion or lust, although he in no way despises the body or practises asceticism from other-worldly motives. The higher man emancipates himself from morality, from the code of ethics asserted by the herd, and is a *creator of values*; but that is not to say that he is a slave to the lusts of the flesh or to any other lust, for he is the very opposite of a slave. The noble man is the embodiment of Life, of ascending life—and Life is, according to Nietzsche, the Will to Power. The noble man, the true aristocrat, embodies therefore the Will to Power but it is the Will to Power of the higher type of man.

This conception of the Will to Power has occasioned a great deal of misunderstanding, perhaps naturally enough, since it has suggested that Nietzsche's higher man is the embodiment of brutal physical force or of political domination. But Nietzsche's conception should not be narrowed down to these factors: the power of which he is thinking is primarily power of personality, of soul, interior power. "The noble man honours in himself the powerful one, him also who has power over himself, who knows how to speak and how to keep silence, who takes pleasure in subjecting himself to severity and

hardness, and has reverence for all that is severe and hard."[1] This conception of hardness is responsible for a good deal of the abuse of Nietzsche; for does he not say that the higher man is to be hard? Does he not teach hardness in place of sympathy and pity? Yes, Nietzsche does indeed, in opposition to Schopenhauer, the "Soothsayer," condemn pity and exalt hardness; but we ought to realize that for Nietzsche hardness is not the same as brutality or wanton cruelty. In speaking of the noble man he says, that "in the foreground there is the feeling of plenitude, of power, which seeks to overflow, the happiness of high tension, the consciousness of a wealth which would fain give and bestow: the noble man also helps the unfortunate, but not—or scarcely—out of pity, but rather from an impulse generated by the superabundance of power."[2] The noble man may be an egoist, but he is not "selfish" in the ordinary petty use of the term; he may be hard, but he is not brutal or wantonly cruel; he gives, but gives out of a superabundance of power, from the bestowing or radiant virtue. He gives, because it is of the nature of superabundance to overflow. We may not like Nietzsche's higher man, who is really the "natural" man raised to the highest pitch of development, psychical and physical, but that is no reason why we should caricature him. It may well be that an attempt to reduce Nietzsche's theories to practice leads to disastrous results, to a very ignoble type of man (and this is bound to be so, if we grant that man's vocation is "supernatural" and that he cannot be perfect and merely a "natural" at the same time), but that does not justify us in interpreting Nietzsche as though he foresaw and willed those consequences. That Nietzsche would have recognized in the Nazi "élite," for example, a concrete realization of his "higher man," is inconceivable: they may or may not be a concrete and practical application of his theories, but, if they are, they embody an application unwilled by Nietzsche himself.[3]

It has been mentioned that the higher man emancipates himself from morality and creates his own values. According to Nietzsche, one of the main drags on the higher man and on the evolution of a higher type of culture is morality, above all Christian morality. Christian morality is, in Nietzsche's eyes, a phenomenon of decadence, of weakness, of hostility to life. The Christian, like Plato, preaches the existence of a "Beyond," and sets a life "there" over against life "here," as true life over against apparent life or half-life. He thus calumniates this life and this world and is hostile to all

[1] *Beyond Good and Evil*, aph. 260. (Quotations from Nietzsche are taken from the trans. published by Messrs. George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., and edited by Dr. Oscar Levy).

[2] *Ibid.*

[3] See my article on "Nietzsche and National Socialism" in the *Dublin Review* for April, 1941.

ascending life on this planet. As Nietzsche rejected the doctrine of a transcendental "Beyond" and regarded *this* life as true life, indeed as the only life, it is easy to understand why he was so vehement in his attack on Christianity, for he regarded it as enchaining and shackling free and noble spirits, deceiving them with transcendental phantasies and preventing their free expansion. He did not want to eliminate Christianity from the hearts of *all*—on the contrary, let the plebs keep their comforting mythology!—but he did want to liberate the higher men.

Nietzsche regarded Christianity as the expression of the Will to Power of the herd. The herd, the inferior and weak majority of men, desire to protect themselves, and out of this desire—and because of their jealousy and resentment against all that is noble and lofty, all that is not inferior and weak—they proclaim a code of morals which inculcates those virtues which are useful to the herd, such as sympathy, loving-kindness, brotherly love, and they proclaim too its universal binding-force, thus chaining down all those who would, if left to themselves, rise above the herd. This is the psychological origin of Christian morality and it expresses the herd's instinct of self-protection, the herd's Will to Power. Accordingly Nietzsche calls upon the free spirits, the higher men, to emancipate themselves from this bondage and to create their own values, setting a "master-morality" over against the "slave-morality," the antithesis "noble" and "despicable" over against the antithesis "good" and "evil." The free spirits are the exceptions, the herd constitutes the majority: let the herd therefore retain its own valuations and by all means let the slave-morality hold good among the slaves; but let not the noble aristocrats of culture, the proud and fearless ones, the free and independent, be any longer enslaved by a morality which professes to be absolute and of divine origin, but which in reality is but the expression of the herd's Will to Power and the herd's desire to protect itself.

Now from what we have just said it is clear that for Nietzsche there is no absolute morality, no universally-binding moral code. Moral valuations are relative, relative to their authors, one morality being the expression of the Will to Power of the noble spirits, another morality being the expression of the herd's Will to Power. But at this point a formidable difficulty arises, As we have seen traditional morality expresses the herd's Will to Power. Now, according to Nietzsche, *Life* is the Will to Power. Christian morality, therefore, as expressing the Will to Power of the herd must express Life. But does not Nietzsche declare that Christian morality expresses decadence, hostility to life? There would then appear to be a blatant inconsistency; for on what grounds can Nietzsche condemn one set of values in favour of another, if both sets express the Will to Power?

He cannot say that one set is the valid and absolute set and condemn the other, for he did not believe in an absolute morality: all moral valuations are relative in his opinion. On what grounds then can he legitimately prefer one to the other, except on those of personal taste?

The key to the difficulty would seem to lie in the fact that we must judge of moral valuations according to the *kind of life* which they tend to promote. Thus, in Nietzsche's eyes, "master-morality" is the expression of and tends to promote ascending life, fuller life, while the "slave-morality," pre-eminently Christian morality, expresses decadent life, descending and poorer life. Yet it may be objected, that here again an absolute standard slips in. For the judgment is not simply that one type of life is more congenial to some people's taste than another type, but that one type of life is, absolutely speaking, superior to another type. And if this be so, then the corresponding moral valuations should be subject to comparison from an absolute standpoint and are no longer merely relative. Even if, to escape from the difficulty, a distinction were drawn between an absolute and static scale of values and a dynamic or to-be-created scale of values, the question might still be asked, how the values we create can have any claim upon us, unless they are *really* superior to hitherto-accepted values. Nietzsche might answer that they have no claim—for they are so far non-existent, and in any case there are no subsistent values in Platonic style—but that they are simply the expression of the higher man's Will to Power. These values express the higher man's Will to Power and those others the herd's Will to Power; and that is all that we can say: there is no question of comparison from an absolute standpoint, for the absolute standpoint is *ipso facto* the *standpoint of the herd*, which proclaims an universal and absolute morality.

This does appear to be some sort of answer to the charge of inconsistency; but all the same it is very difficult, when reading Nietzsche, to rid oneself of the impression that in his heart of hearts he believes in an absolute set of values, even if those values are not those of Christian morality as he understood it. Theoretically he does not believe in an absolute standard, but practically he seems to accept it. It is perhaps worthy of note that Professor Nicolai Hartmann, who does believe in an abiding world of values, incorporates into his valuational field several Nietzschean values—for example, if my memory of his great work on ethics does not betray me, "die Fernstenliebe" and "die schenkende Tugend." Nicolai Hartmann would say that Nietzsche had "discovered" hitherto-unrecognized values, not that he had created them. If this were so, then Nietzsche's claim to transvalue all values would involve a misconception: he would really have been revealing to the eyes of contemporaries values to

which they had been formerly blind. This is no place to enter on a discussion or criticism of Nicolai Hartmann's Ethics; but we would point out that his treatment of values opens up the possibility of a fresh line of approach to Nietzsche.

To return to the "higher man," the creator and determiner of values. Nietzsche finds types of higher men, or approximations thereto, in history. Goethe, for instance, "the last German whom I respect,"[1] is cited in Nietzsche's Notes on *Zarathustra* as one of his predecessors along with Heraclitus, Empedocles, and Spinoza. Among others Dante, Michelangelo, Pascal (whom Nietzsche regarded as having been ruined by Christianity), Caesar and Napoleon are also mentioned as exceptional men. Nietzsche's fondness for Napoleon has naturally led to the "warlord" conception of the higher man. And does he not declare that "higher man is a combination of the monster and the superman" and that "these opposites belong to each other"?[2] Yes, but Nietzsche himself admits that Napoleon "was corrupted by the means he had to stoop to" and "*lost noblesse* of character." In any case it must be remembered that to Nietzsche these higher men of history were by no means flawless: they were very far from being the realization of his ideal. Just as he looked at contemporary man and, filled with disgust and shame, evolved the conception of "higher man," so, looking at the approximations to higher men which he found in history—those that stood "beyond good and evil"—he saw that they fell far short of the ideal, that they remained "human, all-too-human." The result was that the ideal tended to become more transcendental, to be pushed into the future: in other words, the result was the conception of Superman. (I do not mean to imply that Nietzsche did not continue to praise Napoleon and other great figures of history *after* he had evolved the conception of Superman, for Nietzsche proclaims Superman in *Zarathustra* and yet later speaks of Napoleon in, e.g. the "Will to Power," but my meaning is that Nietzsche's discontent with *all* historical men, even the men of the Renaissance whom he so greatly admired and never ceased to admire, was responsible for his conception of Superman.)

Historical man being thus insufficient, Superman appears on the scene: the higher man is projected into the future as "Übermensch." "*I teach you the Superman.* Man is something that is to be surpassed —What is the ape to man? A laughing-stock, a thing of shame. And just the same shall man be to the Superman: a laughing-stock, a thing of shame."[3] "Man is a rope stretched between the animal and the Superman—a rope over an abyss."[4] We must not be misled by the mention of the ape into imagining that the doctrine of Superman is simply an extension of Darwinism. Nietzsche certainly thought

[1] *Twilight of the Idols*, sect. 51.
[2] *Will to Power*, II, 1027.
[3] *Zarathustra's Prologue.*
[4] *Ibid.*

that Darwinists were unjustified in speaking as though evolution had stopped with the species man, and he implied on occasion that man is a fresh species, but this is to be understood as meaning that Superman is man raised above himself, man-surpassed, man developed to the highest possible degree. This Superman is the lightning out of the future, he is the meaning of the earth (not in the sense of a meaning given *ab extra*—for Nietzsche rejected such teleology, being an atheist in theory, even if not in psychological attitude—but in the sense of a meaning *to be given, to be created, by man*).

People are sometimes disappointed that Nietzsche gives no clear picture of the Superman. But how could he possibly do so? Precisely because the Superman is Superman, he cannot be clearly delineated; he does not yet exist, but *is to be*, and it is surely difficult to describe him who as yet is not. Nietzsche can only speak of Superman in prophetic tones as he discerns him dimly in the light of the coming dawn. He calls on us to work for the coming of Superman, to make the meaning of our lives the creation of Superman. "Let your will say: the Superman *shall be* the meaning of the earth";[1] Nietzsche professes to be but the herald of the lightning, the lightning itself being Superman—whose beauty "came unto me as a shadow." Superman is thus to come, to be created, and Nietzsche urges those who enter on marriage to have as their highest hope the creation of "one that is more than those who created it." Ultimately he asks: "Thirst in the creating one, arrow and longing for the Superman: tell me, my brother, is this thy will to marriage?"[2]

We have seen that Nietzsche's criticism of Christian morality was directed by his desire for a higher culture and by his "Fernstenliebe." The same must be said of his criticism of (i) Democracy and Socialism, and (ii) the State. Nietzsche condemns the doctrine which he ascribes to partisans of Democracy and Socialism, that all men are equal. He insists that all men are not equal, and that the dogma of their equality and social theories founded thereon, are simply weapons in the hands of the herd, which they use to protect themselves and prevent the emergence of a natural aristocracy, the noble and free spirits. In other words, Democracy represents the Will to Power of the herd, the inferior majority, the crowd of weak persons who club together to protect themselves and who look with eyes of watchful resentment on all those who strive to rise above the herd and free themselves from its slavery. Among much else that Nietzsche has to say on both Democracy and Socialism we may mention that he diagnosed—and rightly, I believe—the Christian themes that linger on in non-religious democratic theory. For example, does not the ideal of the French Revolution, "Liberté, Egalité, Fraternité," derive ultimately from Christian morality? God and supernatural

[1] *Zarathustra's Prologue.* [2] *Zarathustra,* chapter xx.

religion were omitted, but much of the driving-force in democratic theory has been of Christian origin, even if social theorists and revolutionaries have not been conscious of the fact.

(In case it may be thought that Nietzsche was merely "reactionary" in politics, we may mention his shrewd observation that if the wealthy do not like Socialism and dread its advent, then they had better alter their behaviour, since it is largely their luxury and display of wealth and their tone of life that cause the Socialistic movement. He points out to the wealthy that the state of mind of proletariat revolutionaries is simply what *their*, i.e. the wealthy's, state of mind would be were they in the position of the poverty-stricken proletariat. Both are actuated by lust of possession, and psychologically speaking, there is little to choose between them.)

Leaving aside Nietzsche's interesting theories on the origin and natural function of the State, it is worth drawing attention to the very hard blows that he delivers against State-idolatry, worship of the "cold monster," the "new idol." The State, in what we would call its totalitarian form, wants only so much culture as will serve its own ends. It sets itself up as an object of worship, and all culture must be subordinated to the monstrous idol. "Higher men" are not wanted—only servants of the State. The State is accordingly judged by Nietzsche in its relation to culture. In so far as it promotes culture, he will commend it: in so far as it debases culture and prevents the free growth and the evolution of free and independent minds, he condemns it. Because in his opinion our culture must be European in character, he condemns all narrow-minded ultra-nationalism, "bovine nationalism," as he trenchantly calls it. It is therefore absurd to make the Nietzschean philosophy equivalent with the Nazi ideology, for Nietzsche's theory rises above all race theories—a "mendacious swindle"—all excessive nationalism and all ideas of German domination. Did he not declare that wherever Germany extends her sway she *ruins* culture? Nietzsche is the prophet, not of the Super-race nor of the Super-nation, but of *Superman*. His philosophy may well be false, but it is most certainly not a Nazi philosophy.

It may be in place to say something of Nietzsche's attitude towards religion, towards the Christian religion in particular. Nietzsche says many things that are, as they stand, most undoubtedly blasphemous in character. Yet it would be wrong to think that Nietzsche's attitude towards Christianity is that of a Hyde Park secularist or "rationalist." He was not concerned to rob believing Christians of their faith: on the contrary, he always counselled believing Christians not to read his books. We might indeed ask, as did one of his friends, why then did he publish his books; but he wrote them primarily with a view to "disciples," to speak to the ears of the "higher men"

and to liberate them from the thraldom of Christian morality those who no longer believed in Christian dogma but who still gave their allegiance to Christian moral values, as though the values could retain a universal significance when the transcendental foundation had disappeared. Nietzsche did not want to be a mere *Nihilist*: in other words, it was very far from being his aim to rob of their religious beliefs and moral standards those men who had nothing to put in the place of what they lost and were unable to follow Nietzsche along the path of his positive philosophy. His aim was to stimulate the "noble" and "free" spirits to break the shackles of herd-morality and to determine their own values: he summoned his followers after him, not to a holocaust of all values but to a *transvaluation of values*. Those who could not follow him through the valley of destruction out onto the mountain-heights of creation had better leave his writings alone and unread: he did not want to lure men into the valley of destruction and then to leave them there to die of despair—or to content themselves with the husks of swine. It is essential for anyone who wishes to understand Nietzsche to grasp this point: otherwise there is a danger of portraying him as an advocate of libertinism in conduct and merely destructive rationalism in thought. That such might be the practical effect of his writings, may no doubt be true, but it was not Nietzsche's intention.

Moreover, although Nietzsche was an atheist, his psychological attitude, as manifested in his writings, scarcely gives the impression of being that of a naturally irreligious man. A deep earnestness and seriousness, an almost religious pathos, is visible throughout. He sprang from a pious Lutheran family with generations of pastors behind him; and in his youth he had been a pious boy who wanted for a time to be himself a pastor. He came indeed to discard the Lutheran religion of his upbringing, but it is very doubtful if he ever succeeded in shaking himself altogether free from Christ, Whom he never ceased to revere and Whom he professed to consider the one true Christian. For the matter of that Nietzsche always respected sincere Christians, in spite of all his attacks on their religion; and it is perhaps not fanciful to discern in the depths of his soul a growing inner tension between the way he had chosen and the Christ Whom he had renounced, a tension which probably contributed to his final breakdown. It is significant that some of the letters he wrote after madness had seized him were signed "Der Gekreuzigte." Moreover, his psychological attitude towards Superman is markedly religious in character; we are reminded of a Hebrew prophet looking forward to the advent of the Messiah.

But whatever Nietzsche's psychological attitude may have been, the foregoing remarks should not be taken to mean that the present writer wishes to make out that Nietzsche was not, or did not remain,

a professed atheist. "*God is dead,*" he proclaimed and he continued to proclaim it, denying all transcendence of this life and this world. What is more, he *willed* this atheism; he *willed* the assertion of a pure "Diesseitigkeit"; God *must* die—in order that Superman may live. "Now, however, this God hath died! Ye higher men, this God was your greatest danger." "God hath died: now do *we* desire—the Superman to live."[1] This news of the death of God is the great liberation. "We philosophers and 'free spirits' feel ourselves irradiated as by a new dawn by the report that the 'old God is dead'; our hearts overflow with gratitude, astonishment, presentiment and expectation. At last the horizon seems open once more, granting even that it is not bright. . . ."[2] This liberation is *willed.* "God is dead"—"And we—we have still to overcome his shadow!"[3] In other words, Nietzsche wills a pure "Diesseitigkeit," in order that man may out of his own resources, in unhampered freedom and power of will, surpass himself and create Superman. It is certainly true, that Nietzsche felt at times appalled by this thought: witness a poignant letter to his sister in which he declares that "A profound man needs friends unless indeed he has a God. And I have neither God nor friend!" Yet in spite of this feeling Nietzsche not only resolutely exposed what he regarded as the illusion of the Transcendental, but willed the death of God—that Superman might live. And he sealed this will to "Diesseitigkeit" by the doctrine of the Eternal Recurrence, the doctrine that there is a cyclical process in the universe and that all returns, even my action here and now, thus effectually barring all "supernatural" intervention and the "Beyond."

So far then as open profession goes, Nietzsche's philosophy contains a resolute will to "Diesseitigkeit." But it cannot be denied that his thought is ever pressing beyond the given, beyond even that which seems humanly possible: God is dead, *must* be dead, in order that men may be gods, transcending themselves. There are of course two sides to Nietzsche's hope for man: there is on the one hand the insistence on the full development of man as he is, leading to the "higher man," the flower of culture that is rooted in an actual and historical soil, and there is on the other hand the insistence on the more-than-man, the divinization of man (needless to say, not in the theological sense), in short, Superman. By this latter path a tendency to transcend pure "Diesseitigkeit" creeps in unawares. Nietzsche *wills* pure "Diesseitigkeit," but restless and discontented with *all* the given as he is, his philosophy passes beyond itself into what Professor Karl Jaspers calls "Unphilosophie," transcending all actual horizons and leaping into what very nearly becomes a "Beyond!" But as Nietzsche has "exposed" or rejected or passed by all props and bridges and stable positions in his unceasing onward

[1] *Zarathustra,* chapter lxxiii. [2] *Joyful Wisdom,* p. 276. [3] *Ibid.,* p. 151.

march, there is no actual content to this self-transcendence of his philosophy: it remains vague and unformed, a tendency, an appeal, a longing for the more-than-empirical-and-historic. His philosophy is resolutely atheistic, but it is a very peculiar brand of atheism; for although he rejects religion he does not embrace Positivism (in spite of his second phase); although he condemns Christianity as hostile to Life—expressing *his* hostility in the antithesis "Dionysos versus Christ"—he will not content himself with any of the customary alternatives, the life of unbridled lust or the life of bourgeois pleasure or the life of high-and-dry-scholarship or indeed any other form of human life as he saw it. Destroying, attacking, Nihilistic, yet with a will to the assertion of positive values and aims, Nietzsche reaches out beyond every temporary halting-place and every stable position: the will to pure "Diesseitigkeit" contains within itself an unavowed, doubtless unconscious, will to transcendence. He yearns for Being but cannot content himself with any actual state of being.

This all-devouring Nihilism, coupled with a terrific will to the positive Transvaluation of all Values and the attainment of a higher culture through the elevation of the type, man, this denial of the Transcendental coupled with a radical dissatisfaction in the actual, renders it practically impossible to assign a definite and at the same time stable content to Nietzsche's philosophy, to label it and put it away in a compartment side by side with other systems: it extends beyond all labels, all compartments: it is perhaps rather a philosophizing than a "philosophy." Hence the failure of all those who attempt to use Nietzsche for the furtherance of their own particular aims. If the Positivist attempts to use Nietzsche's denial of the Transcendental to support his own attitude, Nietzsche eludes his grasp, refusing to be caught in the trammels of Positivism and reaching out into the invisible future: if the Nazi attempts to use Nietzsche's doctrine of the Will to Power, of the Order of Rank, of hardness, he is confronted with Nietzsche's ridicule of the Race-theory, of State-idolatry, of "Deutschland über Alles," of mere militarism: if the lover of the life of the senses attempts to find support in Nietzsche's acclamation of sense and instinct, in his insistence on life and loyalty to the earth, he suddenly finds Nietzsche preaching self-control, self-command, hardness towards oneself, devotion to a vague and ideal future. In short, he who attempts to rest on any one "platform" in Nietzsche's thought will sooner or later find that platform sink beneath him—or drawn upwards after Nietzsche in the philosopher's restless quest as, breaking with past and present, he passes onwards beyond all horizons. Are we perhaps to draw the conclusion that the will to pure "Diesseitigkeit" defeats itself and that the immanent logic of Nietzsche's idealistic Nihilism simply opens the way once more to the Transcendental?

IS LIBERTY COMPATIBLE WITH ORGANIZATION?

J. E. TURNER, Ph.D.

It is frequently contended that one of the gravest dangers of the future of civilization is that the organization of society will be carried so far as to imperil, if not indeed to destroy, social and individual liberty. If this is actually true, we seem compelled to choose between these two ends—either, that is to say, to subordinate or sacrifice freedom, or to minimize organization.

But this appears to me to be a fatally mistaken approach to the problem; and I believe that it is possible, though by no means easy, to reconcile these apparently conflicting ideals so as to secure an increasingly organized liberty, enjoyed in due proportion by each citizen and by every social group. In the first place, the actual course of social change necessitates an intensified organization, because the steadily expanding complexity of civilized life ineluctably demands a wider, and at the same moment stricter, regulation for its continuance. It is undeniable that every new invention, every improvement in communications, adds in some measure to the intricacy of life; it is of course a matter of balance, since many difficulties are so simplified that they cease to trouble us; despite this, however, the net result is that civilization grows more and more complicated. It is true, still further, that our ability to control this advancing complexity steadily increases; but this leaves unaffected our crucial problem—Can this be achieved without the restriction, or even the ultimate loss, of freedom?

One apparent solution, generally supposed to appeal to the philosophic temperament, must be discarded altogether, except perhaps as an occasional loosening of the bowstring; for the "simple life" has become as unattainable as a "simple" philosophy; both subsist, like the Golden Age, in the realm of myth.

Now whether, faced with such a future, man can retain any genuine liberty, depends plainly on what we take this term to imply; and whilst this will for long provide a highly controversial issue, we must all agree, negatively, that freedom can never mean "doing just what I myself like" without further ado; this, both individually and nationally, leads direct to chaotic anarchy.[1]

But since space forbids any adequate analysis I shall at once

[1] On the other hand Anarchy, in the sense of the disappearance of all State regulation, may be a highly desirable ideal.

equate Freedom to Self-determination, even though this excludes the subtle questions of the reality and nature of any "self,"[1] and similarly of the correct significance of "Determination"; I can only hope that fuller exposition will clarify my own meaning. In the first place, then, we must intimately combine the two widely differing ideas of determination and selfhood in such a way as to lay full and proper emphasis on each in turn, without eviscerating either in favour of the other; and to begin with determination, this means the highest degree of dominance, control or regulation; I should myself add causation, despite the dubiety that recent Physics is taken to have thrown on this concept. For even if we concede—what I take to be extremely doubtful—that causation is no longer applicable to ultra-microscopic processes, still it is agreed that, in some sense, it is exhibited by all those macroscopic changes with which social activities are concerned; and although this is amply sufficient for my own argument I shall dispense with the word so as to minimize controversy.[2]

Retaining, therefore, the heaviest possible stress on regulation or dominance, as such, this must next be associated with selfhood in the sense that it must originate from the self, so far as is compatible with its undeniable finitude. For to describe the self as essentially finite is to recognize that it is inescapably subjected to conditions which, in the first place, bring it into being and, in the next place, limit and direct its activities both from without and from within. In this important respect I have not the slightest desire to question recent discoveries in Heredity and Psychology which show that, far more than we ever realize, finite selfhood is rigorously conditioned, exactly as it is, still further, by historic and economic factors. But this contention that the self is the product of its highly complex environment does not imply that it is nothing more than

[1] I should describe the self as an extremely complex system of psychological, and perhaps spiritual, factors, with which it may be necessary that a "body" of some sort should be combined. All its constituents may be transient, provided that the system which they form possesses a marked degree of permanence; but this seems to hold true of every real, from atom to galaxy. What characterizes the self is, therefore, the *type* of system and of permanence, both of which, still further, must not simply permit, but actively contribute towards, growth and development. All this implies, negatively, that the self need not be regarded as some hopelessly mysterious entity, nor again as a mere geometrical centre of experience. Nor should we, possibly with Hume, leave the house and then peer through the window in search of the self, in order to base a philosophic scepticism on this futile procedure.

[2] So far, however, as microscopic changes are involved it is indubitable that, from the very nature of the situation, no investigation can demonstrate the operation of causation. But this, clearly, cannot justify the assertion that causation does not actually subsist in the subatomic realm.

a mere automaton, or robot or marionette. Were this the case, it would not be a self at all, but merely a thing; as in fact actually happens whenever drugs, or diseases or vices, destroy genuine selfhood so that the individual becomes, in a very literal sense, enslaved and ceases to be truly human. Certainly this distinction between self and thing is a matter of degree. Even the impact of a falling stone, like the variations of a compass, is partially determined by these objects' own physical constitution; to this extent, therefore, even they are self-determined. But the essential point is that, in all such instances, this attribute is very heavily overbalanced by external influences; less so, however, in the case of the compass than of the inert stone; still less, again, in the plant; and thus we discern an advancing scale of self-determination which culminates in the normal human mind, where it attains so extensive a range that the very term "self" acquires a new meaning. In principle, this is due to the exclusively human capacity for forming complex systems of abstract ideas, and then of realizing these in action; whatever ideational capabilities animals enjoy is, on the other hand, extremely rudimentary and unsystematized. This distinctively human power is the basis of all planning, whether trivial and transient or on the boldest national year-long scale. Finally, and again making due allowance for finitude, this capacity to form and carry out one's own ideational schemes constitues freedom; and the fact that this is painfully restricted must not be misunderstood to mean that it is non-existent. In this respect freedom is exactly like radium. True, we have very little of either, but that little is all the more valuable; while just as, though with immense difficulty, we can increase our radium store, so we can, only with still more difficulty, expand freedom; neither precious possession, however, can be handled with impunity; in both cases alike proper safeguards are of vital importance.

Individual and social liberty alike, therefore, when thus identified with self-determination, depend absolutely on the ability first of all to formulate ideas, and then, by comparison and selection, either theoretical or practical or both combined, to utilize the resultant systems as the determinants of conduct.[1] All the initial stages are, inevitably, extremely defective, while improvement is, to begin with, a painful process of trial and error until expanding theory, as is most obvious in scientific research, takes the place of such crude experiments, to which we still remain committed in almost all social experience; and hence the futility of so many of our purposes, no matter how fine and well intentioned they may be.

[1] It will be recalled that self-determination for small nations was one of the principal aims of the previous war and the Treaty of Versailles; *cf.* H. A. L. Fisher in *The Background and Issues of the War*, pp. 7 ff.

Nor does this stress on ideas imply any ignoring of feeling and emotion. Quite the contrary; but our problem is that of due emphasis or proportion—which of these is to enjoy control? The answer, on practical grounds alone, seems unmistakably clear, since the entire advance from animality to humanity, from savagery to civilization, from childhood to adulthood, consists in the progressive dominance of ideas over feelings; a dominance, it must be recognized, which aims never at the eradication of the emotional factors, but simply at their proper regulation by slow and intricate processes of refinement and purification; while to carry this too far is to incur a futile and shallow intellectualism.

In spite of its unpardonable over-simplification, this analysis reveals the solution of the false antinomy between freedom and organization. For some degree of organization is essential from the very beginning, since it is perfectly clear that unorganized ideas are almost useless; they are, in fact, the sole material of animal "intelligence" apart from domestication. In principle, therefore, and apart from practical details, there can never be any conflict whatever between organization and liberty, even though the crudeness of my own ideas and plans must plunge me into continual and desperate struggles with my fellows. But even my schemes for a pleasant holiday, not to mention a war, rest very largely on exact and carefully systematized ideas, while all our daily tasks involve a highly intricate ideational combination which is habitually applied to control action. I may, of course, if I am fool enough, carry planning so far as to spoil my holiday or even risk victory; but this is to condemn folly, not the true foundation of all genuine liberty.

Incidentally, all this should be obvious in that vast realm of experience where emotion is most powerful. For all great art demands a precision, which clearly means organization, equal to that of mathematics, profoundly different though it is in kind. But the *exact* shade, or tone or curve, and these again in their most delicately precise balance, are of the very essence of fine art, and so supremely difficult that only the "Great Masters"—and how significant is this familiar title—ever attain success.[1]

Not only, then, is organization indispensable from the start, but its importance increases with the scale of our plans, whose rapidly expanding complication demands ever more efficient organization. Our difficulties arise, therefore, never from organization as such, as is so frequently contended, but from our blundering efforts to improve this, which lead far too often to its over-exaggeration. Once again we find that we are at the mercy of the finitude, or in

[1] The mathematical basis of Aesthetics is equally pertinent, although the artist is nearly always quite unconscious of the principles to which he must nevertheless invariably conform. The proper sphere of Pragmatism, therefore, is not Philosophy but Art.

other words, imperfection, of the individual self. But this can never justify the sacrifice of the individual to the State or even to the community, which simply leads to the fatal elephantiasis of Totalitarianism. From the very nature of the situation, liberty pertains inherently to the individual, so that to suppress this is to destroy freedom at its root. As with radium once more, our scanty store must be increased, despite the grave risks and the necessary safeguards.

But while individual liberty remains an ever imperative demand, it is rendered hopelessly inadequate and futile by the recurrent complexity of all social relations; and this crucial obstacle can be overcome only by some form of co-operation whereby every citizen becomes merged within a larger group, but never wholly lost therein. On the contrary; co-operation must itself be a free response even while it attains ever higher levels of organization; to begin with at least, the volunteer is far preferable to the conscript. This, in truth, constitutes the crucial task—to harmonize at one and the same moment individuality and co-operation, liberty and efficient organization; time and time again we are tempted to select and intensify one of these factors in the vain belief that it alone is the essential means to success; but thus to sacrifice any one of the conditions is to imperil all.

It is nevertheless, I believe, the individual who remains of paramount importance, even though we are immediately confronted anew with the grave obstacle of his finitude. From this comprehensive standpoint, again, finitude is one type of evil, even though it is inescapable and presents many aspects that may be advantageous. At this point, however, I must once again become dogmatic and contend that, in the long run, all evil is self-destructive and yields some form of good; its very dynamism becomes the powerful instrument of its own overthrow. This holds true, therefore, of human finitude; of itself it compels man to his unceasing effort to transcend and eradicate it; and while it is certain that we can never fully succeed, it is equally undeniable that we attain ever higher levels of achievement. Our advance, however, is most rigorously conditioned. For individuality and liberty, being inseparable, must expand and contract, rise and fall, together; it is indeed obvious that the finer types of selfhood enjoy more freedom than the lower—the adult than the child, the genius—in his proper sphere, of course—than the man in the street. Finally, since co-operation becomes increasingly imperative, the reciprocal adjustments of interests and activities—in other terms, the ineluctable organization—can be secured only within a community of highly developed individuals, each of whom is guaranteed his due measure of freedom. But the basis of this guarantee, as also the criterion of the measure, constitute a further problem.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE CIVILIZED MIND IN THE ANCIENT CIVILIZATIONS

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THE positions which are offered for consideration in this paper may be summarized in the following four points:

First, there is a civilized type of mind which may be clearly distinguished from a primitive type.

Second, the civilized mind developed from the primitive under certain economic and ethnological conditions which are to be described.

Third, this emergence of the civilized mind from the primitive took place at a fairly definite period and reached its height in the remarkable efflorescence of genius between the ninth and fourth century B.C., over an area from Egypt to China. This was the appearance in that period of a mind essentially one in character, with natural variations, in the Greek thinkers, the Hebrew prophets, the early Hindu mystical philosophers and the Buddha in India, and the ethical teachers of China of the Confucian school.

Fourth, this type of mind with its characteristic powers was achieved once for all and was never lost. In spite of the decay of most of the ancient civilizations, the civilized mind has been transmitted, chiefly through the survival of Greek and Graeco-Hebraic thought, into science, philosophy, and theology to become the modern mind for the world of culture of to-day.

The Primitive and Tribal Mind

We may now define the Primitive Mind and the Civilized in a general way in contrast with each other. Inasmuch as it is the *Tribal* mind which develops most directly into the civilized, we may take it as typical of the primitive, although there is traceable an earlier stage such as characterized Palaeolithic Man, and such as may still be observed in some of the more lowly peoples at present existing. The psychological qualities of these peoples are, however, included in the tribal ways of thinking; and hence the tribal mind may be assumed to be representative of them. Within the primitive or tribal mind, then, as we go on to describe it, the most important influence is what M. Lévy-Bruhl calls the "mystical," Rudolph Otto the "numinous," and which we may name the sense of mysterious power, that is, the ascription of power to things not understood—

things which, specially attended to as strange and mysterious, are therefore regarded as possessed of power to affect one for good or ill, i.e. as beneficent or dangerous. The tribal mind is deeply concerned with magical or religious or with magico-religious means or action for averting the harm or securing the benefits of the power. Its thought is thus *concretistic*, as K. G. Jung suggests,[1] occupied, namely, with concrete means, with material objects or actions for attaining those ends. It is also *atomistic* or particularistic, in that it formulates no general principles, but lays down particular acts (of magic, ritual, or taboo) for each particular need or contingency. The tribal mind is further governed by the *solidarity* of the group; the interests of the tribe are supremely authoritative, and the customary rules of the community are its laws and its substitute for an ethical system. This type of mind, finally, particularly in its more advanced forms, is strongly *imaginative*. It is therefore mythopoeic and given to dramatization, using images and myths because it does not possess abstractions, and aiming at its wish-fulfilment by dramatic imitation of that which it desires to come to pass.

The Civilized Mind

In contrast we define the Civilized Mind as possessing *first*, the power of abstraction or of conceptual thought by which general principles are formed which co-ordinate a host of concrete instances. *Second*, among these concepts are ethical principles such as justice, truth, and so forth, which apply to a multitude of cases of conduct, and lead to the substitution of moral and civil laws for rules of tribal custom. In the *third* place, the individual, through the wider and more varied range of life in the ancient civilized communities, is released from the cramping bonds of tribal solidarity. He has considerable scope for initiative in his work, his art, and in the ordering of his life; he even acquires a conscience of his own; and, when we come to the Greek philosophers, and especially to Socrates, he claims an immortal soul.

What are the conditions and forces which made the passage from the primitive and tribal mind into the civilized type possible, and actually produced it in the course of history? The civilizations with which we are concerned are those familiar to ancient history and to archaeological research, which occupied what is often called the Fertile Crescent in the ancient world. They included Egypt, Assyro-Babylonia, the newly discovered Indus civilization, the Aryan-Indian culture, the early Chinese empires and the Greek States. The important point for this study is that these civilizations were created by peoples who were at the tribal stage of culture, and in processes of history which began between 6000 and 4000 B.C. It is worth

[1] K. G. Jung: *Psychological Types* (London, 1923), p. 533.

while to state in broad and large terms some of the characteristics which these communities, as we see them, have in common. Their life is founded upon large-scale agriculture; they have a settled existence in towns and cities, carry out great operations in irrigation, war, town-planning, and building, have an organized system of government and law; and their religion is generally of a polytheistic type in which the gods are more or less individual, with tendencies nearly everywhere to belief in a supreme god, or even in a monotheistic deity. The most striking circumstance in their history is the fact that these agricultural civilizations all, more or less directly, contribute to that galaxy of genius, that blossoming of the human mind, which occurs near or within the last thousand years B.C., and to which we give the general name of the Prophetic Horizon.[1]

The Origin of the Civilizations

These civilizations originated in what Dr. Gordon Childe has brilliantly described as "two revolutions," namely, "the change from a food-gathering to a food-producing economy; and the establishment of urban civilization based upon industry and commerce."[2] The first of these revolutions was the discovery, somewhere near but prior to 4000 B.C., of agriculture and cattle-rearing. As a consequence probably of the resultant abundance of food, there ensued an immense increase in the numbers of tribes living in the steppe lands of Eurasia. They became hordes, overflowed their existing habitat, and flooded conquering and settling in the cul-de-sacs of the great river valleys. This is traceable in the prehistory of Mesopotamia, Egypt, the Indus, and it applies also to the early agricultural empires of China, founded by migrants from the steppe lands into the basins of the great rivers. On the basis of the wealth or capital created by the still greater resources of large-scale agriculture on the rivers, there was accomplished the second revolution, namely, the establishment of an urban civilization with large cities and a population whose ways of thinking were in many respects different from those of the Tribal Horizon. From these conditions, in fact, there emerged the Civilized Mind.

Let us note what happens under these same conditions to the primitive and tribal mind. When the tribes increase to hordes migrating to new surroundings, the moulds of custom into which their life had been run are necessarily broken; many taboos become impossible of observance, new situations are presented which call for initiative, and the tribesman breaks out of the solidarity of custom into a new freedom. An important element in the agri-

[1] Cf. article on "Racial Crossing and Cultural Efflorescence" in *Man*, for Jan.–Feb., 1941, vol. xli.

[2] V. Gordon Childe: *New Light on the Most Ancient East*, London, p. 283.

cultural life as compared with hunting and food-gathering is the element of *pause* in experience when the cultivator must wait on the processes of Nature, for example, the growth and ripening of the crops. This provides stillness for reflection and a thought-life. The abundance and ease of food-production by irrigation and the use of the rivers released large numbers of the people from what had been almost the whole-time occupation of seeking food, for other occupations such as building the cities and a multitude of arts and crafts. This further widened the area of the secular, the unmysterious and the rational. Moreover, the capital produced by agriculture created a leisured class, who had time for reflective thought and from whom came the rulers, organizers, artistic workers, the early philosophers, and the leaders of religion. It was these factors which made the Civilized Mind possible.

Abstract or Conceptual Thought

We may now take some examples of the chief quality of that Civilized Mind, viz. the power of abstract or conceptual thought. In looking back over the history of the ancient civilizations it is possible to see how the dependence of the primitive mind upon the perceptual, the concrete, the material, yields to the power of abstract thought. The most striking example is the Egyptian reforming king, Akhenaten. He is of the Prophetic Horizon, one of the galaxy of great thinkers of the new type, although he comes so early as the fourteenth century B.C. (*c.* 1385). He belongs to a nation that is singularly concrete-minded, and, because of that primitive quality, retains throughout its history a primitive type of religion along with its marvellous works of engineering, building, and other arts. The ancient Egyptian keeps to the end that earliest and most concrete of all conceptions of the future life, namely, that it is a simple continuation of the present life; and he is content with the idea that to provide the dead man with a mummy for a body, and symbolic miniatures of the food, servants, etc., necessary to him, is to supply him with the conditions of a happy hereafter. It is deeply interesting, therefore, to find Akhenaten combine the abstract with the ethical in the remarkable motto of his seal, "Living in the truth," and exemplify it in his art, his religion, and his domestic life. There is a notable universalism in his thought of Aten, his sun-god, as the creator of not only the land of Egypt but of the foreign lands of Syria and Cush. There is a concession which is not surprising to the concrete way of thinking in the representation of the deity by the symbol of the sun's disk with rays proceeding from it; but the abstract and ethical conception breaks through in the hands, extended in blessing, in which the rays end. It may be an excess of enthusiasm in Flinders Petrie to suggest that there is an anticipation

of modern science in this conception of the sun's rays as the source of life and action; but he is probably right in saying that "it was a reaching forward to the truth with a truly philosophic view and determination, which anticipated the course of thought some thousands of years."[1]

A second early example of the development of abstract thought is associated with the Indo-European peoples who invaded India about 1500 B.C., and also with the teaching of the Iranian prophet, Zarathushtra. It is the abstract, conceptual, and moral principle called ṛta by the Indian and aṣa by the Iranian branch of these Indo-Iranians. In ṛta one seems to observe the original fountain of the ideas of right, equity, justice, which enter into Western civilization, and flow through the history of Greece and Rome and of the later European nations in the various streams of ethics and law, of science and the observed order of Nature, of philosophy and of moral ideals for the conduct of the individual and the right relations of men in society. The principle is closely associated with the high god of Zarathushtra, Ahura Mazda, as well as with Varuna, the finely ethical heaven-god of the Indian Rigveda. In the original teaching of Zarathushtra there is a strong vein of abstraction, while there is a singular absence of concrete symbolism and of sensuous representations of every kind. Even Heaven is for him the House of Good Thought and Hell the House of the Lie. It is the more striking that the twin enthusiasm of the Iranian prophet with his religion is his enthusiasm for agriculture. It appears to have for him the freshness of a new discovery, and he regards himself as in some sort an apostle of the tilling of the fields and the sowing of corn.

It is scarcely possible to trace behind the conceptual and ethical principle of ṛta and beyond the genius of Zarathushtra the tribal way of thinking of the people from which they came; but it *is* possible to see, in the subsequent history, a reversion to Tribalism in which the nature of the primitive type of thought can be clearly seen. The nature of the relapse can be traced most simply in the Indian branch, in the story of the vanishing of the high ethical god Varuna, to whom are addressed the loftiest hymns of the Rigveda, from the worship of the Aryans shortly after their settlement in India, and the luxuriant growth of the religion of the Brahmanic priesthood, which was a jungle of ritual and magic charms of the most primitive and concrete kind. On the other hand, the fact remains that the civilized or modern type of mind had arrived in India once for all, and was only buried for a time beneath that jungle of the primitive; for it is undoubtedly the case that weariness of the ritual and pretensions of the Brahmans was a strong contributory cause of the movement for release or deliverance in India

[1] W. M. Flinders Petrie: *Tel-el-Amarna* (Methuen), p. 41.

within the period of what we have called the Prophetic Horizon. It was then, when in Palestine, and in Greece and in China, men of the civilized and modern type of mind were turning to the abstract and ethical in thought and conduct, that the early philosophers of North India sought peace of mind in meditation and mystic union, while the Buddha preached his "four noble truths" and the ethical eightfold path to the attainment of them.

The Development of Law

The transition from the tribal to the civilized mind is nowhere more marked than in the history of the growth of Law. Law in the sense of general principles, each applicable to a multitude of similar cases, does not exist for the primitive mind; and there are only tentative, embryonic forms of it in the ancient civilizations. The most primitive societies known to us have their rules of conduct which are taught to the youths in the initiations; and these might be called the "laws" of the tribe; but the typical instruction is that of certain Australian aborigines whose elders describe or dramatize the things the youths must not do, saying, "If you do this when you return to the tribe, you will be killed." In other words, each rule is a statement of a concrete act which must not be done. Now, this concrete, atomistic character enters into the earliest collections of laws in the ancient civilizations. These are of comparatively late origin, after 2000 B.C., that is, when the civilized mind had had time to develop; and they include the Code of Khammurabi, the Hebrew Book of the Covenant, the early Roman collection of the Twelve Tables of about 200 B.C., and others later but still of the same type, such as the Indian Laws of Manu and the early Norwegian and Anglo-Saxon Laws. These compilations are primitive in character in that they are not *codes* as understood by lawyers in modern times, because they are not unified under general principles which apply to many separate cases and situations, but are collections of rules for dealing with specific cases which may and do actually arise. The early codes are "thus intermediate between the primitive and the civilized products of intelligence in that they are, on the one hand, the result of conceptual thought in a simple form, bringing together into one code, issued under one authority, a number of rules which are available for the community in an accessible form, while, on the other hand, they retain the primitive atomistic character of meeting each particular demand for guidance or judgment in its own particular way."[1]

The emergence of the modern type of laws in which general principles are embodied in statutes which govern a multitude of cases, was not achieved in the most ancient civilizations. It was

[1] *Law and Religion* (Sheldon Press, 1938), p. 9.

compelled to wait, on the one hand, for the development of the power of abstract and conceptual thought to the height which it attained in the Greek genius for science and philosophy, and, on the other hand, for the emergence of ethical conceptions such as justice, compassion, value for personality, which is owed perhaps most of all to the Hebrew prophets, but also again to the Greek thinkers, and to both of these combined in the Christian system. This development is *par excellence* the civilized mind.

The Personal Self or Soul

One may contrast finally the primitive and the civilized mind by observing the process by which man has arrived at the idea of personal self or soul. There is a curious sameness in the process in all those people which have achieved civilization, whether ancient or modern. It is an advance from concrete metaphors to abstract ideas, and from various images to a unified conception. In some religions the unification is never completed, so that the ancient Egyptians and the modern Chinese think of a plurality of souls. In China[1] there was the universal vague notion of the person himself existing after death as seen in dreams, then the *shih* or medium indwelt by the departed at the funeral feast, then the *ch'i* or life-breath, and finally the ethical quality called *i*, the moral self or conscience. With all these varied elements it would seem as if but a step were needed to reach the consummation in the unified conception of the soul, the self of the individual. But that step was never taken; and the reason for this throws a further light on the nature of the civilized mind. It is that at the great period of Chinese thought from the fifth to the third century B.C. the supreme teachers of the Confucian school, though within the Prophetic Horizon, were lacking in certain characteristics of the civilized mind, namely, the impatience of contradictions, the zeal for the wholeness of truth, and the sense of the right of every man to the whole of truth. Hence there was a complacent toleration of the existence of the primitive beliefs of the people in general, and a contentment that the ordinary man should be devoted to ancestor-worship, magic, and divination, so long as the higher thought was known to the sages. This was a tragic error in the history of the Chinese people. The Greek philosophers and dramatists and the Hebrew prophets about this same period acted upon a different principle. The Greek mind, intolerant of contradiction within itself and making no compromise with untruth in any sphere, went on to create science and philosophy; and the Hebrew prophets, resisting to the utmost not merely social injustice and oppression but unreality and reaction to tribalism in religion, sowed the seed of the highest ideal in ethics and what is purest and universal in religion.

[1] A. Waley: *The Way and its Power* (Tao-te-Ching), pp. 26 f.

LEARNING FROM EXPERIENCE

E. S. BUDDEN, D.PHIL.

THE following is an attempted answer to the question: in what kind of world is learning from experience possible? The method is to build up imaginatively a world until what has in general outline been constructed is such as to permit the kind of learning by experience with which we are all familiar. We may hope that some interesting facts even now may emerge from a consideration of this trite subject. Not all that we know has been learnt from experience, though, no doubt, anything we know, if it has come to our notice, has done so in the course of experience. With this truth we are not concerned. Our subject is what is called "empirical science"; but by sometimes calling it by the homelier name appearing in the title of this paper, we may remind ourselves that we are not dealing with a specialist branch of knowledge or a technical subject, but with what is a necessary feature of even the most commonplace experience.

It is obvious that in a world which consisted of a single simple event or thing, no learning would be possible. So that our world, if One, must also be Many. It is obvious, too, that, even if there is no other process of coming-to-be, there must be the coming into being of our knowledge. Time, therefore, must somehow belong to our world. So far as we can see, it belongs to the external world as well as to the succession of our states of mind. In a somewhat similar fashion, we might be able to divine that our world must also be spatial; but this is too difficult a matter for our present discussion. We will, as it were, take Space as a gift, since our interest is to discover, not what may be *remotely*, but what is *obviously*, a condition of learning from experience.

We can imagine a world both temporal and spatial and both Many and One, in which there still could not be learning. It would be a world in which one thing happened after another, and in which things were to the right of, left of, below, above, etc., one another. Yet the God who created it might quite well have taken great care not to repeat himself in the matter with which he filled space and time. It is not difficult to see that, in these circumstances, even language would hardly be possible.

Moreover, everything in such a world might be inevitably what it is through God's inexorable decree, nothing being present whose whole being is not fully *determined*. Yet even this determinism does

not help. What at least we require is *repetition*, and determinism is no guarantee or source of repetition. Theologians may find they have to argue from God's perfection to the thorough determination of the universe, but we are mistaken if we suppose that determinism (in this, as I believe, the proper sense), is a condition which the world must satisfy if it is to allow of knowledge from observation. God might, deliberately, upset our forecasts. In such a case, it would not mean that the world was undetermined or subject to chance. What we expect of God is something much more complicated than the outlawry of chance.

Something might be learned once our world contained similarities or repetitions of a simple kind. Suppose an artist to daub a canvas with various colours at random. We might remark that the colour in one corner is like that of another, and find a common name for them. We might count the patches of red and of blue, and so forth. The same would in principle be true of all kinds of similarities; we might note them as small boys will note the numbers on motor cars or railway engines. Not only might we recognize all reds as instances of redness; we might also recognize all colours as instances of colour; and so with other characteristics. Yet though we should be apprehending the universal, we are still not doing anything like what empirical science does at its most developed.

For what the scientist does is above all to argue from the known to the unknown. The scientist is essentially a prophet. The historian may often be content merely to say: "I might have known . . ."; or: "I ought to have expected . . ." The scientist, and indeed all of us in the practical business of life, are arguing to *what will be* from *what is* and *has been*; or to *what must have been* from *what now is*; or to *what lies outside our vision* from *what lies within it*. The difference between science and history lies not so much in their method, but in that the scientist gambles on his knowledge more frequently than the historian, being essentially a "student of form," while, by comparison, the historian is a reminiscent gossip, a teller of idle tales.

As we can see, the conditions which make generalization possible are not enough to make prophecy, as above described, possible. For we might note, for example, that all particular colours are instances of colour, or that noises are sometimes loud and, at other times, soft, without having anything from which we might prophesy that the next colour will be red, or any other particular colour, or the next noise loud. No doubt in a world in which generalization is possible, language is possible, but what is sufficient for language is not sufficient for prophecy.

It is not enough, then, that our world should contain similarities. It must exhibit patterns composed, of course, of more than one

distinguishable element. In these patterns, the elements may succeed one another (e.g. melody); or they may occur or exist at the same time (e.g. harmony). In actual fact, the patterns we think we discern are mostly, as it were, both melodic and harmonic. Where we believe there are patterns, or, as we usually say, where we think two or more things are causally connected, we argue, with varying degree of confidence, from the awareness that one element has occurred or is actual to the occurrence or actuality of the other elements in the past, in the future, or in some other place. If we never found what we could take for patterns, we should hardly be justified in looking for them; apart from the fact that we do find them, we have no reason to suppose they exist. Moreover, we think that because we have, in some cases, found what we believe to be patterns, there are others yet to be found; but that is a mere supposal. Again, it would be absurd to suppose that, because we have observed some apparently constant conjunctions, there are no events, characters, or things, etc., which are not constituents of a pattern. If we claimed that learning from experience would be impossible unless everything in the universe (*a*) belongs to a kind at least twice exemplified; and (*b*) is a constituent of a pattern at least twice exemplified, we are making a claim that can have no justification. For, what reason is there for supposing that science is only possible at all if debarred from exhaustive knowledge of the world only by such limitations as time and space, i.e. that science is only possible if it, theoretically, could be the full and complete account of all reality? We should hardly be too emphatic if we said that such a claim outrages common sense. What science requires is that there shall be patterns, not that everything should be a constituent of a pattern. Otherwise, we might say, analogously, that if there are to be any rules for industry, every thing in industry must be regulated.

Again, in howsoever subtle a fashion we may reason, we cannot show that the only universal judgments we can make at all are those which are both true and known to be true; or that the possibility of predicting at all rests on the possibility of predicting with absolute certainty. Yet these are the arrogant claims we imply in such statements as: "Science is possible only on the assumption that every event has a cause"; and: "Science presupposes the Uniformity of Nature." In truth, the business of science is to look for causes; but there can be no certainty in particular cases that there are causes to be found.

So far, however, we have not often used the word "cause." Has it not been unnecessary, and will not its use now introduce into the discussion a matter that has not *naturally* arisen? So far, we have been concerned with patterns of events, qualities, things, etc., and the proper relation between one constituent of a pattern and another

is not the relation of cause to effect, or *vice versa*. The notes of a melody, the flowers in the carpet, form a pattern, but they are not the causes and effects of one another. Causality is the *activity* of bringing about a change; it is not an observable relation. We are sometimes aware of ourselves as causing; we sometimes infer that other people have been active; we are in some measure aware of the limitations of our power to act, and we usually assume that people suffer from the same kind, though not necessarily the same degree, of limitation. Where we find anything, as we believe, beyond the competence of humanity to bring about, we may believe that some other agency has been at work, because we think, perhaps *a priori*, perhaps merely as a matter of prejudice, that nothing in nature is capable of bringing itself into being. In this sense, viz. "nothing brings itself into being," "every event has a cause" is of no special importance to the possibility of learning from experience.

In the sense that every event is a constituent of a pattern at least twice exemplified, "every event has a cause" *is* relevant to the possibility of science, but so far from being necessarily true, is, as we may see, necessarily false. It may be the case that history *as a whole* repeats itself, but, in the first place, there is no reason to suppose it does, and, in the second, if it did, the absolute similarity between each Great Age would preclude the suggestion to the scientist of any particular connexions. Truly the repetition of what may be called *total* situations would give the observer a chance of looking more than once at the same thing, and he might then be able to pay particular attention to something which had, on the previous occasion, barely been noticed. We must, however, remember that if history did repeat itself, science could be no more developed in one Age than in another.

We are interested in discovering two or more phenomena which occur together or not at all. If every phenomenon were as indispensable to the occurrence for whose inseparable companions we are looking, there would be no patterns, or families, at all capable of being isolated, and, so far as we could see, anything might happen, and so any kind of prophecy would be impossible. For example, if the falling of the rain is a condition as necessary as the blowing of the wind to the removal of my hat on a stormy night, and yet not more necessary a condition than my being a philosopher, and Queen Anne's death, there will be no "causal" law to be discovered. In short, the being and discovery of many patterns or connexions are only possible if there is also lack of connexion. Moreover, if we reflect, we can see that we should be doing no more than evade the issue if we took refuge in a statement that, though there are degrees of relevance, everything in the world is in some degree relevant to the occurrence of everything else. For the real issue

is between indispensability and the lack of it. You can drown a cat in either salt or fresh water; it just does not matter *at all* whether the water is salt or fresh. Similarly the behaviour of the sunspots is either an indispensable condition of my toothache, or it has *no* connexion.

This at least is true so far as the connexions discernible by us are concerned. Of course, in the eyes of God, the universe may be like a great work of art, a whole in which everything has a place determined by the beauty or purpose of the whole. If this be the case, and we must be inclined to hope so, we can hardly claim to know that it is, or to hope to discern the aesthetic or teleological inevitability of Nature as we observe it.

Now if the absence of connexion is necessary to the being and being discerned of connexions, then there are some things which are not constituents of patterns at least twice exemplified. Not every event can have a "cause," otherwise *no* event would have a "cause." Prediction rests for its possibility on the very conditions which ensure its uncertainty. We can learn from experience, because our knowledge so obtained can never, even after its own style, be complete.

When the scientist performs an experiment, he has to begin at the beginning. He, by bringing into being one constituent of a pattern, puts nature under an obligation to complete the pattern. Because of this necessity of beginning at the beginning, an emphasis, in some ways false, has been placed on the relation between successive constituents. But their inseparability has nothing to do with their successiveness; for, to use the traditional terminology, the necessity of the connexion is the same whether the elements connected follow one another or are in being at the same time. We have already hinted that to argue from what is seen now and here to the unseen now and there is to prophesy in the same way as to predict is prophecy.

This account is, of course, much over-simplified. Yet it is difficult to believe that a more detailed analysis would discover any great difference of principle. The nature of the constituents of the patterns has been left vague; they are perhaps not only events, things, and qualities; but to expand the list at all would give the impression of an attempt to be exhaustive.

Finally, since the discussion has an obvious bearing on the free-will problem, it may be observed that psychology can discover some general truths about human nature only because some truths about human nature are not general. Here, as in other fields of scientific knowledge, if we may use a metaphor, the subject studied is a game which, though it has many and complicated rules, is not determined to the last detail by them. Now, though the game may

develop as a whole, though what we have done in part limits what we yet may do, our freedom though circumscribed is not destroyed —at least until we are on the verge of being checkmated. That I can guess what John will do is no reason for denying his possession of freedom. I can only guess. Perhaps if I myself knew what it was to be rational, knew in full John's circumstances and purposes, and how rationality would require me to act relative to them, and that rationality would not be confronted by alternatives equally good, I might, if I knew that John was going to be rational, be justified in betting on his future course of action. But I cannot even know whether he will be rational or drift along with the tide.

NEW BOOKS

Ideals and Illusions. By L. Susan Stebbing (London: Watts & Co. 1941. Pp. xiv + 206. Price 8s. 6d. net.)

In her illuminating discussion of Bentham and the Utilitarians, Professor Stebbing remarks that they seemed to be talking about the pleasures of life, but their real concern was with misery and pain. Her own book is haunted by the oppression, the fear and misery which are the daily bread of so many people to-day. It is that which is her real concern. She seeks to diagnose the conditions which have led to this evil, so far as these conditions depend on men's attitude to life. She is not writing as a historian, and does not discuss economic or political issues. Behind these issues she sees conflicting ideals of the life of man, some of which are in her view demonstratively evil, some of which, though attractive in their own way, rest on illusions; and it is these conflicts of ideals which form the explicit theme of her book. But always her real concern is with misery and the resulting loss of opportunity to "have life, and have it more abundantly." The evil of the totalitarian conception of life she thinks can only be fully understood if this conception is realized to be an ideal; and to it she opposes the ideal expressed in the American Declaration of Independence, which she sums up in her own sentence, "All men ought to be free and happy." Her aim is to bring out what this involves and to show that it is an ideal worth striving for. The totalitarian has no interest in trying to secure that persons shall be either free or happy in her sense; the advocates of Christianity whom she quotes do not believe that it is possible for anyone to be free and happy so long as he thinks only of this world, and does not put his faith in a world beyond; while there are many who have no belief in ideals at all, and see in the business of life only an attempt to seize what advantages the changing conditions offer. I am not sure whether Professor E. H. Carr, whose position she attacks in the first chapter, really comes into this third class. I have not managed to read his book, and she may be right; but the quotations she gives seem capable of a different interpretation. It may be that what he is concerned to do is to attack, not those who formulate ideals and try to work towards them, but rather those who, both in formulating and in working towards their ideals, give too little consideration to the actual conditions under which they have to work, and, if we might so put it, hitch their waggon to a star which looks attractive without troubling about the stability of the waggon. But whether Professor Carr holds it or not, the position she attacks is one which is often held, and her attack seems to me to be sound. Equally sound I think is her objection to the view indicated by her quotations from Miss Rosalind Murray and Cardinal Newman. Taken by themselves, these quotations would suggest that it is not only possible to "save people's souls" (in the orthodox Christian sense) without any attempt to change the insanitary, poverty-stricken, ugly conditions in which they may be living, and without helping them to an education such as befits a human being, but infinitely more important to save their souls than to change their conditions. It is true that the Church has never held that the latter can be neglected, but the point Professor Stebbing has to make is important in spite of this. Her point is that on the view she is attacking, the conditions under which

people live cannot strictly speaking be described as either good or bad: just as Kant said that there is nothing good in itself but the good will, so on this view, there is nothing bad in itself but the bad will; evil consists entirely in disobedience to the will of God, and conditions of life can (according to the quotation from Miss Murray) be described as evil only in so far as they result from evil actions. Against this Professor Stebbing puts the point that no action can be described as evil unless there are conditions which can themselves be described as evil independently of the actions which produce them; and that the judgment that certain conditions are evil is a judgment of an entirely different type from the judgment that certain actions are evil, and independent of it. I should have liked this to be developed more fully.

What may be called the ideal of "other-worldliness" is often reinforced by a double attack on those whose outlook is concentrated on life in this world. They are told firstly that they *cannot* have a genuine morality, since morality is meaningless unless one believes in God and in human immortality, and secondly that they *do not* have a genuine morality, but that all their actions which look moral are but disguised forms of self-seeking. The first statement is clearly theoretical; the second I will call quasi-factual. Professor Stebbing deals with both these arguments in her last chapter, entitled "The Last Illusion"; her treatment depends on her view, defended in the second chapter, that the terms "spiritual" and "worldly" are not opposed, but that "there are spiritual excellencies in and of this world, this temporal world—i.e. our world." I agree with her. I do not think it strengthens the case for religion to argue that without religion life must be degrading. And the quasi-factual statements are open to grave objection in point of form. For example in the quotation given by Professor Stebbing from Mr. Heard, that " . . . the Rationalist, as is reasonable, lives a life of continually increased material satisfactions and continually lowered achievements," we have an assertion which looks like a statement of fact, while it is probably, as she notes, a conclusion deduced from Mr. Heard's own views with regard to the nature of ethics. In general, such statements, if taken as statements of fact, would be a libel on some of the best men and women; but they succeed by their form in conveying this libel without actually committing themselves to it. I should have liked her to rewrite Mr. Heard's statement in accordance with the principle laid down in Chapter VIII for speaking plainly; it clearly needs this. So do all similar quasi-factual statements.

I have left myself no space to deal with many other points Professor Stebbing discusses, or with her own positive exposition of the democratic ideal, and of what it involves; but I hope I have said enough to give some idea of the wide range of topics and of the timeliness of her book. It is an admirable book, lucid and well planned, sincere and written with restraint and yet with great depth of feeling.

L. J. Russell.

Reason and Revolution. Hegel and the Rise of Social Theory. By Herbert Marcuse. (New York: Oxford University Press. London: Milford. 1941. Pp. xii + 431. Price 21s. 6d. net.)

In the Germany of Hegel's youth, feudalism was still prevalent, and the masses were in bondage to the privileged few, "the impotent prey of their despotic power." Denied political freedom, they were reconciled to their lot only through accepting Luther's doctrine of freedom as an inner value, or by finding peace in the pursuit of art, philosophy, or religion. In these circumstances, Hegel saw the individual as "estranged" from the state, and

he became obsessed by the problem of how the ancient Greek harmony of intellectual with social and political life could be recreated in Germany. How could state and individual be so reconciled that freedom might be attained *in* political life instead of outside it? After trying unsuccessfully to find a solution of this question in religion, Hegel turned to philosophy, especially to logic, because he realized that the opposition of individual to state was only one of many oppositions, such as those of thought and being, subject and object, which the traditional logic had taken as fixed and immutable, and none of them could be overcome unless that logic could be transcended. The Hegel of many text-books is portrayed as preoccupied with logical abstractions; but the real Hegel pursued these only in order to discover a metaphysical framework for the solution of the concrete problems in politics, religion, etc., which were his primary interest.

It is with the real Hegel that Dr. Marcuse is always concerned, and the first half of this book ably summarizes the structure of Hegel's thought and interprets its development, with special reference to its political application, in his theological writings, through the major works of his maturity, to the philosophies of Right and History. While Dr. Marcuse does not shirk the difficulty of expounding the early part of the *Phenomenology* and the essential features of the *Logic*, he makes his points clearly and lights up the concrete background of Hegel's abstractions. He distinguishes two main trends in Hegel's thought: the first is dialectical, and this leads to a genuine solution of the political problem; the second is a shelving of the problem, a relapse from dialectic to a positivist acceptance of things as they are.

The connection between the abstract reasoning of Hegel's logic and an advocacy of political reform is not immediately obvious; but Dr. Marcuse shows in detail that it is real and necessary. When Hegel described the essence of dialectic as "negativity," he was indicating that it was an essentially critical instrument and thus implicitly a generator of opposition to prevailing social, as well as intellectual, forms. For a world of positive, given, entities in fixed opposition to one another, dialectical logic substitutes a world in process of development. Now what develops both is and is not; its truth lies not in its present state but in the whole process of its production and producing. The spur to this process is negativity (we become men by *putting away* childish things), but the negating of a past condition is at the same time the positing of a new condition to be negated in its turn as development proceeds. Categories (in the development of thought) and things (in the development of reality, the reflex of thought) are thus as much negative as positive, and all are to be rejected, instead of accepted as given, because they are all but stages in a development to be completed only by their negation. If this account of thought and reality be true, then oppositions lose their fixity, for in order to become explicitly what it genuinely is (i.e. what it was implicitly at the start) the thing developing must become what it is *not*, i.e. it must negate itself and find its fulfilment by passing over into its opposite. For instance, the individual is in essence free, but his freedom lacks actuality, and his essence remains unfulfilled, until he negates his particularity and enters into the social and political relationships which at first sight seem to be purely objective and the plain negative of his freedom. From this point of view, objective political institutions are in essence mere means to the actualization of the subject's freedom, and when the individual realizes this fact he will proceed to change the existing system in order to make it such a means, i.e. to make it correspond with its essence and so become "rational." Along this route, individual and state lose their set opposition and can be harmonized, for if men still lack political freedom, then existing states con-

tradict their nature as states, and this is an irrationality which the free individual can, and, because he is rational, ought to negate and abolish.

In the *Philosophy of Right* these views are not wholly absent, but what Dr. Marcuse finds dominant is the less progressive strain in Hegel's thought. Hegel had lost the confidence of youth and begun to feel that the world, now grown old, might be "understood by philosophy, but not rejuvenated." The task of philosophy then is to discern the rationality of what is, rather than to defend a theory in the light of which the present could be changed for the better. For instance, Hegel saw in "civil society" a system which was based on the satisfaction of private needs but which led inevitably to poverty and unemployment; and Dr. Marcuse thinks that his dialectical principles ought to have led him, as they later led Marx, to urge the negation of the capitalist economy which produced this result. Instead, Hegel took the contradictions and miseries of civil society to be ultimate, and, as a palliative, superimposed an "all-powerful" state which led to war and the suppression of individual freedom. Thus, Dr. Marcuse argues, he regarded the social and political institutions of his day as rational and inevitable, but this was in effect to relapse into that positivist acceptance of the rigidity of facts against which his major works were a sustained protest.

In the second half of his book, Dr. Marcuse turns to consider Hegel's posthumous influence on the development of social theory. He shows how, after 1830, there was a growing conviction that philosophy had come to an end. Truth had been domiciled in a complex of abstract principles, but man's concrete welfare now demanded the "negation" of philosophy in the interests of either the individual (Kierkegaard's irrationalism, which "later made it possible to exalt above the universality of reason such particularities as the race or the folk"), social practice (Marx), or a scientific sociology (Comte and his followers). Dr. Marcuse argues that of the post-Hegelian social theorists, it is Marx alone who adopts and develops, instead of opposing, Hegel's most distinctive and progressive ideas. Marx agreed with Hegel that theory upheld reason, right, and freedom; he accepted Hegel's analysis of the misery and injustice of civil society in practice. But he inferred that since practice here "negated" theory, the existing system should, on dialectical principles, be negated in its turn by socio-historical action. In his shrewd and incisive analysis of Marx, Dr. Marcuse does not overestimate Marx's debt to Hegel, and he goes on to defend historical materialism against the charge of determinism and to interpret the identification of theory and practice as implying a pre-eminence of theory and as compatible with an absolutist view of truth.

It is this attitude to theory which, in Dr. Marcuse's judgment, differentiates Marx from the positivism which "has dominated sociology from Comte's day to this." The characteristics and consequences of this positivism are made plain in a trenchant critique of Comte, F. J. Stahl, and L. von Stein, and there is little difficulty in showing the distance which separates these writers from Hegel. The dialectic was essentially *critical*; positivism accepts social facts as if they were as rigid as the natural phenomena studied by physical science, and it is therefore committed to a *neutrality*, which soon results in conservatism and the defence of the *status quo*. The last chapter of the book briefly reviews Hegelianism in Great Britain and Italy, and ends by showing not only that Hegel's philosophy is an enemy, instead of a source, of Fascist and National-Socialist theory and practice, but that the apologists of these "ideologies" are fully conscious of the fact. As one of them has tersely put it: "On the day of Hitler's ascent to power, Hegel died."

Dr. Marcuse's interpretations are often novel, but they are well documented and therefore easily checked; despite the wideness of the field, he never loses

sight of his main contentions; his details are sufficient to illuminate, never so excessive as to obscure. Nevertheless, the reviewer is bound to record his opinion that Dr. Marcuse is sometimes inaccurate in detail to an extent which may mislead the unwary. Some examples may be given from his treatment of Hegel's *Philosophy of Right*.

(i) The relation between "civil society" and state is persistently obscured. Dr. Marcuse treats them as essentially separate and distinct (p. 213), but Hegel holds that the former is contained within the latter (§§ 260 ff.), once the state comes on the scene. Up to that point society is a training-ground for politics (e.g. § 187). Concentration on economic satisfactions brings frustration, and hence institutions (police and corporations) are needed to curb selfishness and to train the individual to recognize and promote the common good which political life presupposes. The state is thereafter able to ensure in politics the freedom which individuals could not gain in society where their sole interests were economic. Doubtless Hegel was in error on his own principles in regarding the contradictions of society as necessitated by economic life, instead of by a specific form of that life; but to suggest, as Dr. Marcuse does (p. 214), that Hegel ought to have unified state and society (otherwise than he does by packing the latter into the former) is to invite him to make the error, brought home by subsequent history to Marx, of ignoring political and national interests or subordinating them to economics. (ii) Dr. Marcuse often refers to Hegel's "absolute" or "all-powerful" state (e.g. p. 220), and says that Hegel accepts and "glorifies" the Prussian monarchy (p. 218). These expressions are perplexing, because elsewhere he makes it plain that Hegel always advocated a state based on law, not on a despot's decree, and that he "endorsed the state only in so far as it preserved and promoted individual freedom" (p. 389). And any history book reveals the error of supposing that Hegel's rational state was identical with *any* existing state. Dr. Marcuse greatly exaggerates the extent to which Hegel accepted the *political* order of his own day. (iii) "Hegel denied that the progress of reason had anything to do with individual happiness" (p. 294). But see e.g. *Zusatz* to § 265 where Hegel says that "it is of course true that the aim of the state is the happiness of the citizens. If their subjective ends are unsatisfied, the state is on an insecure footing." (iv) "Hegel declares that fraud and crime are an unpremeditated or civil wrong" (p. 197). See §§ 84 ff., where "civil wrong" is specifically distinguished from the other two and treated in a different section. (v) "Hegel envisages a final situation where the labour of all will be subject to administrative regulation, § 236" (p. 212). Reference to the paragraph cited shows that Hegel envisages this only to reject it as incompatible with private welfare and personal freedom. (vi) In the corporation "the individual obtains only an ideological good, the honour of belonging to the corporation, § 253" (p. 213). Here again, to look up the reference is enough, for Hegel there says that the liveryman also receives sure subsistence and, if need be, poor relief. These are not "ideological" goods.

However, despite these and other similar blemishes, this is a book for which the reviewer is grateful and which he has read with admiration. To the patient and critical study of Hegel it is a contribution of distinction; but it is more than that, for it is also a pungent and timely critique of positivism as applied to the field of social and political conduct.

T. M. Knox.

The Philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead (Volume III in "The Library of Living Philosophers"). By various authors. Edited by PAUL ARTHUR SCHILPP. (Northwestern University, Evanston and Chicago. 1941. Pp. xx + 745. Price $4.00.)

In the General Introduction to this book by the Editor, he explains that in the present volume it was unfortunately not possible to get a "Reply" from the pen of Professor Whitehead to the descriptive and critical articles of his commentators and critics, on account of illness. In lieu of his reply Professor Whitehead has given to the Editor for publication his two most recent philosophical papers and utterances; papers concerning which he himself writes that they "summarize" his "final point of view" and constitute, to his own mind, a sufficient answer to his questioners and critics. These essays respectively are entitled "Mathematics and the Good," and "Immortality."

The book is a large one and deals with every aspect of Whitehead's philosophy. The volume opens with Autobiographical Notes, and these are very pleasant reading. We are presented with a picture of the boyhood's life of Whitehead in the 1870's in his North Foreland Vicarage home in the parish of St. Peter's, two or three miles from Ramsgate, possessing an old church with a Norman nave. In a few words Whitehead enables us to conjure up an image of the human background of his early, impressionable years: "Unconsciously I watched the history of England by my vision of grandfather, father, Archbishop Tate, Sir Moses Montefiore, the Pugin family, and others. This vision was the source of my interest in history and in education."

At the age of fifteen Whitehead was sent to Sherborne School and we are told a little about his studies there—the reading of Herodotus, Xenophon, Thucydides, Sallust, Livy, and Tacitus. He writes: "I can still feel the dullness of Xenophon, Sallust, and Livy." When he reached the higher forms, we learn that he was excused in the composition of Latin verse and the reading of some Latin poetry, in order to provide him with more time for mathematics. How fortunate his Masters showed such discernment! The Sherborne boys in those days read the Bible in Greek, using the Septuagint for the Old Testament. These Scripture lessons were popular "because the authors did not seem to know much more Greek than we did, and so kept the grammar simple."

The boy's last year at Sherborne was very enjoyable as Head of the School and Captain of Games. He played both football and cricket. The reviewer suspects that he was not only a steady bat, but was also handy with the ball when a too conservative partnership, however admirable the form displayed, had to be broken up for the sake of revivifying change.

On going to Trinity College, Cambridge, as a "Scholar," Whitehead took up seriously the study of Mathematics. At the same time he was in constant contact with friends on the classical and historical side of University studies. Here are the names of some of his contemporaries and friends—Henry Head, D'Arcy Thomson, Jim Stephens, Ned Wedd, Sorley, all fellow members of the "Apostles" Club.

The first chapter of the book is written by Mr. Victor Low on "Whitehead's Philosophical Development." It is a long chapter and deals with the historical unfolding of Whitehead's thought on Mathematics, the philosophy of Natural Science, and Metaphysics. Mr. Low has evidently read and pondered over everything that Whitehead in his long career has published. He proves himself a devoted and patient guide, a sympathetic exponent, and an extremely competent commentator.

Mr. William V. Quine follows with an essay on "Whitehead and the Rise

of Modern Logic." It is largely concerned with an exposition and criticism of *Principia Mathematica*, and comparisons with the work of Peano, Frege, and other mathematical logicians. The reviewer has no competence to appraise an essay on Mathematical Logic, but it is clear to him that the subject is handled with the mastery of an expert.

Mr. Filmer Northrop gives a full and excellent account of Whitehead's philosophy of science. He rightly says that Whitehead's books on this subject have been one continual protest against the bifurcation of Nature into the real Time, Space and physical objects postulated by the science of physics, and the psychological Time, Space, and sense perceptions of the observer. Dr. Northrop makes very clear to the reader the epistemological problem which this bifurcation of Nature set the philosophy of science, pointing out that Kant tried to overcome the impasse by the theory that the concepts of Space, Time, and Causality were derived from an *a priori* source. The writer then shows that Whitehead's view of Space differs from Einstein's in certain important respects. The connection between matter and space is essential to Einstein's theory of space: whereas Whitehead claims to be able to derive space from the continuum of events internally related, and without postulating matter at all. Dr. Northrop finds certain difficulties in accepting Whitehead's claim for a solution of the problem, because he thinks that in some respects it conflicts with Einstein's general theory of relativity.

Dr. Northrop also claims to show that Whitehead's assertion that simultaneity of spatially separated events is apprehended intuitively in sense experience, is true only of a particular individual observer, and that his account of simultaneity cannot provide for *public* time. But if there is no escape from a "postulated" simultaneity for all in the same frame of reference, we are back in the position of "bifurcation" of Nature once more!

Mr. Evander McGilvary has written on Whitehead's treatment of "Space-Time, Simple Location and Prehension." In the course of his comprehensive discussion, Mr. McGilvary says that in a recently published paper he has attempted to show that the assimilation of time and space was not the work of Einstein but of Minkowski, and that "it was accomplished by the use of the spurious equation $c = 1$, where c is the velocity of light adopted as unit velocity. . . . The equation $c = 1$ is spurious because c is a *velocity* unit and *not* unity (i.e. the number 1)." Mr. McGilvary, after explaining his own views, goes on to say: "There is as much difference between a unit of velocity and the number 1 as there is between 1 cow and the number 1. It is the failure to recognize this logical fact that brought 'Space-Time' into our world, and all the attendant mysticism."

Mr. Joseph Needham's contribution is entitled "A Biologist's View of Whitehead's Philosophy." He is sympathetic with a philosophy which regards Nature as consisting of "societies of societies of societies," to use Whitehead's phrase. He suggests that we may be on the threshold of a long period, lasting perhaps for several centuries, in which the organic conception of the world will transform human society. Mr. Needham, however, gently rebukes Whitehead for not being sufficiently outspoken in giving a stronger lead in sociological and political realms to "the social tendencies of our times." Others will be glad that Professor Whitehead refrained from assuming this rôle.

Mr. Percy Hughes's essay, "Is Whitehead's Psychology Adequate?" deserves close study. He considers that the key notion of Whitehead's discovery is "that the flux of energy throughout Nature is continuous, from the modes of electro-magnetic energy which are the special concern of Physics, to the spiritual aspirations expressed in human policy and art." Mr. Hughes points out that in Whitehead's philosophy the significance of the human body in

Nature is that it focalizes acts of all degrees of creative emphasis, and is a mechanism achieved by Nature for subordinating acts of minimum creativity (such, for example, as acts of routine) to acts of maximum creativity where there is conscious self-direction towards ideal ends. Mr. Hughes thinks that the body interpreted in this way justifies the new science of *Psychological Physiology* which Whitehead proposes.

This essay by Mr. Hughes seems to the reviewer excellent both in respect to those aspects of Whitehead's philosophy with which there is agreement and in regard to the various criticisms he makes in considering the question of the adequacy or otherwise of Whitehead's psychology.

Mr. Wilbur Urban's essay on "Whitehead's Philosophy of Language and its Relation to his Metaphysics" is destructive throughout. He complains that in inventing a new metaphysical idiom, Whitehead "excludes from metaphysical discourse all those concepts and categories which hitherto made communication between mind and mind possible." Mr. Urban is especially distressed at Whitehead's rejection of the subject-predicate category (with the corresponding categories of substance and quality) for philosophical purposes. He even goes so far as to maintain that the notion of an actual entity cannot be made intelligible apart from the substance-attribute category, and says he cannot understand how an occasion of experience can be *both* feeler and the unity emergent from its own feelings. It will be remembered that Whitehead has striven to make clear what he means by the term "subject." He explains that the word "subject" means the entity constituted by the process of feeling and including this process: and that feelings are the details of the process intermediary between this unity and its many data.

Mr. Urban extends his criticism still more widely. He asserts that the chief notions in Whitehead's metaphysics—feeling, value and valuation, mind, even the concept of God—are redesigned by Whitehead out of all recognition to fit into the philosophy of Process. Mr. Urban remains obdurate in spite of Whitehead's warning that deficiencies of language stand inexorably in the way of formulating metaphysical first-principles, and that in attempting this, words and phrases must be stretched towards a generality foreign to their ordinary usage.

Mr. A. D. Ritchie has given us a study on "Whitehead's Defence of Speculative Reason." As one would expect, it has been done with marked thoroughness and competence. Mr. Ritchie agrees with Whitehead's statement that reason applied to the solution of practical problems degenerates and petrifies as methodology and ultimately as mere habit unless it is revivified by reason "enthroned above the practical tasks of the world," seeking "with disinterested curiosity an understanding of the world." Mr. Ritchie considers that the most important utterance by Whitehead is the passage in *The Function of Reason* (p. 37), where it is stated that when mentality is working at a high level, it brings novelty into the appetitions of mental experience, and that in this function there is a sheer element of anarchy. But at this point mentality becomes self-regulative: "It introduces a higher appetition which discriminates among its own anarchic productions. Reason appears. . . . Reason is the special embodiment in us of the disciplined counter-agency which saves the world."

Mr. Arthur E. Murphy's discourse on Speculative Philosophy is a sweeping criticism of speculative philosophy in general and of Whitehead's particular species of the genus. He asserts that speculative philosophers first beg the question at the outset by identifying *ultimate* reality with some object of preference, and then proceed to affirm that everything else that cannot be poured into this chosen mould is either "appearance" or "non-entity."

Students of Whitehead will be aware that he claims that a "concrete" fact when looked into is discovered to be a fact of aesthetic experience. But Mr. Murphy does not see why "events, protons, electrons and the like should be a topic of aesthetic experience, centres of emotional concern." Also, he does not see why hosts of entities in the world should not be as "vacuously actual" as they appear to be.

Finally, Mr. Murphy questions Whitehead's dictum that the experience of every actual entity is a "value" experience, and that all ultimate reasons are in terms of aims at value. He remarks: "Why should I trust my rudimentary grasp of the dim meaning of actuality as more ultimate information than physics can supply as to what is going on emotionally inside Cleopatra's Needle on the Thames Embankment?"

Mr. William E. Hocking has chosen as his theme "Whitehead on Mind and Nature." It is only possible here to state baldly two or three objections raised against Whitehead's philosophy. First, Mr. Hocking balks at the view that inorganic occasions in Nature, such as those subjacent to light rays, have self-enjoyment. Certainly, according to Whitehead's system, every actual entity has a "mental" pole as well as a "physical" pole. Consequently I suppose it must be said that a subjacent occasion connected with a light ray experiences its own relevant "sensum." This, however, should not be interpreted as the identical sensum of the concrescent percipient event which has developed by "enhancement" along the whole causal chain. Still less should "conscious" self-enjoyment be read into low-grade inorganic occasions.

Secondly, Mr. Hocking claims that "bifurcation" can be avoided without assuming that all occasions are self-creative and experience self-enjoyment. This is how he puts his point. If ultimately the "whole" is on one side of the fork, and a "part" on the other, the fork image ceases to apply. He urges that this is the precise position. His actual words are: "Nature is complete *for me*, and what is abstracted off into the set of physical conditions is a part of the Whole." Mr. Hocking, however, does not explicitly tell us what kind of experience the "whole" is from which the abstraction is made, and consequently the problem is merely stated.

Finally, Mr. Hocking has wider grievances. He does not think we can account for creation by a principle of creativity, nor for the arrival of quality by the presence in the universe of an eternal entity which ingresses into Nature, nor for mind by "disseminating" through the universe germs of mentality. It is clear that each student of Whitehead must judge for himself whether or not Mr. Hocking's general disgruntledness is warranted.

Mr. Roy Wood Sellars contributes a chapter on "Philosophy of Organism and Physical Realism," the purpose of which is to contrast Critical Realism with Whitehead's philosophy and seek to justify the former. In summing up his discussion, Mr. Sellars states the agreements and differences between himself and Whitehead. Both he and Whitehead hold to a causal theory of presentations. Whitehead rejects the substance-predicative perspective, while Mr. Sellars seeks "to explore a more critical development of sense perception and its categories." Whitehead adopts a reformed subjectivism: Mr. Sellars essays a reformed materialism. In the realm of "perception" Mr. Sellars regards it as "a rather confused mingling of sensing and judging," and considers that things perceived are real and equally real selves are in commerce with them. Whitehead, on the other hand, maintains that there is no "vacuous" actuality, and that "togetherness" is only conceivable on the experienced foundations of felt, aesthetic, compresence. Concerning the category of substance, Mr. Sellars follows modern physical science in accepting the view that the constituents of Nature are "a relational complex, elements

in their domains, something co-existential, dynamic and productive of change." Mr. Sellars recognizes that Whitehead's reformed subjectivism conflicts with critical realism. Finally, Mr. Sellars rejects eternal objects. He holds that sensations are events and that the qualities of these events are as particular as the sensations.

Mr. John Goheen's study on "Whitehead's Theory of Value" is a very thorough piece of work. The reasoning is so close throughout the essay that it is not possible to give a summary of the argument, and the study must be read to be understood and appreciated.

In a recent paper by Whitehead ("Mathematics and the Good"), the function of "form" is emphasized as fundamental in the analysis of value. It is pattern or form which imposes limitations on existence, and with the limited occasion or event, value emerges. In regard to the Good in human life Whitehead says:

> "The cohesion of social systems depends on the maintenance of patterns of behaviour, and advances in civilization depend on the fortunate modifications of such behaviour patterns. Thus the *infusion* of pattern in natural occurrences, and the *stability* of such patterns, and the *modifications* of such patterns is the necessary condition for the realization of the Good."

Since every event has an "end," there is "adjustment" among the diverse feelings composing an Actual Entity, so that the various subjective forms may be interwoven in pattern contrasts. Thus the notion of "adjustment" has also significance both in the analysis of Beauty and the Good.

Mr. Goheen in his discussion asks whether the notions of "infusion," "stability," "modification," and "adjustment" indicate where experience of the good (or "beautiful") is to be found. He is inclined to think that the terms are so general that they would seem to hold for any change whatever. He considers something more specific is necessary to serve as a guide to the Good. Indeed, he maintains that the notions of "infusion" of pattern, "stability," "modification," and "adjustment" of pattern, have no significance apart from the analysis of value in terms of *demand of satisfaction*. Mr. Goheen, therefore, turns to Whitehead's theory of feeling for further light on the question. The greater part of the essay is devoted to an exposition of Whitehead's views on this topic developed in *Process and Reality, Modes of Thought, Adventures of Ideas*.

Mr. Goheen considers that the fundamental doctrines involved in Whitehead's theory of feeling reveal the fact that his conception of value is identical with feeling. In *Modes of Thought* Whitehead says: "Morality is always the aim at that unity and harmony, intensity, and vividness which involves the perfection of importance for that occasion." Mr. Goheen interprets this passage as meaning that it is Whitehead's intention to subject the central doctrine of "valuation" to the demands of aesthetic harmony. Indeed he maintains that Whitehead has even extended the notion of "harmony" and "perfection" to cover the situation of organic needs, "valuation," and the "end" valued. Mr. Goheen in his criticism remarks that the part-whole relation in aesthetic experience sometimes involves an element of discord. Does Whitehead, therefore, regard the need-end relation as a form of "Harmony" where some clash of "parts" intensifies the experience of the whole? Mr. Goheen considers that the extension of the notion of aesthetic harmony to the need-end relation "runs the risk of losing sight of the very nature of the relations in which 'valuation' takes place."

Mr. Goheen brings a number of other criticisms to bear on Whitehead's views, but only one other can be mentioned here. Throughout his writings Whitehead aligns "definite pattern," "unity," and "order" with satisfactory

feeling. Mr. Goheen does not see how it can be asserted that "definite pattern" is the source of satisfactory feeling. He remarks: "The resolution of conflict is not necessarily any more a pattern than the conflict itself." But although it may not be "more" of a pattern, it will at least be a "different" pattern. Consequently the "how" of feeling will be different. But Mr. Goheen evidently thinks that although pattern or form may well be a condition of Existence, form throws no light on the nature of Value or the Good. I do not think Whitehead would agree with this statement.

Notwithstanding his many criticisms, Mr. Goheen considers that Whitehead in his theory of feeling offers many doctrines which are important in the consideration of the nature of Value.

The reviewer found Mr. Bertram Morris's chapter on "Art Process and Aesthetic Fact" a little obscure. A number of questions are raised concerning which Mr. Morris feels disquietude. I can only mention two or three: Has Whitehead confused individuality with particularity? Does the assumption of God as the Poet of the World explain facts which could not be explained equally well without this assumption? Does the art-process begin with a kind of emergent, in some genuine sense disjoined from and discontinuous with the non-conscious processes of the physical world? Finally Mr. Morris is disturbed by Whitehead's remark that perhaps in the distant future "symbolic logic will become the foundation of aesthetics."

Mr. Julius Bixler contributes an excellent expository chapter on Whitehead's Philosophy of Religion. He points out that Whitehead is a philosopher who inquires about the meaning of religious intuitions rather than a theologian who offers proofs for the existence of a divine being. The divine element in the world is to be conceived as a persuasive and not a coercive agency, and it is the business of philosophical theology to show how the lure of persuasive reason arises in a world which seems to be based on the clash of senseless compulsions.

Whitehead attacks the problem as a problem of Cosmology. His philosophy in broad outline is *First*: there is the process of creation by which the actual world has the character of temporal passage into novelty. *Second*: there is the realm of eternal objects which ingress into the creative process and provide it with forms of definiteness, qualities, and values. *Third*: there is God, the actual non-temporal entity who in His primordial nature is the principle of concretion, effecting a definite outcome from a situation "otherwise riddled with ambiguity," and who in His consequent nature receives the creative advance of the world and saves what in it is worth while.

Whitehead connects religion with our deepest intuition of values. He says: "The peculiar character of religious truth is that it explicitly deals with values. It brings into our consciousness that permanent side of the universe we can care for."

The world as we know it is far from being a perfect harmony. There is evil, a positive disruptive force, the clash of incompatible aims, and Mr. Bixler points out that Whitehead closes his book, *Adventures of Ideas*, with a dualism which is not wholly resolved. On the one hand there is "Adventure," on the other "Peace," but not a complete harmony. Adventure, the eager seeking quest characteristic of the transient occasion, with its own inherent freshness and vigour, saves the world from staleness, boredom, and orthodoxy. Peace is the disclosure of the ideal harmony towards which each occasion may tend without the vitality being lost. "Yet," says Mr. Bixler, "as if he thought the word itself savoured too much of stale conformity, Whitehead seems unable to conclude with peace. His final emphasis is on the 'Unity of Adventure' where individuals retain their freedom yet share in a common quest."

Mr. Charles Hartshorne's discourse on "Whitehead's Idea of God" takes the form of an exhaustive analytical commentary. On one or two matters Mr. Hartshorne prefers his own amendments to Whitehead's conception of Deity. These divergencies are concerned (*a*) with the notion of "Creativity" and (*b*) with the notion of "The Primordial Nature of God."

In Whitehead's writings "Creativity" is distinguished from God and never identified with Him. He says: "It is the pure notion of the activity conditioned by the objective immortality of the world . . . it is the ultimate notion of the highest generality at the base of actuality . . . it cannot be characterized because all characters are more special than itself." It would, therefore appear that in the Organic Philosophy there is an "active factor" which is beyond God. Mr. Hartshorne, however, demurs, and gives his own interpretation. He urges that God has all activity within Himself. His actual words are: "All Creativity belongs to God *either, but not both,* as his own self-decision, *or* as his uniquely adequate way of being decided by others." But Whitehead has said: "It (God) shares the double character of being a creature of Creativity, and a condition for Creativity, with all creatures." And again: "Neither God, nor the world, reaches static completion. Both are in the grip of the ultimate metaphysical ground, the creative advance into novelty."

Concerning (*b*) Mr. Hartshorne asserts that Whitehead's description of "The Primordial Nature of God" as "conceptual" is inadequate. It will be remembered that Whitehead defines the Primordial Nature of God as the conceptual envisagement of the whole realm of eternal possibility, the non-fettered act of all-inclusive valuation, and as the "presupposed actuality of conceptual operation in unison of becoming with every other creative act." Mr. Hartshorne refuses to limit the Primordial Nature of God to "conceptual" activity. He claims that it is not only conceptual, but volitional and perceptual as well.

Mr. Paul Schilpp has made himself responsible for the chapter on Whitehead's Moral Philosophy. It is a very faithful and impartial piece of work. In his final critique he catalogues five points he considers stand in need of critical discussion, and two which he thinks call for rejection.

The points needing further elucidation are:

(*a*) Whitehead maintains that "Importance" is a generic notion, and that "morality," "logic," "religion," "art," are each a subordinate species. Mr. Schilpp remarks on this point that even if it were agreed that "importance" is fundamentally a combination of "interest" and "unity," it does not seem plausible that morality should be a species constituted by that combination.

(The reviewer thinks it necessary to mention here that Whitehead says that the category of importance arises out of "the fusion of the finite with the infinite.")

(*b*) The second question raised is whether "importance" is itself an ultimate category.

(*c*) The third question is this: Does not Whitehead tend to identify morality with "interest," resulting in the founding of morality upon the emotions in general? Would not this be a treacherous quicksand for the foundation of morals?

(*d*) The fourth question arises from Whitehead's remark, "Our intuitions of righteousness disclose an absoluteness in the nature of things: and so does the taste of sugar!" Mr. Schilpp wants to know whether this passage merely means that feelings are what they are, and are felt as what they are. If it means more than this, Mr. Schilpp demurs. He says that our intuitions of righteousness when closely inspected and analysed seem to him to disclose "neither any absoluteness in the nature of things, *nor* even about the intuitions themselves."

(The reviewer ventures to suggest that the passage in its context means this: Every occasion of experience should claim a relevance *beyond* finite immediacy, namely aesthetic significance. If any fail to do this, so much the worse for those occasions of experience, whether great or small.)

(*e*) Finally, Mr. Schilpp thinks that Whitehead cannot help seeing all things *sub*

specie mathematicae, and is troubled by the doubt whether a "coherent and rationally justifiable ethical theory" is capable of derivation from "sheer mathematics."

The two points in Whitehead's theory which Mr. Schilpp finds definitely objectionable are (1) Whitehead's view of the close connection between morality and beauty and (2) Whitehead's identification of the good with "pattern." Although claiming in his Harvard University lecture "Mathematics and the Good" to show the connection between Mathematics and the Good, Whitehead, according to Mr. Schilpp, has succeeded in this task no better than did Plato.

The reviewer can do little more here than mention Mr. Henry Holmes' valuable chapter on "Whitehead's Views on Education." Although Mr. Holmes has found certain aspects of Whitehead's general philosophy especially suggestive for educational policy, he does not think that Whitehead realizes the enormous difficulty of making education for the duller minds and slower-moving bodies what it can be for those more favourably endowed.

Mr. John Dewey brings to a close the many able expositions and critical essays of the book with one on "The Philosophy of Whitehead." Whitehead's well-known statement that "an occasion of experience which includes a human mentality is an extreme instance, at one end of the scale, of those happenings which constitute Nature," is regarded by Mr. Dewey as of great importance for philosophical thinking. Mr. Dewey is also sympathetic with Whitehead's dictum that the occasion of experience is within the world and the world is within the occasion, and that the categories of philosophy have to elucidate "this paradox of the connectedness of things—the many things, the one world without and within."

Mr. Dewey is, however, critical and unconvinced in regard to Whitehead's insistence that the basis of experience in every actual entity is emotional. He prefers a *functional* interpretation of identical elements, rather than the "falling back upon identity of contents."

Mr. Dewey is particularly severe in his criticism of Whitehead's statement that the notion of energy at the base of physics must be considered as an abstraction from the complex emotional and purposeful energy, inherent in the subjective form of the final synthesis of an actual occasion. He considers that such a view is a conversion of moral idealism into ontological idealism or spiritualism, "a conversion which the history of thought demonstrates to be the fatal weakness of the whole movement initiated by Plato and Aristotle."

The two latest papers by Professor Whitehead, "Mathematics and the Good" and "Immortality," are said by him to summarize his final point of view. They will be read with great interest by students of Whitehead. It is only possible here to give one or two quotations to illustrate the line of thought adopted.

"The superstitious awe of infinitude has been the bane of philosophy. The infinite has no properties. All value is the gift of finitude which is the necessary condition for activity. Also activity means the origination of patterns of assemblage, and mathematics is the study of pattern. Here we find the essential clue which relates mathematics to the study of the good, and the study of the bad."

But Professor Whitehead is careful to point out that the notion of pattern in respect of Good and Evil is meaningless without reference to the background of *feeling* within which the total pattern arises: "Every abstraction derives its importance from its reference to some background of feeling which is seeking its unity in one individual complex fact in its immediate present." That is to say, the nature of existence is the acquisition of pattern by feeling, and the notion of pattern emphasizes the relativity of existence, namely how things are connected.

In his paper on "Immortality," Professor Whitehead, for the purposes of

his argument, distinguishes two Worlds. The World which emphasizes the multiplicity of mortal things is the World of Activity, the World of Origination, the Creative World. The other World, the World which emphasizes Persistence, is the World of Value. Value is in its nature timeless and immortal. Value is the general name for the infinity of values, partly concordant and partly discordant. The essence of these values is their capacity for realization in the World of Action. The World of Creation aims at Value, whereas the World of Value is saved from futility by its impact upon the process of Creation.

"Personal identity" in a changing world of occasions is, says Professor Whitehead, the key example for understanding the essential fusion of the World of Activity with the World of Value. "Personal identity" is exhibited when the change in the details of fact exhibits an identity of primary character amidst secondary changes of value. "The identity serves the double role of shaping a fact and realizing a specific value."

The World of Change develops enduring Personal Identity as its effective aspect for the realization of value. But, says Whitehead, Realization is an essential factor in the World of Value to save it from mere futility of abstract hypothesis. This being the case the following statement is ventured:

"Thus the effective realization of Value in the World of Change should find its counterpart in the World of Value: this means that temporal personality in one World involves immortal personality in the other."

Again: "The World of Value exhibits the essential unification of the Universe. Thus while it exhibits the immortal side of the many persons, it also involves the unification of personality. This is the concept of God. . . . He is the unification of the multiple personalities received from the Active World. In this way, we conceive the World of Value in the guise of the co-ordination of many personal individualities as factors in the nature of God."

And finally: God's nature "receives into its unity the scattered effectiveness of realized activities, transformed by the supremacy of its own ideals. The result is Tragedy, Sympathy, and the Happiness evoked by Actualized Heroism."

But these two papers must be read in their entirety to appreciate the seriousness and profundity of Whitehead's last thoughts.

The volume is excellently printed and tastefully bound. There is a good index and a complete bibliography of Whitehead's writings.

SYDNEY E. HOOPER.

Science Versus Materialism. By REGINALD O. KAPP. (London: Methuen & Co., Ltd. 1940. Pp. vi + 280. Price 10s. 6d. net.)

This book, by the Pender Professor of Electrical Engineering at University College, London, is an attempt to solve the problem: Is Matter the only reality? Those who say yes are called materialists; some of those who say no are called vitalists. The author contends that the facts of science prove the materialists to be wrong. The only true criterion for distinguishing material from other reality is stated in two forms. According to the first, inorganic matter is determinate, but organic matter is doubly determinate—i.e. subject to the laws which characterize inorganic matter and an additional set of laws also. The second form of the criterion is that organic bodies are made to a specification, while inorganic bodies are not. The treatment is polemical rather than judicial, and the presentation is in a form designed to appeal to the layman.

Clearly, everything depends in a discussion of this kind on what we mean

by the word "matter." The author's definition is that it is anything which has location, but the definition does not seem very satisfactory. The ether of space, for instance, or a free electron, cannot be said to have location, yet the author includes both among material things. This point is fundamental, for since it is considered worth while to write a book to prove that facts on which all are agreed are better summarized under two words than under one, the question of precise definition of those words is the first which demands settlement. We cannot find that Professor Kapp has given sufficient care to this question. If he had, he might have written a short article instead of a book.

No one disputes that there is a difference between a living organism and a piece of dead matter. Most people agree also that there was a time when there were no living organisms on the Earth. If we ignore the possibility that living cells were somehow brought to the Earth from another part of space (which would merely transfer the essential problem elsewhere), we then have the question, How did dead matter become living? The answer must be: By a process which can be described in scientific terms or by one which cannot.

If we choose the latter alternative there is nothing more to be said. If we choose the former, then whether we define matter in terms which include the potentiality of its becoming alive, or in terms which require the postulation of some other scientifically defined concept to account for its becoming alive, is purely a matter of convenience. Arguments of the type which Professor Kapp uses to show that matter cannot become alive could have been used by a nineteenth-century chemist to prove that matter cannot be radioactive, but when radioactivity was discovered it was found convenient to modify our definition of the atom so as to make it either stable or unstable. It does not seem to be a matter of life or death which course it will be found better to follow when we learn enough to describe the origin of life.

Professor Kapp's book is interestingly written, but there are occasional unfair charges against his opponents and some carelessness in expression. Perhaps the worst example of the latter is the insistence that double determinateness is the characteristic feature of the organic world (p. 57), followed by the proof (p. 87) that "a machine is doubly determinate." We are surprised also to read of the "late E. F. Armstrong" and the "late J. B. S. Haldane." These gentlemen happily are still with us—one of them, in fact, is a colleague of Professor Kapp's—while "Clark Maxwell" (pp. 55, 242), so far as we know, never existed.

HERBERT DINGLE.

The Renaissance of Asia. (Lectures delivered under the auspices of the Committee on International Relations on the Los Angeles Campus of the University of California, 1939.) (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. 1941. Pp. x + 169. Price 9s.)

The movement now universally recognized as the awakening of Asia originally sprang from the Renaissance in Europe.

Six hundred years ago Europe awoke from the Middle Ages under a new impulse. The revival of letters was an intellectual movement which restored to life the rich humanity of Greece and Rome and released the mind of man from arid ecclesiastical tyranny. It brought with it the exhilaration of an untried freedom and the zest of an unlimited experiment; but it took the human soul from its station in a balanced and rounded scheme of things, to

deliver it over to every kind of danger and excess. The wonderful system of Catholic theology had given man his place in the universe; it taught him his duties, allowed for his weaknesses, and at all times exhibited him in so complex a scheme of fixed relations, mundane and celestial, extending beyond the very bounds of thought, that only a temper of absolute humility could carry the burden lightly or look without terror down those endless vistas of law and providence. From his servant's estate in this great polity he was released by the Renaissance, and became his own master in thought, free to design, build, and inhabit for himself. The enormous nature of the task, which is still in progress, did not at first oppress him; he was like a child out of school, trying his strength and resource in all kinds of fantastic and extravagant attempts. It was an age of new philosophies, new arts, new cults; none of them modest or sober, all full of the spirit of bravado, high-towering but not broad-based, erected as monuments to the skill and prowess of the individual. That arrogance and self-sufficiency of craft which by the men of the Renaissance was called virtue was found in a hundred guises

The warming sun of this new day awoke in Europe new energies; and, of all its results in human life, none was fraught with greater moment than the launching of enterprise overseas. Having affirmed anew his right to freedom and power, the European set out to explore the world, and in his many voyages he came to lands where the peoples could offer no effective resistance to his intrusion. In the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries the Portuguese, the English, the French, and the Dutch embarked on the discovery and exploitation of the East, and by the middle of the nineteenth century Britain had taken India, Holland the East Indies, while the Eastern empires of France and Portugal only failed to realize the ambitions of their founders because war in Europe had, especially for the French, deprived them of foreign territories which once seemed within their grasp. Meanwhile, Russia took the same easterly course by land and had reached the Pacific Ocean by the middle of the nineteenth century, Vladivostock being founded in 1861. The net result was that, when Queen Victoria was proclaimed Empress of India (1876), the East had felt the full weight of European power throughout the whole continent, and only one important manifestation of it was yet to come, in a very different form, in Japan.

If the spirit of adventure, lured by the magic of the East, was the original motive of this phenomenal expansion of Europe, trade became its permanent justification and led to political consequences which were not at first foreseen. Every extension of trade brought with it problems that lay beyond the ordinary scope of commerce. The mere exchange of goods demanded the creation of permanent European settlements on the coasts of Asia, and these in their turn provoked political difficulties with existing rulers. In practically every controversy of the kind the European Powers, in the end, resorted to force in order to secure satisfaction for their commerce. Wars in their turn brought new territories into European possession, and the pacification and settlement of these territories compelled the conquerors to set up a vast fabric of administration for the civilian government, the dispensing of justice, the economic exploitation, and the military defence of the countries concerned. The wealthy trading corporations of Amsterdam and London—each of them called the East India Company—ruled territories and amassed fortunes on a vast scale, acquiring such power and responsibility that eventually they had to be dispossessed by the Governments of Holland and Great Britain. Throughout the Indies, from Aden to Saigon, the process was carried relentlessly to its appointed end. In China it took a moderate course which left the territorial integrity of China practically intact, though the sovereignty

of the Chinese people was limited by a series of treaties in the nineteenth century. Even Japan felt something of the weight of the long arm of Europe, although alone of all the peoples of Asia, the Japanese learned the secret of power and put it to such good use that within one generation Japan blossomed into a State capable of meeting the West on its own terms.

Thus the instruments of Western civilization were brought wholesale to the Orient, and with them the ideas of which they were the symbols and the agents. They have since set up ferments of change throughout the East. The manifold effects wrought by European influence upon Asia since Vasco da Gama first sighted the shores of India (1498) are not yet in full blossom; but we can reckon them in the economic revolution embodied in railways, telegraphs, and factories; in the assault upon ancient tradition by modern education; in the endeavour to Christianize the Orient by religious missions; and in widespread political change. Each is significant in its own way, and it is idle to single any one as more profound than the others. They are ubiquitous in Asia, and have clearly wrought something more than superficial results. Nor are they to be dismissed as the triumph of materialism alone; for no organization of mere material forces could have launched the expansion of Europe, maintained it for five centuries, and given it such proof of innate power. Therefore those who proclaim the conquest of Asia as a victory of steel and gold, won by the rifle and machine-gun over obsolete arms, give a totally inadequate reason for this momentous event and miss its significance.

When the restless "Ocean Men"—to give the Europeans their earliest Chinese title—landed in Asia they carried with them something greater than the visible cargoes of their ships. Unwittingly, perhaps, they bore the message of European thought, the principles of science, the ideals of politics, and the teaching of the Bible. This invisible cargo, once brought on shore, acted like a leaven on minds little accustomed to such learning; and although the ferment grew but slowly, it worked with a power that far eclipsed visible victories of material things. Against an attack such as this, unexpected and persistent, the nations of the East offered a stubborn resistance, but their defence weakened as the attack grew in force, and one by one they fell before it. India, sustained by the enduring power of Hinduism, has never completely yielded; and beneath the political strife of to-day we can see a deeper struggle between tradition and the desire for change—a struggle which will be long maintained. China fell an easier victim because the country was already ripe for a change of domestic régime and possessed no last line of defence against novelty and change such as Hinduism gave to India. Japan capitulated deliberately, and accomplished a revolution in her own life as proof of her respect for the greater prestige of European ideals.

These were not the victories of force, though force was on the side of the victors. They were the triumphs of one mind over another, of a mind alive over a mind asleep. The most piercing weapons in the armoury of Europe were not of iron and steel; they were the invisible projectiles of the mind carrying explosive novelties of thought into the heart of the immobile East and blowing up the very foundations of her ancient life.

Some may doubt whether, in actual fact, the historic foundations of Asia have been radically disturbed. The future alone can tell. But this much is certain, that the ferment now described as a Renaissance is both psychological, economic, and political in its manifestations, and that the problem of the relation of East and West has thus taken a new form in our own time.

The Californian lectures now under review describe and analyse some of these manifestations. Professor Klingberg compresses India into some thirty short pages: a formidable endeavour in which he partially succeeds. He has

a competent, but somewhat lifeless, grasp of his subject. In the immediate political field he shows an appreciation, unusual in American commentators, of both sides of the political problem; and his hearers must surely have come away from that lecture hall in Los Angeles with a better appreciation of the British-Indian situation than they had before. But neither he, nor any of his collaborators, really get to grips with the actual issue in the contemporary relations of East and West. They move freely over its surface, but rarely reveal the depths beneath. It must therefore be said that the title of their collective lectures is a misnomer, because none of them attempts to interpret the inner meaning of Asia's Renaissance.

Granted this limitation, there is good stuff in this little book. We get from Professor Kerner, as we would expect, a rapid and revealing analysis of that Russian drive to the Orient which is one of the great factors in the history of the Far East. We find in Professor Steiner's estimate of the future of China, an equally pertinent, though less adequate analysis. But it is in Mr. Kazuo Kawai's diagnosis of the *Domestic Factors in Japanese Foreign Policy* that we find something which is worth all the rest of the book put together. In his thirty pages Mr. Kawai does more to reveal the inner drama of Japan than many others have done in whole books on the subject. There is, in his mind and in his expressive writing, a quality of expert knowledge and interpretation which makes him a welcome guide for those who would understand what Japan is doing and why she is doing it. And if this little volume contained nothing else than Mr. Kawai's expert examination of the interplay of Japanese domestic forces in determining the foreign action of the Japanese Government since 1931, we should give it the welcome it deserves. And his thesis will still have its own pertinence, whatever be the result of the conflict now raging in the Western Pacific Ocean.

But—and here I make my own insistent comment—despite the immediate value of much that this little volume contains, the Renaissance of Asia still awaits its authentic narrator. Scores of books on Asia have poured from the presses of Europe, America, and Asia in our time; but none, or very few, of them, have presented the essential picture and thesis of Asia's awakening and its relation to the Western World. Forty years ago, in a book now forgotten by all except the few *cognoscenti*, Meredith Townsend gave us, in his *Asia and Europe*, a picture of these two partners in world history, presented *sub specie aeternitatis*. To-day we need a similar, but more profound, interpretation of the same theme; for the relations of East and West, in our time, have a new importance as insistent as anything that is involved in the immense Civil War now raging in Europe.

A. F. Whyte.

Personalism and the Problem of Evil: A Study in the Personalism of Bowne, Knudson and Brightman. By Floyd Hiatt Ross. (New Haven: Yale University Press. London: Humphrey Milford. 1940. Pp. 51.) (No price quoted.)

This paper-backed pamphlet in the series Yale Studies in religion represents part of a Ph.D. thesis. As such, it deals with a restricted subject, but as it raises almost every aspect of the enigma of evil, it has an interest wider than might at first sight appear. The school of thought it studies has had considerable influence on the philosophy of religion in America, and to a lesser extent has made itself known in Europe. The problem of evil is by no means peculiar to Personalism, but as philosophy has always found it difficult

to accommodate God and man in the same universe, a Personalism which finds full rights for man, tends to limit God. This raises the inevitable test question of evil, How can Personalist thinkers deal with it? Dr. Ross gives a good account of the position of each of the three men his book deals with, especially Brightman, who adopts the idea of a finite God, and holds that the struggle with evil is an aspect of the struggle within the divine nature. This conception is open to manifest criticisms, but it is a bolder attempt than that of the two other philosophies reviewed, which, accepting the usual view of God as eternally complete and perfect, find evil insoluble. Dr. Ross's monograph is a fresh reminder that on a monistic and moral view of God, the issue of evil is inexplicable. A pluralistic view, by abandoning omnipotence, can postulate benevolence in God. Admittedly pluralism is contrary to our natural way of thinking of final things, but since small-scale physics has shown us that the nature of the physical universe does not adapt itself to such ways, why must the nature of God? In short, the problem of pain can be solved in practice, as the patience of the saints proves. It can be met in theory, but only at the cost of abandoning the traditional ideas of an omnipotent and absolute God, and, with Alexander, placing perfection at the end rather than at the beginning. Dr. Ross has left little to be said on the limited field he explores, and his well-documented survey makes it easy for anyone who wishes to follow up the particular issue, whilst those who are interested in the greater issue involved will find this little book by no means unsuggestive.

E. S. Waterhouse.

Leibniz's Unknown Correspondence with English Scholars and Men of Letters. By Raymond Klibansky. Reprinted from *Mediaeval and Renaissance Studies.* (London: The Warburg Institute. 1941. Pp. 17.)

In this brief article Dr. Klibansky draws attention to the unpublished correspondence between Leibniz and Oxford scholars to be found in the Bodleian Library, and what he calls an "unexpected store" of letters in the British Museum, by which I gatber he does not mean, "not to be found in the printed catalogues of manuscripts issued by the British Museum." He had hoped to publish this correspondence, but the times are not ripe, and he intends instead to give in the near future a list of the material, beginning with that in the Bodleian. Apart from these announcements, the present article gives some account of the attitude of Leibniz toward England, drawn partly from unpublished MSS. in England and in Hanover, but largely from material already published.

In Appendix I he prints two letters, the first being from Joseph Addison to Leibniz. This letter, which is in the Library at Hanover, is included in the recent edition of the *Letters of Addison* made by Walter Graham (p. 119). Mr. Graham remarks that on this letter in an unidentified hand is the note, "In the year 1708 as appears by the Answer of Mr. Leibniz," and in a footnote says that the "answer" has not been found. It is part of this answer that Dr. Klibansky prints as the second letter in his appendix: although he does not give the source, I take it that it too is in the library in Hanover. Dated October 5, 1708, it is of extraordinary interest and appropriateness to-day. Put "Hitler" for "Louis XIV" and "Germany" for "France," and much of what Leibniz says could have been written to-day. In Appendix II Dr. Klibansky indicates the main documents (already published) illustrating Leibniz's efforts to come to England as Historiographer Royal.

L. J. Russell.

PHILOSOPHY

A History of Modern Philosophy. By WILLIAM KELLY WRIGHT. (New York: The Macmillan Company. 1941. Pp. ix + 634. Price 17s. 6d. net.)

This substantial volume is intended to introduce the history of post-medieval "occidental" philosophy to college students and others with little or no previous knowledge of the subject. The author has some ability as an expositor, and his summaries are reasonably accurate considering the scope of the work. Nevertheless, the book makes dreary reading, and one ventures to think that it will not produce many philosophers. The cause of the author's failure lies in his misconceiving his chief purpose. He seems to think it of primary importance to present the thought of past philosophers without showing partisanship, and with the minimum of criticism. Every great philosopher has had what he calls valuable "insights" into the nature of things, and these must be communicated to the reader. This would be well enough if philosophy were a kind of religion, behind the wranglings of whose different sects the convert must be taught to see an underlying agreement about dogma. But philosophy is not a religion, and if philosophers are united it is not in dogma but in spirit. For this reason the first duty of a historian of philosophy is to discuss his subject in a critical manner and examine its problems as living issues, with a view to showing his readers how to think for themselves. It cannot be said that Mr. Wright has made much progress towards this end. Hardly a single philosophical problem gets adequate discussion in his book, and many vital questions (e.g. the problem of the scope of philosophy and its divisions) are passed over altogether. By reading this book the student will increase his stock of big ideas; but he will not improve his ability to evaluate them.

W. H. WALSH.

Can We Keep the Faith? By JAMES BISSETT PRATT. (New Haven: Yale University Press. London: Humphrey Milford, Oxford University Press. 1941. Pp. vi + 218. Price 16s. 6d.)

In the early days of the present century when James, Starbuck and Coe were rousing religious and psychological circles, both somewhat sceptical of the fact, to the existence of a psychology of religion, Dr. J. B. Pratt published his *Psychology of Religious Belief*, a book which made a definite contribution to the subject. Since then he has written some half-dozen books, each of which has given fresh ground for regarding him as an impartial assessor of the merits of both Christian and non-Christian religion, and a competent psychologist. His last book comes, therefore, with good omens, and its subject is exactly indicated by the title, which is no catchphrase to attract the casual reader, but a plain question to which is given a candid answer. A brief outline of the road over which Dr. Pratt takes us will show better than anything else the scope of the book. First he asks what his title means, and decides that it must refer to the great general tradition of Christianity not to any attempt to embody that tradition in creeds or formulae. He goes on to warn the complacent that it is by no means certain that the Christian faith must last for ever. If Dr. Watts sang that Jesus should reign where'er the sun doth his successive journeys run, the New Testament does not say so. It asks if the Son of Man shall find faith on the earth? Other religions in plenty have died.

From this Dr. Pratt proceeds to give the bulk of the book to a careful examination of what is meant by the faith, refusing the dogmatism which unchurches all who do not accept the orthodox creed, and also the like dogmatism which insists that this or that doctrine must be abandoned if Chris-

tianity is to live. The concluding chapters are on "Can We Keep the Faith?" which question is answered by saying "We can if we will," and "Shall We Keep the Faith?" The answer is that if it be not true we should not want to keep it: if it is true we cannot lose it. Last comes a chapter headed "But If Not." The capacity for idealism, the desire to worship would remain, and we have already had reminder that they can be attached to militant Nationalism, to Militarism, Fascism, and Nazism. These doctrines of the Devil are the alternative, and their only rival would be Metaphysical Materialism or Ethical Humanism, both utterly unable to resist. Men do not die for either, but they will die for Nationalism. Dr. Pratt does not think that Christianity will die, but he does well to remind us of the alternative. Altogether this is a wise and welcome book, and anyone who is interested by the title will not fail to be even more interested by the contents.

E. S. Waterhouse.

Ethics and Social Policy. By Wayne A. R. Leys, Ph.D. Prentice Hall. (New York: 1941. Pp. xiii + 522. Price $4.00.)

The purpose of this book is "to make the principles of ethical criticism accessible and intelligible to people who must evaluate public policies and personal plans of conduct." This is a praiseworthy aim; but unfortunately the book has more of the vices than the virtues of a characteristically American approach. Determined to be relevant to current life and its problems, the author gives us a number of detailed and often very interesting factual accounts of such matters as the relations between capital and labour in the U.S.A., social experimentalism, medical ethics, the leadership principle; but he fails to allow himself enough sustained and penetrating theoretical discussion to afford a clear view either of his own or of other ethical theories. His own position is apparently "ethical relativism"; but his style is such that one can never see the wood for the trees. Relativism, the theory that ethical principles are relative to human purposes at work in a particular environment, came as a healthy reaction against the simple moralism of the churches; but to-day the need is for something more positive. Dr. Leys writes in the mood of nineteenth-century liberalism, which, vaunting its tolerance, treated all purposes as of equal worth. In this view what is desirable is simply the harmonious fulfilment of as many extant purposes as possible, in such a way as to afford the greatest happiness to the greatest number. This view has played into the hands of "appeasers" and "non-interventionists," and has thus contributed to a violent reaction toward false but positive ethical principles, such as those of Nazism.

Olaf Stapledon.

Democracy: the Threatened Foundations. By Reginald Lennard. (Cambridge University Press. 1941. Pp. x + 121. Price 3s. 6d.)

Democracy is challenged in this war as it never was in the last. Imperial Germany threatened to upset the balance of power in Europe and to destroy the British Empire, and its Government was too autocratic for our liking; but the Kaiser did not make the frontal assault on our position which has been made by his successors. For it is not merely individual democracies, or even the idea of democratic government, which are menaced by National Socialism: what is now threatened (and the fact has become more and more clear with the progress of the war) is the whole set of principles and ideas

which constitute what may be called the liberal conception of life. The present is a testing time for democracy, understood both in its more narrowly political sense and in its wider ethical signification.

If we are to defend democracy against all attacks, open and covert alike, it is essential that we have a clear grasp of its foundations. Because of that alone we have reason to be grateful to Mr. Lennard, whose unpretentious little book should at least stimulate thought where it is most needed. But it would be ungracious to give the impression that the book is only valuable as a starting-point. The truth is rather that Mr. Lennard has written an exposition of the foundations of democracy which is at least as good as anything else available on the subject. There is hardly a page of his book which does not contain some shrewd observation or effective argument; and one cannot but admire the economy and ease with which he makes his points. The general approach is political and historical: it is democracy as we know it in this country, and democracy principally as a form of government, that Mr. Lennard sets out to analyse. For that reason he discusses such subjects as the spirit and history of English democracy, as well as the attitude of democrats to war and education. The method has obvious advantages: by keeping the reader's attention all the time directed to historical facts, Mr. Lennard is able to lay full emphasis on the achievements democracy already has to its credit. And it cannot be said that in so doing he altogether neglects the abstract principles which lie behind those achievements. Yet it may be questioned whether at times—in his first chapter, for instance, where there is an enterprising analysis of Lincoln's famous definition of democracy, and towards the end of the book, where totalitarian conceptions of the state and society are combated—his discussion of these abstract principles is altogether satisfactory. Philosophical readers at least would have welcomed a more lengthy treatment of the ethical foundations of democracy; and again, if these had been brought more into the foreground, the general picture might have been truer and more satisfying. But it would be a mistake to neglect what Mr. Lennard has achieved because of what he has passed over. As things are, he has performed a very useful service; and if philosophers ask for more, he can reply that it is up to them to produce it.

W. H. Walsh.

Poetry Monads and Society. By Hunayun Kabir (University of Calcutta. 1941.)

The author of these suggestive lectures on aesthetics, delivered originally at the University of Madras, has worked out a theory of art which he applies only to poetry. He spends several chapters showing that the function of poetry is not to give pleasure, to disseminate knowledge, to improve character, to divert, or to promote psychological health. But it is questionable whether such theories have not already been effectively refuted.

His positive contribution is of real value. He describes artistic experience as standing in isolation from all other forms of experience, and regards the artist as a man who is interested in the individual and unique aspect of things. His analogy with the Leibnitzian "monad" should not, however, be pressed too far, because the "monad" has no external relations, whereas a work of art is always related to an appreciative or creative mind. But the emphasis on individuality and uniqueness is sound. The other aspect of art which he regards as no less essential is, in fact, a relation: the communicative relationship between an artist and his audience.

The publication and communication of experience give the material work

of art its *raison d'être*. In this way the poet transcends his private and personal experience, and adds something to a common cultural heritage. It would have been interesting if the writer had followed up his exploration of the relation between subject and object by an analysis of poetry itself and its numerous branches, lyrical, narrative, and dramatic, classical and romantic, tragic and comic: but perhaps he will give us another instalment of his views on this subject.

LISTOWEL.

The Life and Philosophy of Johann Gottfried Herder. By F. McEACHRAN (Oxford: Clarendon Press. 98 pp. 7s. 6d.)

The book contains a brief account of Herder's life, a summary of his principal works, and an interpretation of his philosophical and aesthetic theories, seen against the background of Western European and German thought. On the whole, the author has been more successful in showing the various strands of earlier and contemporary speculation that are woven into the texture of Herder's philosophy, than in defining the particular pattern which these elements assume in his work. The account thus remains somewhat superficial and hardly constitutes an independent analysis of Herder's philosophy.

Herder, of whom Goethe said that "the more one loved him the more one had to keep away from him, in order not to be provoked into killing him," was unfortunate not only on account of his neurotic temperament, but also on account of the character and the limitations of his genius. His chief contribution to modern thought is a new conception of history. Comprising the process of cosmic evolution as well as the development of mankind, history was to Herder the manifestation of God's all-present creative power. In his *Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit*, Herder made the ambitious attempt of compiling a Universal History, starting with the genesis of the solar system, going on to the formation of the earth, and culminating in the development of mankind and its differentiation into national groups as a result of the geographic and climatic conditions of their environment.

Against some recent attempts to interpret Herder's emphasis on the natural and, to him, desirable differences between nations as the beginning of National-Socialist racialism, (an error not shared by Mr. McEachran), it must be said that if Herder conceived folk-groups as biological units this does not imply that they were rigidly separated from each other. On the contrary, with Herder as with Goethe (see the *Metamorphose der Pflanzen*), it is just the "unity in the manifold," the infinite adaptability and variability of the *one* form that characterizes natural genesis. This is why Herder rejected the term "race" in its application to the branches of the human species: it seemed to indicate a plurality of original types and to be irreconcilable with the idea of the common origin of humanity. On the fundamental biological unity of mankind and the natural law of evolution from lower to higher forms Herder based his postulate of a development towards the goal of perfect *Humanität*. On this concept which comprises all the nuances of the human, the humane, the humanist, and the humanitarian, turns the whole of his philosophy. Vague as it is, it is always charged with an intensity of emotion which reflects Herder's affinity with the ideas of the French revolution. If some writers of the following generation distorted isolated elements of his thought into a nationalistic interpretation of history, this is a mood alien to Herder himself whose work is tempered with eighteenth-century tolerance, deepened, if anything, by his new valuation of the individual.

Above all, nations were to him no "monads without windows." They express themselves in language and poetry, and their utterances can be understood in their very individuality by those who have learnt the art of empathy (*Einfühlung*). This is the guiding spirit that motivates Herder's innumerable translations from nearly all European and Oriental languages. To understand and to interpret mankind in all its geographic and historical diversity is an essential part of the concept of and the education towards *Humanität*.

Herder's essay *Ueber den Ursprung der Sprache* was the first attempt of a "genetic" explanation of linguistic phenomena. Here again he is at pains to prove that the greatest possible differentiation can be accounted for on the basis of an assumption of the fundamental unity of all human language, "the great Proteus."

His literary criticism, too, is dominated by the tendency of viewing phenomena primarily as manifestations of the creative power behind them. He therefore judged poetry not by external standards of fixed canons, but according to the energy with which a particular human feeling was expressed.

Herder's tragedy was that he lacked both original creative powers and true philosophical penetration. He was a translator and critic of genius, but his own poems are mediocre. On the other hand, his theoretical speculation often suffers from a tendency to rash and facile synthesis. As Goethe said, "Herder . . . always wanted to reach his aim quickly, and got hold of the general idea, when I had hardly come to grips with the perception (Anschauung)." It may have been partly the disproportion between his receptive sensibility and his actual productivity which gradually warped Herder's character and was responsible for the censorious, nagging attitude which wrecked all his friendships and ruined the last years of his life.

Mr. McEachran rightly points out that one of the most characteristic terms of Herder's vocabulary is "Wirkung." The meaning of this word fluctuates between "energy," "activity," "effect," "influence." It denotes a turn of mind which views every phenomenon in terms of energies—those that created it, as well as those to which it gives rise; it presupposes always communication of some sort— a giving and taking, a speaking and hearing, a creative mind that expresses itself and one that responds to its influence. Herder himself, though not substantially a great man, was great in his "Wirkung," in the first place through the decisive influence he had on Goethe, but also through the new stimulus he gave to philosophy and to all branches of historical and linguistic studies in Germany.

There are some minor errors which should be corrected. On p. 61 Mr. McEachran states that after the clash between Goethe and the Herders in 1795, caused by Caroline Herder's unreasonable financial demands on the Duke, "the relations . . . came to an end for ever." This has to be qualified in so far as in fact Goethe and Herder did meet once again at Jena on Goethe's initiative and in the absence of Frau Herder "whose obstinate sparrow's brain was responsible for everything." Also there exist a number of short letters from Goethe to Herder written between 1795 and 1803; some of them are mere business notes, but others are not without a certain wistful warmth of feeling, especially the one, written in 1802, in which Goethe thanked his "old friend" for his willingness "to introduce my son into the Christian community in a more liberal fashion than tradition prescribes"; Herder was to confirm August Goethe. The letter ends, "receive him kindly, and arrange everything according to your liking, *indem Du meiner gedenkst.*"

In his summary of the *Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit* Mr. McEachran does not always bring out the real trend of Herder's argument.

According to his account (p. 71), "Herder feels it was good that such a noble race as the Germans (rather than Huns or Bulgars) occupied the territories of the Roman Empire." Apart from the fact that Herder would have objected to this use of the term race, this account of the passage removed from its original context falsifies his meaning. Referring to the "Migration of the Nations" at the beginning of the Middle Ages, Herder said:

"The historian of mankind should beware of making a favourite of one nation and of thus belittling those tribes to whom conditions denied luck and fame. From the Slav, too, has the German learnt; Celts and Letts might have become Greeks, had their positions among nations been different. We may be quite satisfied that nations of such beautiful, strong and noble disposition (*Bildung*) as the Germanic tribes were, occupied the Roman world and not Huns or Bulgars, but to think them for this reason to be the elect people of God in Europe, who possessed an aristocratic birthright to own the world, and to whom on account of this superiority other peoples were destined to serve—this would be the ignoble arrogance of barbarians."

LOTTE LABOWSKY.

Books received also:—

L. M. RUSSELL. *The Path to Reconstruction.* A brief introduction to Albert Schweitzer's *Philosophy of Civilization.* London: Messrs. A. & C. Black Ltd. 1942. Pp. 12 + 68. 3s. 6d.

PROCEEDINGS OF THE ARISTOTELIAN SOCIETY. New Series, Vol. XLI. London: Harrison and Sons Ltd. 1941. Pp. 174. 25s.

MICHAEL B. FOSTER. *Plato to Machiavelli* (Masters of Political Thought, Vol. I). London: George G. Harrap & Co. Ltd. 1942. Pp. 294. 10s. 6d. net.

E. PICKWORTH FARROW. *A Practical Method of Self-Analysis.* London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd. 1942. Pp. xv + 153. 6s. net.

SIR WILLIAM CECIL DAMPIER. *A History of Science* (Third Edition, Revised and enlarged). Cambridge University Press. 1942. Pp. xxiii + 574. 25s. net.

ERNEST CHAMPNESS. *Adult Schools: A Study in Pioneering.* The Religious Education Press. 1941. Pp. 79. 1s. 6d. net.

DR. HILDA D. OAKELEY. *Should Nations Survive?* London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd. 1942. Pp. xi + 146. 6s. net.

ANDREW J. KRZESINSKI. *Is Modern Culture Doomed?* New York: The Devin-Adair Co. 1942. Pp. xiv + 158. $2.00.

CHARLES BERG, M.D., D.P.M. *War in the Mind: The Case Book of a Medical Psychologist.* London: The Macaulay Press. 1941. Pp. 272. 8s. 6d.

Sweden Speaks (ed. Gustaf Witting, trans. by Edith M. Nielsen). London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd. 1942. Pp. 212. 8s. 6d.

KARL OTTEN. *A Combine of Aggression: Masses, Elite, and Dictatorship in Germany.* Trans. by Eden Paul and F. M. Field. London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd. 1942. Pp. viii + 356. 15s.

RUTH NANDA ANSHEN (Editor). *Freedom: Its Meaning.* London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd. 1942. Pp. 335. 16s. net.

PROCEEDINGS OF THE AMERICAN CATHOLIC PHILOSOPHICAL ASSOCIATION: Vol. XVII, *Philosophy and Order.* Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America. 1942. Pp. 204. $2.

RICHARD B. BRANDT. *The Philosophy of Schleiermacher.* New York: Harper & Brothers. 1941. Pp. viii + 350. $3.00.

INSTITUTE NOTES

On Friday, May 15th, Dr. A. C. Ewing of Cambridge University gave a lecture at the Institute, entitled "Democracy"; while on Friday, June 19th, Professor H. J. Paton, Corpus Christi College, Oxford, lectured on "Justice among Nations."

Notice of the Annual General Meeting will be sent to members in due course.

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THE BRITISH INSTITUTE OF PHILOSOPHY

Appeal for New Members and Donations

THE Council appeals to members to do all in their power to introduce new members in order to extend the benefits of the Institute and to increase its revenue.

The Institute has no endowments, and its work, which includes lecture courses and meetings for discussion in the various Centres, as well as the conduct of the JOURNAL, cannot be carried on from revenue derived solely from subscriptions of £1 1s. per annum. The Council, therefore, appeals for donations, small or large, from sympathizers with the Institute's aims.

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